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THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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

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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics, and international affairs.

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Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (ISSN 0032-3295, E-ISSN 1538-165X) is published by the Academy of Political Science, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274; (212) 870-2500; fax: (212) 870-2202; aps@psqonline.org. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy.

Regular membership: one year, $47; two years, $85; three years, $113; student, $32 a year. Libraries and institutions $249 a year for a combined subscription to the print and electronic versions. Periodicals postage paid at New York, NY and additional mailing offices. Foreign postage is $8 surface or $32 air mail additional per year. Volume 118 Number 4, Winter 2003–04. Special membership: contributing, $75; fellow, $150; patron, $250; benefactor, $1,000. *Contributions are tax deductible.* Credit cards accepted: American Express, MasterCard, and Visa.

Manuscripts, books for review, and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274. Correspondence about advertising and reprint permission should be addressed to Loren Morales Kando, Business Manager, the Academy of Political Science, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274; fax: (212) 870-2202.

PREPARATION OF ARTICLE MANUSCRIPTS: *PSQ* is a fully refereed journal. Manuscripts and footnotes should be double-spaced throughout in 12 point type and submitted in triplicate with a 200 word abstract. Two of the copies should be prepared for blind refereeing. Place all tables, figures, and notes at the end of manuscript. Manuscripts over 40 pages will not be refereed.

PUBLISHED INDICES: A title page and an index of articles and book reviews appears in the Winter issue of *PSQ*. *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* lists articles from 1886 to 1953 and *The Social Science Index* has articles dating from 1953 to the present. Articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci*, *The International Bibliography of Political Science*, and the *Public Affairs Information Services Bulletin*. Articles are abstracted in *United States Political Science Documents*, *The International Political Science Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, *Urban Affairs Abstracts*, *Political Science Abstracts*, *America: History and Life*, and *Lancaster Index*. Book reviews are listed in *The Book Review Digest to Social Science Periodicals*, *Book Review Index*, and *Book Review Digest*.

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Postmaster—send address changes to Political Science Quarterly, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274.

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

Visit our Website at http://www.psqonline.org

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

ANDREW FLIBBERT explores the weapons proliferation pressures that have long confronted Iraq. He argues that the logic of the security dilemma may one day lead Baghdad to renew its efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Democratization, responsible leadership, or a continued American military presence are unlikely to eliminate Iraq's quest for the deadliest weapons in a dangerous regional environment that covets Iraq's oil reserves.

STEVEN KULL, CLAY RAMSAY, and EVAN LEWIS examine the prevalence of misperceptions related to the Iraq war among the American public: that weapons of mass destruction and evidence of close links between Iraq and al Qaeda had been found and that world public opinion approved of the United States going to war with Iraq. Such misperceptions were powerful predictors of support for the war, and their prevalence varied dramatically according to respondents' primary source of news.

JOHN R. PETROCIK, WILLIAM L. BENOIT, and GLENN J. HANSEN analyze the nomination acceptance addresses and television advertising spots of presidential candidates from 1952 through 2000 in order to determine whether the candidates pursued issue-ownership strategies. The authors conclude that they did, that the issue emphases of the candidates are echoed by the weight that voters assign to those issues in their judgments about the candidates, and that the media may be less influential than the candidates themselves in priming the issue concerns of the voters.

ORLANDO J. PÉREZ uses public opinion surveys to investigate how crime victimization affects public attitudes toward democracy. The article focuses on the cases of El Salvador and Guatemala. Across the developing countries, fear of crime and perceptions of social disorder are widespread. The failure of the state and its public order and criminal justice institutions to respond adequately and to provide protection and basic security may threaten democratic development. The fear of becoming a victim of crime significantly reduces support for democracy, increases support for authoritarian measures, and lowers confidence in the police and the political system.

MICHAEL NELSON and JOHN LYMAN MASON employ case studies of Mississippi and Georgia to explore the recent spread of legalized gambling in the South. Their research affirms the value of the prevailing theories of state policy innovation while suggesting several refinements, particularly in diffusion theory. They also draw attention to the sometimes-neglected importance of state constitutions and electoral politicians in the policy innovation process.

STEPHEN J. WAYNE reviews three books that address recent trends in voting behavior and their impact on the role of parties in government and on presidential-congressional relations.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

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After Saddam: Regional Insecurity, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Proliferation Pressures in Postwar Iraq

ANDREW FLIBBERT

The U.S. government's decision to go to war with Iraq was premised on the credible claim that a brutal and unpredictable ruler like Saddam Hussein had to be prevented from developing or retaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD). While some congressional moderates hoped to constrain Iraq's military capability through muscular inspections and close UN supervision, the Bush administration contended that removing Saddam was the best and, ultimately, the only effective course of action. Accordingly, despite global opposition and the UN Security Council's refusal to sanction military intervention, the United States fought a six-week war in March and April 2003, deposing the regime with considerable ease. In the war's aftermath, security has been slow to return to the country, U.S. troops had difficulty locating Saddam and his top advisers, continued guerrilla-style resistance has plagued the American occupation, democracy has proven elusive, and no substantial stockpile of WMD or production facilities have been uncovered. The latter problem, more than any other, has led to new debates over the war's justification, as war supporters and opponents alike continue to question the imminence of the threat to American interests underpinning administration claims and U.S. actions.[1]

[1] The administration's five major public justifications for the war included 1) claims of Iraq's continued possession and development of weapons of mass destruction in violation of UN Security Council resolutions; 2) the regime's purported ties to al Qaeda; 3) Saddam's brutal rule and gross violations of human rights; 4) the promotion of democracy in the Middle East; and 5) the improvement of Arab-Israeli relations.

ANDREW FLIBBERT is visiting professor of political science at Trinity College and an adjunct professor of politics at New York University.

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Aside from concern over the politicization and manipulation of intelligence, the major challenge to international security after the war is not simply ascertaining the extent of Iraqi weapons or production facilities. There is little doubt that Iraq once had active nuclear, chemical, and biological programs that would have yielded usable weapons sooner or later. A greater concern is the likelihood that future Iraqi leaders will seek WMD because of the underlying regional pressures for proliferation. U.S. or international efforts to prevent a post-Saddam Iraq from seeking WMD may well prove chimeric, perhaps even impossible in the long run. Removing the Iraqi dictator may have been desirable and even necessary, but it is far from sufficient to end the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iraq. Without a fundamental transformation of the regional security environment, too many incentives will drive any future sovereign Iraqi state to seek nuclear and other WMD. Most of the underlying causes of Iraq's pursuit of WMD remain in place today, and nothing is likely to change this continuing reality. The war launched by the United States could generate the greatest proliferation pressure of all.

The proliferation problem will be only a minor concern in the short and medium term, for it is unlikely that a capacious and independent Iraqi state will re-emerge any time in the coming decade. In fact, there is no reliable guarantee against the long-term disappearance of centralized state authority or Iraq's permanent fragmentation, both of which would preclude a serious weapons program. Even if a new Iraqi government manages to consolidate power and extend its authority beyond Baghdad, it will face the enormous task of reconstructing the country and reconfiguring a viable and supportive social coalition, whether democratic or authoritarian in nature. The United States has a vital, publicly declared interest in preventing the resumption of all prohibited weapons programs. Discoveries of hidden weapons caches or dual-use facilities are possible, but a decade of UN inspections have apparently succeeded in eliminating the lion's share of Iraq's banned programs and will prevent the thousands of Iraqi scientists and engineers from restarting their work any time soon.

In the coming years, however, circumstances are sure to change. This article examines why such change is likely to favor the eventual resumption of Iraqi proliferation efforts. First, the article describes and critiques the decade-long overemphasis on personalistic (first-image) analytical perspectives that have dominated popular, official, and some scholarly thinking about Iraq's drive for WMD.[2] Second, it details the domestic and international incentives propelling Iraqi proliferation and discusses their historical, strategic, and geographic impetus. Third, it shows how Iraq's security dilemma underpins its pursuit of a deterrent capability and how actions by the United States have proven unhelpful and even counterproductive in this domain. Subsequently, it assesses the

[2] First-image theorizing focuses analytically on decision making by state leaders and generally leaves aside the domestic and international sources of policy. See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

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major counterarguments: the claim that proliferation in general is either unproblematic or can be stopped militarily, or the alternative claim that democratization, enlightened leadership, or a continued American military presence will eliminate Iraq's quest for weapons. Finally, it concludes that regional conflict resolution is the only viable way to reduce the proliferation pressures that otherwise are sure to affect Iraqi military policies after Saddam.

The Place of Personality

Much of the current thinking about Iraq and weapons proliferation reflects a vital legacy of the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf crisis: the personalization of U.S.-Iraqi relations that emerged at the very outset of that crisis. In August 1990, President George H. W. Bush by all accounts was deeply offended by what he saw as a betrayal by Saddam's regime—its invasion of Kuwait—especially after he had sought to fend off congressional critics of Iraq and had worked to maintain good relations with the regime.[3] This anger translated into a domestic political strategy intended to mobilize popular support for the war to "liberate Kuwait" by personalizing the conflict and invoking Saddam's existential threat to American values and interests.[4] President George H. W. Bush was among the first to compare Saddam with Hitler, beginning in Fall 1990. Political analysts, pundits, and government officials thus began to refer to the need to "disarm Saddam," emphasizing his personal idiosyncrasies and psychological attributes as if these qualities were central to regional and global security.[5] In the subsequent decade, this personalistic approach was evident in the perpetuation of the Saddam-as-Hitler analogy, which assumed that Saddam came from a dangerous but rare breed of tyrants and that ousting him in conjunction with minimal democratic reforms would eliminate the threat and start a favorable political chain reaction in the Middle East.

Certainly, analytical attention to state leaders' personalities and decision-making proclivities is essential when explaining their behavior in high-pressure

[3] See Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991) and George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Vintage Books, 1998).

[4] In building international coalition support, the administration's strategy was less personalistic, emphasizing both *realpolitik* (regional balancing) and Iraq's violation of international law. In President Bush's 29 January 1991 State of the Union address, he highlighted the latter when referring to "the long-held promise of a new world order, where brutality will go unrewarded and aggression will meet collective resistance."

[5] Examples of excessive analytical personalization include Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In," *International Security* 25 (Spring 2001): 107–146; Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, "Why Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait," *Survival* 33 (January/February 1991): 18–30; Laurie Mylroie, "Why Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait," *Orbis* 36 (Winter 1993): 123–134; Elaine Sciolino, *The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis* (New York: Wiley, 1991); and Judith Miller and Laurie Mylroie, *Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf* (New York: Random House, 1990). See also Andrew Parasiliti's brief response to the Byman and Pollack piece: "The First Image Revisited," *International Security* 26 (Fall 2001): 166–169.

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international crises or their making of flagrant blunders in foreign policy. First-image theories of decision making can illuminate those moments when leaders' specific choices have immediate and substantial consequences.[6] Yet, the problems of war and peace reflect more than the choices of a handful of influential personalities, just as ensuring regional security requires more than simply removing a malevolent dictator. Even the most personalistic regimes rest on broader foundations that shape and constrain state action in foreign policy, as second- and third-image theorizing have long acknowledged.[7] In the Iraqi case, U.S. officials' obsession with Saddam all but ignored the domestic pressures and geostrategic imperatives that drive Iraq's actions. They disregarded the fact that Saddam was as much a consequence as a cause of regional insecurity and failed to contend with the more fundamental questions: What were the conditions that created and sustained such an awful regime? Why was Saddam so intent on obtaining WMD? Are his successors likely to do the same thing? International security imperatives suggest that they might.

Domestic and International Incentives

Iraq's incentive to acquire WMD stems from the chronic insecurity of the region and the inherent danger faced by a state that is artificially constructed, ethnically diverse, religiously divided, rich in natural resources, and nearly landlocked. Troubled regional relations affect both domestic and international politics. Domestically, such insecurity often brings out the worst in leaders by creating justifications for despotism, undermining civil society, and distorting the economy. Wartime national security concerns erode civil liberties even in democracies, shifting resources toward defense and permitting previously unthinkable state repression.[8] In international politics, the consequences are much more straightforward: nuclear bombs in a conflict-ridden area lead almost inexorably to the demand for more bombs, no matter who is in charge of any given

[6] For a review of psychological approaches to international relations theory, see J.M. Goldgeier and Philip Tetlock, "Psychology and International Relations Theory," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 67–92; and Jerel A. Rosati, "The Power of Human Cognition in the Study of World Politics," *International Studies Review* 2 (2000): 45–75. See also Stanley A. Renshon and Deborah Welch Larson, eds., *Good Judgment in Foreign Policy: Theory and Application* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). For an older, important account of decision making and the level-of-analysis problem, see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[7] The domestic (second image) and international (third image) influences on foreign policy apply to both democracies and authoritarian regimes and include questions of security and political economy. See Waltz, *Man, the State, and War.*

[8] While focused initially on political economy, the literature on domestic–international interaction began largely with Peter Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978); and Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed," *International Organization* 32 (Autumn 1978): 881–911. A valuable contribution to this research agenda for the Middle East is Steven Heydemann, ed., *War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000).

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state.[9] Without a higher authority to regulate the behavior of sovereign states, arms races are all but inevitable, especially in tumultuous regions with poorly developed institutional mechanisms to control conflict.[10] There may be additional, domestic-level causes of nuclear proliferation, but regional insecurity can be sufficient in itself.[11]

It is no wonder that Iraq has sought nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Carved in a famously arbitrary manner out of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq has clashed with every single one of its six immediate neighbors since gaining independence from Great Britain in 1932.[12] It also has lost multiple confrontations with more powerful adversaries, including two recent wars with the United States in 1991 and 2003, an air strike by Israel on its nuclear facilities in 1981, and military conquest and occupation by Britain in 1919 and 1941. These conflicts were just the latest in a history brimming with both great achievement and periodic military catastrophe for local rulers. The Abbasid Caliph founded Baghdad in 762 and laid the foundations for the Golden Age of classical Islam. But the Caliphate in Baghdad eventually declined, suffered a devastating invasion, and was sacked in 1258 by Mongol forces under Hulagu, the grandson of Genghis Khan. The area between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, where Iraq lies, is the birthplace of civilization—where writing was invented—but for Iraqis this source of pride comes with an awareness of countless political struggles and military campaigns over several millennia. Its complex society has absorbed an extraordinary range of foreign influences as Arab, Persian, Turkish, Mongol, European, and now American invaders have dominated the region.[13]

[9] This position represents a "defensive" realist view. In general, see Benjamin Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," *Security Studies* 2 (Spring–Summer 1993): 37–65 and Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," *Security Studies* 4 (Spring 1995): 463–519. For an alternative "offensive" realist conceptualization, see John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). The distinction between offensive and defensive realism is discussed in Glenn H. Snyder, "Mearsheimer's World—Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay," *International Security* 27 (Summer 2002): 149–173.

[10] Debates over the consequences of anarchy in international relations are ongoing. For more on the connection between anarchy and arms races, see Charles L. Glaser, "The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races," *Annual Review of Political Science* 3 (2000): 251–276. On the centrality of security institutions under anarchy, see David A. Lake, "Beyond Anarchy: The Importance of Security Institutions," *International Security* 26 (Summer 2001): 129–160.

[11] I do not claim that domestic-level (institutional, bureaucratic, political economy) or individual-level explanations for nuclear proliferation are untenable. To the contrary, a state's decision to go nuclear may have international or domestic sources, depending on the particular circumstances. We may not have enough cases to make solid generalizations, but the realist paradigm suggests at least one certainty about the likelihood of proliferation. Other certainties remain to be determined.

[12] Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958* (London: I.B. Taurus, 1990); and Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985).

[13] For an overview of the region's history, see Arthur Goldschmidt, *A Concise History of the Middle East*, 7th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002).

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If Iraqis today have a long historical memory for such events, this is not due to an inherent cultural inclination to dwell on the past. It is the result of decades of state policy in which the Baathist regime and its predecessors have tried to construct a uniquely Iraqi national identity by highlighting the region's epic struggles with foreign invaders. In the 1980s, for example, this strategy included frequent reference to the Iran–Iraq war as "Saddam's *Qadisiyya*," invoking the well-known Arab victory over the Persians in 637. For more than three decades, the state also used Iraq's Mesopotamian heritage to tap into the country's celebrated ancient past, cultivating a narrower, patriotic identity to complement the broader currents of Arab nationalism.[14] After 1990, the regime shifted away from secular leftist rhetoric and toward Islamic discourse, selecting bellicose passages from the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* to frame Iraq's confrontation with foreign powers.[15] This use of the past represents a typical legitimation and mobilizational strategy for building national identities, similar to any other political actor's cultivation of historical myth to further contemporary objectives. Such efforts certainly are not exclusive to authoritarian regimes; it does not take a dictator to realize their benefits in any realm requiring communal or national solidarity.[16]

This use of history, however, will leave a legacy long after Saddam is gone. Combined with the stark realities of Iraq's geopolitical position, it will affect how Iraqis understand the international dangers they are likely to face in the coming decades. National myths can be learned and unlearned over time, but they retain a certain discursive hegemony until replaced with something else.[17] This is a slow and complicated process; it is not simply a matter of informing Iraqis about the distortions in the state-propagated worldview. Most Iraqis already understand the politicized nature of the information environment they have inhabited, but many lack a trusted reference point with which to form an alternative perspective. The abrupt, war-induced termination of decades of state propaganda will not change popular or elite threat perceptions in the short term, nor will it lead to an informed citizenry that embraces the views of its

[14] For more on Baathist cultural policy with reference to ancient Mesopotamia, see Amatzia Baram, "Mesopotamian Identity in Ba'thi Iraq," *Middle Eastern Studies* 19 (October 1983): 427–449 and Baram, *Culture, History, and Ideology in the Formation of Ba'thist Iraq, 1968–1989* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991). For an account of Iraqi public art under Saddam, see Kanan Makiya, *The Monument: Art, Vulgarity, and Responsibility in Iraq* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

[15] The regime's appropriation of Islam is discussed in Ofra Bengio, *Saddam's Words: Political Discourse in Iraq* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

[16] Debate continues on the origins and nature of nationalism as well as the role of state power in constructing and manipulating social identities. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1989). More state-centric views include Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983) and John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

[17] State-sanctioned identities like race have provided a basis for political mobilization long after their creation for other purposes. See Anthony W. Marx, *Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of the United States, South Africa, and Brazil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

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conquerors. Given Iraq's experience with both the United States and the sanctions-supporting international community, many years will pass before most Iraqis abandon the idea that the country is vulnerable to external threats and foreign invaders. Recent reality has done nothing to dispel the notion and may even reinforce it. While future Iraqi leaders may believe that Saddam bore responsibility for incurring the wrath of the United States, they still will seek to guard Iraqi sovereignty in the face of threats from the outside world.

Outsiders may claim that none of Iraq's present-day neighbors poses a grave and immediate threat, but the view from Baghdad is quite different.[18] Iran, to the east, is a potential nuclear power with almost triple Iraq's population, geographic advantages like open access to the sea, religious ties to the Iraqi Shia majority, and nearly quadruple the land mass. And while Iraq is roughly the size of California, Iran is larger than Alaska.[19] Turkey, a major military power and NATO member to the north, is double Iraq's size and has triple its population.[20] Iraq and Turkey have had recurring disputes over everything from Kurdish militants to water rights because Iraq's freshwater lifelines—the Tigris and Euphrates rivers—flow from Turkey.[21] Israel, just over the horizon to the west, is much smaller and acutely vulnerable, but for precisely this reason, it has become the strongest military power in the region and perhaps ranks fourth in the world.[22] Israel has undeclared nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of its own—an open secret of sorts.[23] Finally, Saudi Arabia, a wealthy power with strategic depth on Iraq's southern flank, has a rapidly growing population and a latent military potential that no future leadership in Baghdad will ignore given Saudi acquiescence to American military intervention in Iraq. Already possessing a small but modern air force and Chinese CSS-2 ballistic missiles with a range of 2800 kilometers, Saudi power may increase in response to either

[18] Stephen Walt defines threat in terms of both the distribution of power and "geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions." See *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 5.

[19] See R.K. Ramazani, *Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East* (Baltimore: The Johns-Hopkins University Press, 1988).

[20] American nuclear weapons reportedly remain in Turkey at Incirlik. See the National Security Archive at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/19991020/, 29 May 2003.

[21] The Turkish-Iraqi water conflict is expected to get worse as a result of Turkey's ongoing Greater Anatolia Project (GAP), which includes the Ataturk Dam and dozens of hydroelectric power plants in the Kurdish southeast.

[22] Ordinal military rankings are subjective and limited in usefulness. Of the eight nuclear powers, the Israel Defense Forces have important qualitative and quantitative advantages over all but the United States, Russia, and China.

[23] On Israeli nuclear programs and policy, see Shai Feldman, *Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982) and his follow-up work, *Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). On Israel's chemical and biological programs, see Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, *America's Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 64. On reported Israeli progress in completing the strategic triad, see "Israel Can Launch Nuclear Weapons from Subs–Report," *New York Times*, 11 October 2003.

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troubles with its longtime ally, the United States, or the growth of Iranian power.[24]

Just as unnervingly from an Iraqi standpoint, some of its regional rivals have been allied with each other in recent years, or at least they have cooperated extensively on the political, economic, and military fronts. An important Turkish-Israeli strategic relationship began with the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1991 and has expanded to include joint military exercises, intelligence cooperation, and arms sales, with Jordan participating on a low-profile occasional basis.[25] Syria and Iran have had significant ties, most notably during the Iran–Iraq war of the 1980s, but continuing to this day in their support for Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Nine Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria sent tens of thousands of troops to help drive Iraq from Kuwait in 1991.[26] Three weeks before Iraq's invasion in 1990, Kuwait held its first high-level talks with Iran since the revolution in 1979, signaling a return to its traditional foreign policy of regional balancing.[27] Even Israel and Iran, closely aligned until the latter's revolution, still managed to cooperate militarily during the infamous Iran-Contra scandal in the early 1980s, with some observers noting their ongoing potential for strategic alliance.[28]

Although Iraqi aggression prompted much of its neighbors' cooperation, shifting Middle Eastern alignments in a post-Saddam era may not prove reassuring to Baghdad.[29] Some regional partnerships will persist indefinitely, such as a Turkish-Israeli relationship now devoted to countering Syria and Iran. Moreover, no Iraqi regime will be indifferent to technological changes affecting the regional military balance, such as Iran's development of the Shihab-4 missile, with a 2000-kilometer range, and its apparent rapid progress on a nuclear

[24] Saudi annual defense expenditures have risen to approximately $27 billion since 2001. They are the eighth largest in the world, greater than all the other states in the Middle East combined except Israel. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database at http://projects.sipri.se/milex/mex_database1.html. Data on ballistic missile development and proliferation is found at the website of Lancaster University's Centre for Defence and International Security Studies: http://www.cdiss.org/btablea.htm.

[25] See Wolfango Piccoli, "Turkish-Israeli Military Agreements and Regional Security in the Gulf" in Bjorn Moller, ed., *Oil and Water: Cooperative Security in the Persian Gulf* (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2001) and William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774–2000* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001). See also Sabri Sayari, "Turkey: The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis," *Middle East Journal* 46 (Winter 1992): 183–198.

[26] For a Saudi perspective on the 1991 Arab coalition, see HRH General Khalid Bin Sultan, *Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995). For a broader perspective written by an influential Egyptian journalist, see Mohamed Heikal, *Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War* (New York: HarperCollins, 1992).

[27] On Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati's trip to Kuwait, see *Middle East Economic Digest*, 20 July 1990, 4. A preinvasion interpretation of Kuwaiti foreign policy is found in Abdul-Reda Assiri, *Kuwait's Foreign Policy: City-State in World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990).

[28] For more on the Tehran-Tel Aviv Alignment and a broader perspective on Iranian-Israeli relations, see Ramazani, *Revolutionary Iran*, 147–161.

[29] Details of earlier Middle Eastern alliance patterns are found in Walt, *The Origins of Alliances.*

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deterrent of its own, favored even by reformist factions.[30] A defensive all-Arab counteralliance centered on Baghdad is highly unlikely in the short term given the fears and resentments generated by nearly thirteen years of intra-Arab conflict over Iraq. Arab states like Kuwait would find such an alliance unnecessary at best and untenable at worst, having staked their security to a close relationship with the United States. Even an implausible new arrangement combining the six Gulf Cooperation Council states with Egypt, Syria, and Iraq could not provide substantial long-term reassurance to Iraq if it becomes situated between two regional nuclear powers. Iraq is bound to feel acute existential threats no matter what relationships it forms with local or international actors, and alliances alone are unlikely to deliver the American will or the Arab capacity to counter these threats.

Few states in the world today face a comparable combination of potential military threat and geographic constraint while also having substantial human and financial resources with which to overcome such circumstances. Geography alone dictates that Iraq under any future leadership will be exceptionally vulnerable to its neighbors.[31] Very few countries are comparably surrounded and confined—none in the Western hemisphere, only one in Asia, and a mere handful in Africa and Central Europe.[32] Perhaps none has had such troubled relations with neighbors on which it must rely so heavily. With only nineteen kilometers of coastline, no deepwater port facilities, and no unimpeded access to the high seas, Iraq's economic growth will always depend on the willingness of other states to permit the passage of its commercial traffic and oil exports via pipelines, overland trucking, and shipping through the choke points of the Persian Gulf.[33] Even if this vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited under most circumstances, all Iraqis will remember the devastating effects of more than a decade of sanctions, enforceable largely because of the country's particular

[30] Missile ranges are found at the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies: http://www.cdiss.org/btablea.htm.

[31] Iraq's geographic dilemmas are discussed in Ahmad Yousef Ahmad, "The Dialectics of Domestic Environment and Role Performance: The Foreign Policy of Iraq" in Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, eds., *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of* Change, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991). See also Charles Tripp, "The Foreign Policy of Iraq" in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, eds., *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002). See also the extensive discussion of geostrategic imperatives of the region from a great power perspective found in Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy, *Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997).

[32] Only eight other countries have six or more adjacent neighbors and poor (or no) access to the sea: Afghanistan (6), Austria (8), Hungary (7), Burkina Faso (6), Chad (6), Mali (7), Niger (7), and Zambia (7).

[33] A dated but still useful account of Iraq's geostrategic dilemma in the Persian Gulf is found in Gerald Blake, *Maritime Aspects of Arabian Geopolitics* (London: Arab Research Center, 1982). In 1992, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 687, the UN Boundary Demarcation Commission further reduced Iraq's access to the sea by moving the Kuwaiti border northward by 1,870 feet, putting part of Umm Qasr Naval Base in Kuwaiti territory.

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physical location. It is not excessive geographic determinism to observe that neither changing alliance patterns nor global partnerships can transform the physical constraints limiting Iraqi independence.

Deterrence and the Security Dilemma

In managing all of Iraq's relationships and vulnerabilities in a post-Saddam world, WMD represent a potent means of deterrence.[34] This remains true even if their use would constitute an egregious violation of evolving international norms. States under military duress tend to arm themselves to the teeth even if doing so undermines their security in the long run by eliciting dramatic, escalatory responses from powerful potential rivals. This security dilemma has been evident to students of international politics at least since John Herz and Robert Jervis.[35] Most importantly, the security dilemma applies to Iraq with or without Saddam in power, for its logic operates even in the absence of dictators with much-vaunted nuclear ambitions. The militarily counterproductive, politically damaging, or morally repugnant nature of such weapons does not reduce the likelihood of state efforts to obtain them even if other factors limit the success of such efforts. And with both an educated population and the second largest proven oil reserves in the world, Iraq will have the intellectual and financial capacity to do what its leaders deem necessary and appropriate. The realities of geography, economics, technology and, most importantly, a fundamental political impulse will conspire against all long-term efforts to stop Iraq.[36]

Worse yet, arguments from the international community to stop the proliferation of WMD fall on deaf ears when they seem wholly self-interested or

[34] Thomas Schelling's concept of "passive deterrence"—letting adversaries know of a nuclear arsenal without declaring what conditions would prompt their use—is relevant here. See Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 207–229. Also possible is McGeorge Bundy's "existential deterrence"—the general fear-inducing capacity that counters threats to a state's survival. See Bundy, "Existential Deterrence and its Consequences" in Douglas MacLean, ed., *The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984), 8–9. See also Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); and Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan 1973).

[35] John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2 (January 1950): 157–180 and Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978): 186–214. More recently, see Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," *World Politics* 50 (October 1997): 171–201. Others in the Realist tradition who have written on the security dilemma range from Thucydides to Herbert Butterfield, Hans Morgenthau, Arnold Wolfers, and Kenneth Waltz.

[36] For a revealing, if speculative, account of the regime-preserving function of Iraqi WMD, see the 22 February 2002 testimony of Charles A. Duelfer, United Nations Special Commission deputy director, before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities. It is reprinted as "Why Saddam Wants Weapons of Mass Destruction" in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., *The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003): 412–413.

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hypocritical. The United States only began to abandon its offensive biological arsenal in 1969 during the Nixon administration. It acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, but it did not ratify the agreement until late 1974. The Central Intelligence Agency kept its own, unauthorized cache of biological weapons until sometime after the Church committee revelations in 1975.[37] As for chemical weapons, the United States did not relinquish its stockpile until joining the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1992, pledging to destroy the many thousands of tons of chemical agents it had accumulated since World War II.[38] For decades, the United States maintained a chemical weapons capability while working assiduously to prevent its local adversaries in the Middle East from developing their own. In the 1980s, for example, a weak regional nemesis in Libya was the object of American military threats, public denunciations, and a concerted diplomatic campaign. In this same period, however, the Reagan and Bush administrations considered Iraq a counterweight to Iran and gave it vastly more lenient treatment, even after Iraq used chemical weapons on Iranian troops and its own Kurdish population.[39]

Most dramatically, the United States has maintained a nuclear deterrent for nearly six decades and remains the only country in the world to have used nuclear weapons in wartime. While the American strategic stockpile has been reduced considerably from its Cold War peak, U.S. officials have barely paid lip service to the American obligation under the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to rid the country eventually of all nuclear weapons. Even if understandable given the magnitude of the Soviet threat and the reluctance of other nuclear powers to disarm, such a position is bound to elicit a skeptical response from critics. To this day, moreover, the United States retains scientific research programs in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.[40] This continued research, in part, is to contend with the very real danger of their future use against American interests. But as a matter of political reality, probably all sovereign states question the U.S. arrogation to itself of the right to limit their possession of WMD while continuing to expand American capability and knowledge in

[37] Jonathan B. Tucker, "A Farewell to Germs: The U.S. Renunciation of Biological and Toxin Warfare, 1969–70," *International Security* 27 (Summer 2002), 144. In mid-September 2001, Pentagon planners reportedly considered poisoning the Afghan food supply—an act of biological warfare—and very nearly presented the idea to President Bush, who that same day made public comments about Osama bin Laden being "wanted dead or alive." See Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 99–101.

[38] Richard M. Price, *The Chemical Weapons Taboo* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).

[39] On U.S. concerns over the Libyan chemical weapons program and facility at Rabta, see the statement before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, Hearings on the Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons, by William H. Webster, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 10 February 1989. Iraq's 1987 use of chemical weapons against the Kurds at Halabja is documented in Human Rights Watch/Middle East, *Iraq's Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995).

[40] Some U.S. research programs today may even violate the Biological Weapons Convention. See Tucker, "A Farewell to Germs," 144–148.

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this domain. Even defensive American efforts can therefore prompt seemingly offensive responses from states like Iraq, its neighbors, and all others unconvinced of the benevolence of American power.

The phrase "weapons of mass destruction" itself is an odd antieuphemism designed to sound especially threatening, distasteful, and offensive. Its use is reasonable, since nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are horrific in immeasurable ways. But most contemporary observers in American political discourse deploy the phrase as if it were a term of art or a technical term. In fact, it is a distinctly political term and a rhetorical device used with the clear purpose of describing the kinds of weapons that American adversaries may seek and that the United States and the international community does not want them to have. Its political function is apparent in the fact that American policy makers never refer to the U.S. military's development, possession, and potential use of WMD. Their statements on America's nuclear arsenal oscillate between cold claims of *raisons d'état* and warm reassurances of likely American restraint in the event of a crisis. Nowhere outside of the United States is this phrase used with a comparably disingenuous mix of innocence and arrogance.[41]

Those who believe that the United States alone can put the genie of WMD technology and know-how back in its early twentieth-century bottle will be disappointed.[42] The proliferation pressures on states like Iraq are too intense, and they will assure the continued flow of weapons-making knowledge, materials, and hardware to the region. Persistent demand will be met by a ready combination of footloose firms competing in the global weapons marketplace, states in desperate need of revenue, and scientists with valuable but increasingly commonplace skills. Broader trends in the history of military technology and weapons diffusion show that obtaining WMD in all their endless variety can only get easier over time.[43] Close international scrutiny of any given state might suffice for a while, but this pressure just increases the incentive to abstain from the direct international procurement of complete weapons systems in favor of embedding production in domestic civilian infrastructure. The removal of Saddam will not change any of these dynamics because it was not simply Saddam or any individual state decision maker that drove Iraqi proliferation efforts.[44]

[41] The U.S. government includes ballistic missiles in its official definition of WMD. Falkenrath et al., *America's Achilles Heel*, 13.

[42] For an argument about the difficulties of stopping proliferation through arms control, see Jonathan Schell, "The Folly of Arms Control," *Foreign Affairs* 79 (September–October 2000): 22–46.

[43] Basic nuclear weapons science no longer requires someone like Einstein. An overview of the technological aspects of nuclear weapons proliferation is found in Robert F. Mozley, *The Politics and Technology of Nuclear Proliferation* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998). For another perspective on proliferation problems, see Brad Roberts, ed., *Weapons Proliferation in the 1990s* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).

[44] This may contradict Shai Feldman's assertion that "Iraq's massive effort to build nuclear weapons could not have been undertaken and implemented without the initiation, push, guidance, and leadership of Saddam Hussein, the country's sole leader." See Feldman, *Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle* East, 53–54. This claim is true but tautological. Saddam certainly was the linchpin to the Iraqi program, but it does not follow that a future Iraqi effort could only be made under his leadership. There is no support for the contention that weapons programs require the patronage of individual dictators.

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The Proliferation Problem

Some analysts say that proliferation itself is not inherently disastrous. Deterrence even worked with the likes of Stalin because it hangs on nothing more than the fear of punishment for bad behavior. This argument of the "proliferation optimists" includes the leading neorealist of our day, Kenneth Waltz.[45] With even a minimal desire to survive, nuclear powers tend to avoid provocative gambits in foreign policy when facing rivals possessing a credible deterrent. After moving to the brink of annihilation during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union settled into a reasonably stable deterrent relationship. Similarly, Iraq's decision in 1991 not to use chemical or biological warheads against Israel or the U.S.-led coalition lends credence to the claim that Saddam was rational enough to have been deterred.[46] Likewise, no sensible Iraqi leader would ever transfer WMD to small, independent-minded nonstate actors like al Qaeda for fear of retaliation from the states these groups target. Only a weak rationality is necessary for deterrence to function; it is less a product of rationally calculated certainty and more the result of simple-to-achieve uncertainty. A wounded nuclear power might strike back with utterly devastating effect.[47]

The problem with this position is that a truly stable system of deterrence requires all potential antagonists to possess reasonably secure second-strike capabilities. In other words, all parties must have weapons that probably can survive a preemptive attack and be used to strike back at their enemies. Second-strike capabilities create both technical challenges and political problems for state leaders. These capabilities are not easy to build and maintain, as evidenced by ongoing global concern over the stability of the Indian-Pakistani deterrent relationship. One consequence of accepting proliferation, moreover, is that states like Iran and Saudi Arabia—at a bare minimum—would feel the need to acquire WMD to assure their own security. A ripple effect would be inevitable throughout the entire Middle East, North Africa, and conceivably much farther. And as critics of Waltz have pointed out, the likelihood that such weapons could be used accidentally rises with each new nuclear power.[48] Military organizations pursuing their own bureaucratic interests might even pro-

[45] See Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003). A review of the broader literature on deterrence is Paul K. Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 25–48.

[46] Shai Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence During the Gulf War" in Joseph Alpher, ed., *War in the Gulf: Implications for Israel* (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1992), 184–209.

[47] The role of rationality in deterrence has been the subject of great debate and a voluminous literature. For a recent discussion of deterrence theory and proliferation, see Robert Powell, "Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense," *International Security* 27 (Spring 2003): 86–118.

[48] Bruce G. Blair, *The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1993); and Scott D. Sagan, *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

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voke unintended deterrence failures that lead to the deliberate use of nuclear weapons.[49] The cost of high-intensity warfare in a nuclear Middle East is unthinkable, so proliferation gives us little cause for genuine optimism.[50]

If proliferation represents a real danger, the counterproliferation posture currently in vogue at the Pentagon may be correct in recognizing the obsolescence of traditional arms control measures and the Cold War security architecture.[51] But the end of the Cold War did not herald the end of the security dilemma. An aggressively interventionist stance, therefore, is flawed in its emphasis on rogue states as the most profound threat to U.S., regional, and global security.[52] By reducing the challenge facing the world to the purported nuclear ambitions of a handful of dictators, this approach ignores the structural sources of instability and paints a Manichean picture of international politics. The world never has been divided neatly into two contending camps with authoritarian regimes led by deposable tyrants on one side and law-abiding states amenable to arms control on the other. As a practical matter, moreover, a military assault on all potential threats to American security is simply beyond U.S. capacity. In the Iraqi case, attacks on its nuclear facilities in 1981 by Israel and 1991 by the international coalition failed to end the regime's pursuit of WMD, not simply because they left the evil of Saddam in place, but because they left Iraq itself in place, an acutely vulnerable state with the wherewithal to continue taking matters into its own hands in an era when this is increasingly possible.

The Democratic Solution

The leading counterargument to this grim cautionary tale is that democracy is the solution. This claim comes in a few varieties. The most common notion, implicit in Bush administration rhetoric, is that democracies are more moder-

[49] On the possibility of accidents, the difficulty of preserving second-strike capabilities, and other direct critiques of Waltz's position, see Sagan and Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, 46–87; 156–184.

[50] Left- and right-leaning accounts of deterrence and proliferation, written for wider audiences, include Jonathan Schell, "The Case Against the War," *The Nation*, 3 March 2003 and reprinted as "Pre-Emptive Defeat, or How Not to Fight Proliferation" in Sifry and Cerf, eds, *The Iraqi War Reader*, 506–526; and Kenneth Pollack, *The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq*, excerpted as "Can We Really Deter a Nuclear-Armed Saddam?" in Sifry and Cerf, eds., 403–411.

[51] For more on U.S. counterproliferation policy, imminent threat, and rogue states, see Section V, "The National Security Strategy of the United States," September 2002, 8–10. See also the administration's "National Security Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction," December 2002.

[52] As stated in "The National Security Strategy of the United States," "But new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists. . . . Rogue regimes seek nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well. These states' pursuit of, and global trade in, such weapons has become a looming threat to all nations. . . . It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option," 9.

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ate, reasonable, and cautious than authoritarian regimes.[53] By this logic, a democratic Iraq would never waste its considerable resources on dangerous and destructive weapons programs. But even democracy does not constitute a cure for the malady of proliferation pressure, and a democratic Iraq will not be inoculated against the temptation to go nuclear someday. Why would future Iraqi voters not want a potent and compelling deterrent? Why would they be any different from the Indian, Israeli, and Pakistani publics? After all, for more than two decades, average Iraqis have suffered the brunt of the burden for the country's ill-conceived and catastrophic foreign adventures. Regime type simply does not eliminate the external threats to national security—whether real or imagined—that lead states to pursue these weapons. If the perceived threats are high, Iraq is likely to seek WMD no matter what kind of regime governs or who rules in Baghdad.

Some observers also note that democracies are less inclined to launch wars of aggression, especially against other democracies. This particular claim points to democratic West Germany and Japan as exemplary reformed aggressors because their expansionism ended decisively with their defeat in World War II.[54] Although theories of democratic peace may have some validity, even liberal democracies are compelled to defend themselves in whatever ways they see fit. Democracies may not fight, but they do arm. Few liberal democracies exist without either their own nuclear deterrent or a rock-solid security arrangement underwritten by a powerful ally. Japan currently has the world's fourth largest defense budget, but its security pact with the United States is more likely to keep it non-nuclear than any of its constitutional provisions.[55] Iraq will have little reason to believe that its ultimate security will be assured by even a close relationship with the United States unless it has the kind of nuclear umbrella extended to postwar West Germany and Japan.[56] Just as the creation of NATO

[53] The administration took this position to promote the war in February and March 2003. See, for example, President Bush's 26 February speech at the American Enterprise Institute, in which he declared, "The nation of Iraq, with its proud heritage, abundant resources and skilled and educated people is fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom. The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. *They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life.*" (Emphasis added.)

[54] The vast "democratic peace" literature is reviewed in detail in James Lee Ray, "Does Democracy Cause Peace?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 1 (June 1998): 27–46. See also Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) and Bruce Russett, ed., *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).

[55] Japan actually may have the second or third largest defense budget. U.S. assurances may become inadequate in the minds of Japanese voters and political leaders if North Korean saber rattling continues. Data on defense spending can be found at the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, http://projects.sipri.se/milex/mex_major_spenders.html.

[56] American nuclear weapons actually were kept in Japan and twenty-six other countries and territories, according to a recently declassified Pentagon study, "History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons: July 1945 through September 1977," accessed at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/19991020/. The study was first reported in Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, and William Burr, "Where They Were," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 55 (November–December 1999): 26–35.

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in 1949 was not sufficiently reassuring for Great Britain and France to forgo their own arsenals, a future Iraq is unlikely to abstain from seeking the deadliest weapons available.

A final, similar counterargument is that any degree of democracy in Iraq will make proliferation less likely by having a transformative effect on the regional security environment. This assertion is intuitively appealing, but probably incorrect. One cannot improve regional security without changing regional relationships. This is a structural or relational factor, not a consequence of one regime's tendencies or attributes. Since democracies in Iraq, Iran, and Israel would not necessarily have amicable relations, one cannot assume that democratization will produce better regional relations. Even if these states signed peace treaties, each would still calculate that friendship might not last forever. Fears of the future, reinforced by memories of the past, create powerful incentives to build or retain a deterrent capability. In Europe, it took two world wars, tens of millions of deaths, a common external threat, and decades of institution building for the European Union and NATO to create the political and security community that exists there today. This outcome is not likely to be replicated in the Middle East anytime soon, even under hegemonic American tutelage.

The Limits of Leadership

One further hope of the Bush administration may be that good leadership will prevent bad things from happening, easing the transition to an inherently more peaceful democratic regime. But even the most enlightened leadership is not sufficient. If George W. Bush—better yet, George Washington—were at Iraq's helm under likely future circumstances, surely he would find himself looking for ways to defend the country against its nuclear-armed rivals near and far. If someone like Nelson Mandela or Vaclav Havel governed Iraq, the country still would have acute security concerns. F.W. de Klerk's decision to scrap South Africa's nuclear program in February 1990 and accede to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in July 1991 was only possible because of the increasingly benign regional security environment.[57] The single most important variable for determining a state's defense spending, weapons profile, and its likelihood of seeking WMD is not whether the country is run by a thuggish dictator. Nor is

[57] It probably was desirable because of the increasingly hostile international economic environment that apartheid South Africa faced by the late 1980s. See William J. Long and Suzette R. Grillot, "Ideas, Beliefs, and Nuclear Policies: The Cases of South Africa and Ukraine," *Nonproliferation Review* 7 (Spring 2000): 24–40 and Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," *Arms Control Today* 25 (December 1995–January 1996): 3–8. Stumpf was the deputy head of South Africa's Atomic Energy Corporation. For a discussion of competing theoretical explanations for South Africa's nuclear weapons policies, see Peter Liberman, "The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb," *International Security* 26 (Fall 2001): 45–86.

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it a domestic-level variable like regime type, whether democratic or authoritarian. It is the external security environment in which a given state exists.[58]

The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which now has over 180 signatories, locked in place a nuclear apartheid of haves and have-nots that succeeded in controlling proliferation for more than two decades.[59] Yet, it probably worked because much of the world had joined a Cold War alliance system that afforded most states relative security. Critics of all political stripes now question its long-term viability.[60] Those states that declined to join the NPT, including India, Pakistan, and Israel, did so because they felt genuine insecurity despite the alliance system. Cuba, not surprisingly, did not accede until 2002 because Soviet assurances proved inadequate in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban missile crisis. States such as Australia, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, Brazil, and Argentina have reversed or abandoned nuclear programs, but only because their security situations allowed or demanded such forbearance.[61] Similarly, a transformed European security environment enabled the George W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations to elicit the Ukraine's 1994 agreement to relinquish the weapons it had inherited from the Soviet era. Even Switzerland stockpiled hundreds of tons of uranium ore until 1989 because it wanted to be able to develop nuclear weapons if its security environment deteriorated significantly.[62]

Ironically, an American military invasion of Iraq to disarm the regime could make Iraq's future leaders more likely to seek WMD. Even a friendly regime in Baghdad may be quietly encouraged by North Korea's open defiance of the United States, thus far unpunished because of its unmistakable capacity to retaliate with both conventional and unconventional weapons against American intervention. As the revolution in military affairs widens the conventional military gap between the United States and the rest of the world, more state leaders will conclude that a minimal nuclear deterrent is essential to their political autonomy and perhaps their personal survival. In the current climate, any leader-

[58] American defense spending since the founding of the republic has waxed and waned, not in conjunction with the quality of American democracy, but as a function of external threats. This pattern began with John Adams's decision to expand the U.S. navy in response to concerns about French and British power, and it continued through both world wars, the Cold War, and contemporary concerns about terrorism.

[59] Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh used this provocative formulation in justifying his country's May 1998 nuclear tests. See Jaswant Singh, "Against Nuclear Apartheid," *Foreign Affairs* 77 (September–October 1998): 41–52.

[60] See Jonathan Schell, "The Folly of Arms Control." For critiques by William Kristol and other prominent neoconservatives, see "Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century," A Report of the Project for the New American Century, September 2000. This report and related items are available at http://www.newamericancentury.org/publicationsreports.htm.

[61] American diplomatic pressure on Taiwan to forgo nuclear weapons probably would have failed if the government of Taiwan had concluded that its security would be better served with nuclear weapons. American nuclear weapons were placed in Taiwan from 1960 to 1974. See Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, and William Burr, "Where They Were," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 26–35.

[62] Falkenrath et al., 65–66.

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ship at odds with the Bush administration will have a greater incentive to explore all the options. The Bush administration itself has begun to undermine the normative taboo against the use of nuclear weapons by calling for a new generation of "bunker buster" weapons that kill on a supposedly more reasonable scale, only decapitating leadership. Any potential leadership targets are sure to notice this, along with the administration's pursuit of missile defense and the Bush doctrine's substitution of preventive war for deterrence as the cornerstone of American security policy.[63]

Occupation and Outpost

Under the present circumstances, the only sure way to keep Iraq from seeking WMD will be an open-ended U.S. military occupation–too costly in human, material, and political terms. In such a scenario, American soldiers would die in Iraq on a regular basis. Perhaps this would occur only in small numbers, but it would be unavoidable if they continue to occupy much of Baghdad and other cities, just as American police officers die on duty in large cities in the United States. Nor can occupation itself be done cheaply in financial terms because Iraqi oil revenues would be insufficient to pay for both the country's domestic needs and the maintenance of tens of thousands of U.S. forces. The international diplomatic costs of a long-term American presence would not be insignificant, especially if the United States goes it alone and Iraqi domestic instability continues. On a popular political level, a permanent American occupation of Iraq would be disastrous for U.S. relations with the Arab and Muslim worlds, relations that will mean success or failure in confronting the most implacable American enemies. A similar but genuinely multinational occupation force could include only those few countries with both the political will and military capacity to contribute.[64]

A seemingly more palatable alternative to full-blown occupation would be to establish a low-profile but capable U.S. military presence at a handful of relatively isolated bases, perhaps at the international airport near Baghdad, the H2 and H3 airfields in the western desert, Tallil air base near al-Nasiriyya in the south, and at Bashur in the Kurdish north.[65] With troops and aircraft at these

[63] Essential statements of the Bush doctrine include President Bush's 1 June 2002 speech at West Point, where he declared that "new threats require new thinking," and "The National Security Strategy of the United States" (Washington, DC: September 2002). On the doctrine itself, see Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," *Political Science Quarterly* 118 (Fall 2003): 365–388. For an analysis of missile defense, written early in the Bush administration, see Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, "National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy," *International Security* 26 (Summer 2001): 40–92.

[64] Other contributors may step forward, but allied troop commitments in Afghanistan—an effort with wider international support—may combine with instability in Iraq to leave American forces with most of the burden of occupation.

[65] Bush administration officials reportedly first disclosed this possibility in April 2003. See Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Expects Long-Term Access to Key Iraqi Bases," *New York Times*, 20 April 2003.

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locales alone, the threat of direct American military intervention could underpin subtler means of economic and political control, ranging from economic aid and trade relations to security assurances and eventual arms sales. All this might induce the new regime—whether democratic or not—to make the desired choices in both domestic and foreign policy. Such an alternative promises to accommodate Iraq's security needs by delegating substantial decision-making authority to the United States, and it provides a guaranteed source of leverage against the over-development of Iraqi military power. Since the United States will have an interest in maintaining regional stability and supporting at least some aspects of Iraqi national development, this arrangement appears to cut the Gordian knot of Iraq's complex political and strategic dilemmas.

Nonetheless, Iraq's distribution of social and political forces does not predict a favorable national consensus on any form of permanent U.S. military presence.[66] Such a consensus is the only contingency that would allow domestic opponents of this arrangement to be reined in. Unlike their relative acquiescence to a temporary occupation today, many ordinary Iraqis will be leery of their country becoming an enduring American military outpost. This scenario is too reminiscent of Britain's military intervention during World War II after which most Iraqis rejected decisively a continued British presence. Even though the outpost was reduced to two Royal Air Force detachments in 1947, an Iraqi-British treaty providing for the retention of troops could not be ratified the next year because of intense popular opposition that culminated in bloody rioting in January 1948 and November 1952.[67] The present-day context may not be so different, but even if it is, the political interests of many Iraqis will differ from an Iraqi national interest that is ostensibly well-served by American protectors. This divergence will assure their resistance. Some political elites, moreover, will take advantage of nationalist sentiment to excoriate an American neocolonial role in the region. A majority of Iraqis will view it at best as an unwarranted constraint on Iraqi sovereignty and at worst as a Praetorian Guard for an illegitimate regime. The larger the U.S. force, the more likely it will provoke a political response; the smaller the force, the less capacity it will have to monitor and control Iraqi military development.

Even virtual invisibility will not prevent the issue from becoming a rallying cry of nationalist discontent, just as Britain's lingering military presence in Egypt's Suez Canal Zone energized the Muslim Brothers in 1950s Egypt.[68] A host of domestic, regional, and even global political actors will reject any long-term U.S. role that is sufficiently large to change the course of Iraqi politics, perhaps

[66] For historical perspective on Iraqi social cleavages, see Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

[67] The demonstrations of 1948 and 1952, known respectively as *al-wathba* (the Leap) and *al-intifada* (the Upheaval) became part of the mythology of the 1958 Iraqi revolution. Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 118–131.

[68] For an insider account of Nasser and the Anglo-Egyptian treaty ending Britain's Canal Zone garrisons, see Anthony Nutting, *Nasser* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1972), 68–73.

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delighting quietly in the political traction it will give them with their constituents. Legal Iraqi opposition groups, antisystem parties, underground terrorist organizations, and American foes worldwide will resent and resist such a presence. There will be plenty of opponents in a country of nearly twenty-five million people: hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have lost family members to American military power, and not all of them blame Saddam for their losses. Iraq's particular geography and porous borders will make it difficult to interdict foreign activists and agitators from all over, some of whom will arrive quite openly via Baghdad international airport. American attempts to use subtler diplomatic and economic means of control will meet international resistance from states resentful of U.S. domination. Some Iraqis will welcome an American force, maybe in large numbers if the presence facilitates other aspects of the country's political, economic, and social life. But a permanent foreign military outpost has never been sustained in the heart of the region, least of all one designed expressly to limit Iraqi sovereignty and hold the country in check.

Regional Solutions

Only regional conflict resolution, or at least its mitigation, can reduce to a manageable level one of the most certain sources of proliferation pressure: intense regional insecurity. Even if the security dilemma cannot be eliminated in a world of sovereign states, recognition of its continued dynamics may help to reduce its worst consequences. Ultimately, states seek the deadliest weapons whenever they are caught up in intractable conflict, whether of their own making or as a legacy of past political failures. To put it more optimistically, no state has ever sought and obtained nuclear weapons in the absence of a serious external threat.[69] The very invention of nuclear weapons in the United States was driven by war and insecurity: the fear that Nazi Germany would get the bomb first.[70] No doubt, other political factors were at play in the American case, but regional and global insecurity are among the few sure-fire causes of arms proliferation, all but guaranteeing determined and even imprudent state efforts to counter seeming threats to national existence.

Saddam may have passed from the scene, but peace, security, and stability will elude the Middle East until its most serious disputes are resolved. A resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a sensible starting point because it remains the linchpin to Arab-Israeli antagonism and its elimination would give new momentum to regional arms control initiatives that are otherwise untena-

[69] The South African experience contradicts this claim only if entirely domestic political and economic factors gave birth to its nuclear program. This scenario is plausible but unlikely. See Peter Liberman, "The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb."

[70] The Soviets followed suit, not necessarily because Stalin had nuclear ambitions or was bent on world domination. To do otherwise would have permitted a vulnerability that few state leaders will accept.

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ble.[71] This alone would be insufficient, however, because Iraqi insecurity is not a result of Palestinian-Israeli enmity. A durable regional order cannot be built and maintained while states like Iraq, Iran, and Israel fear for their existence, even if such fears are unfounded and elicit self-destructive behavior. Under these circumstances, proliferation pressures are sure to undo any momentary stability achieved by a dominant party, leading to new cycles of confrontation and crisis. Iraq's future leaders will respond predictably to the regional security environment they face, regardless of their political loyalties and the hopes and wishes of the international community. While the evolution and diffusion of weapons technology creates dangerous vulnerabilities for all states, it also provides a constructive political opportunity for those seeking to change an unstable and risk-filled status quo. Conflict resolution may not eliminate all the dangers and uncertainties of international life, but it is a clear and necessary first step toward regional transformation.

A lasting regional order, like its domestic counterpart, cannot be imposed on the Middle East from the outside, especially if local political actors see it as unjust and self-interested. Even the United States lacks the capacity to remake the Middle East entirely as it wishes. These limitations notwithstanding, a durable order would benefit from both the committed leadership of the most powerful international actors and the development of strong and resilient international institutions.[72] Having taken possession of Iraq by force, America now has a responsibility and an interest in expanding the number of parties involved in determining the country's future and creating a transparent process for restoring Iraqi sovereignty without abandoning it in the face of inevitable difficulties. This process might start with the Iraqis themselves, rather than with American interlopers assuming to know best the interests and aspirations of one of the oldest settled communities in the world. It might also benefit from closer cooperation with an international community that Washington seems to have shunned since the debacle at the UN Security Council before the war. Either way, the United States needs to move beyond simple-minded notions of a post-Saddam paradise and the false promise of a hegemonic peace.

[71] For details on the Arms Control and Regional Security talks in the Middle East, see Feldman, *Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East.*

[72] For more on the construction of postwar order, focusing on great-power conflict but relevant here also, see G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

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

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

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

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Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War

STEVEN KULL
CLAY RAMSAY
EVAN LEWIS

The Iraq war and its aftermath have raised compelling questions about the capacity of the executive branch to elicit public consent for the use of military force and about the role the media plays in this process. From the outset, the Bush administration was faced with unique challenges in its effort to legitimate its decision to go to war. Because the war was not prompted by an overt act against the United States or its interests, and was not approved by the UN Security Council, the Bush administration argued that the war was necessary on the basis of a potential threat. Because the evidence for this threat was not fully manifest, the Bush administration led the public to believe that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and providing substantial support to the al Qaeda terrorist group. The challenge for the administration was later intensified when the United States occupied Iraq and was unable to find the expected corroborating evidence.

From the outset the public was sympathetic to the idea of removing Saddam Hussein, though only a small minority of Americans was ready to go to war with Iraq without UN Security Council approval.[1] The majority was inclined to believe that Iraq had a WMD program and was supporting al Qaeda. However,

[1] Asked in a Chicago Council on Foreign Relations poll in June 2002 about their position on invading Iraq, 65 percent said the United States "should only invade Iraq with UN approval and the support of its allies"; 20 percent said "the US should invade Iraq even if we have to go it alone"; and 13 percent said "the US should not invade Iraq."

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most were not persuaded that the case was strong enough to justify taking action unilaterally. The majority preferred to continue looking for more decisive evidence through the UN inspection process and to continue seeking the support of the UN Security Council.[2]

Nevertheless, when the President decided to go to war, the majority of the public expressed support. More significantly, when the United States failed to find the expected evidence that would corroborate the administration's assumptions that prompted the war, the majority continued to support the decision to go to war.[3]

This polling data raises the question of why the public has been so accommodating. Did they simply change their views about the war despite their earlier reservations? Or did they in some way come to have certain false beliefs or misperceptions that would make going to war appear more legitimate, consistent with pre-existing beliefs?

A variety of possible misperceptions could justify going to war with Iraq. If Americans believed that the United States had found WMD in Iraq or had found evidence that Iraq was providing support to al Qaeda, then they may have seen the war as justified as an act of self-defense even without UN approval. If Americans believed that world public opinion backed the United States going to war with Iraq, then they may have seen the war as legitimate even if some members of the UN Security Council obstructed approval.

Of course, people do not develop misperceptions in a vacuum. The administration disseminates information directly and by implication. The press transmits this information and, at least in theory, provides critical analysis. One's source of news or how closely one pays attention to the news may influence whether or how misperceptions may develop.

To find out more about the possible role of misperceptions in public support for the Iraq war, and the role of the media in this process before and during the war, the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) conducted a series of polls with the polling firm Knowledge Networks (KN). From January through May 2003, a more limited set of questions was asked in four different polls. Later, Knowledge Networks developed a more systematic set of questions that was included in a series of three polls, conducted from June through

[2] In August 2002, 55 percent thought Iraq "currently has weapons of mass destruction," and 39 percent thought Iraq is trying to develop these weapons but does not currently have them (CNN/*USA Today*). On al Qaeda, *Newsweek* asked in September 2002, "From what you've seen or heard in the news . . . do you believe that Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq is harboring al Qaeda terrorists and helping them to develop chemical weapons, or not?" Seventy-five percent said yes. Yet, in a 24–25 February 2003 CBS News poll, only 31 percent agreed that "Iraq presents such a clear danger to American interests that the United States needs to act now"; 64 percent agreed that "the US needs to wait for approval of the United Nations before taking action against Iraq," and 62 percent said that "the United States should wait and give the United Nations inspectors more time."

[3] From May through November 2003, the Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks (PIPA/KN) has found a declining majority of 68 percent to 57 percent saying "the US made the right decision . . . in going to war with Iraq."

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September, with a total of 3,334 respondents. These results were combined with the findings from four other polls, conducted from January through May, for a total data set of 8,634 respondents. In addition, relevant polling data from other organizations were analyzed, including polls that asked questions about possible misperceptions.

The polls were fielded by Knowledge Networks using its nationwide panel. Panel members are recruited through standard telephone interviews with random digit dialing (RDD) samples of the entire adult population and subsequently provided internet access. Questionnaires are then administered over the Internet to a randomly selected sample of the panel.[4]

This article first explores the degree of pervasiveness of misperceptions, particularly the following three: that since the war U.S. forces have found Iraqi WMD in Iraq; that clear evidence has been found that Saddam Hussein was working closely with al Qaeda; and that world public opinion was in favor of the United States going to war with Iraq. Second, it analyzes the relationship between the holding of these misperceptions and support for the Iraq war by using multivariate regression analysis to compare the strength of this factor with a range of other factors. Third, it analyzes the relationship between the holding of misperceptions and the respondent's primary news source. Fourth, it evaluates the relationship between attention to news and the level of misperceptions. Fifth, it analyzes misperceptions as a function of political attitudes, including intention to vote for the President and party identification. A binary logistic regression analysis including misperceptions and eight other factors provides a ranking of factors by power. The article concludes with an analysis of the various factors that could explain the phenomenon of misperceptions, including administration statements and media reporting.

Misperceptions Related to the Iraq War

In the run-up to the war with Iraq and in the postwar period, a significant portion of the American public has held a number of misperceptions[5] relevant to the rationales for going to war with Iraq. While in most cases only a minority has had any particular misperception, a strong majority has had at least one key misperception.

Close Links between Iraq and al Qaeda

Both before and after the war, a substantial portion of Americans have believed that evidence of a link between Iraq and al Qaeda existed. Before the

[4] For more information about this methodology, see the Appendix or go to www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp.

[5] Herein the term "misperceptions" is not used to refer to controversial beliefs about what U.S. intelligence has been able to infer, such as the belief that Saddam Hussein was directly involved in September 11. The term is limited to noncontroversial perceptions such as whether actual weapons or actual evidence have in fact been *found*. The misperception related to world public opinion is established based on polling data discussed later.

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TABLE 1

Evidence of Link between Iraq and al Qaeda
(percentages)

Is it your impression that the US has or has not found clear evidence in Iraq that Saddam Hussein was working closely with the al Qaeda terrorist organization?	8–9/03	7/03	6/03	(6/03–9/03)
US has	49	45	52	48
US has not	45	49	43	46
(No answer)	6	6	5	6

Source: Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks.

war, in the January PIPA/KN poll, 68 percent expressed the belief that Iraq played an important role in September 11, with 13 percent even expressing the belief that "conclusive evidence" of Iraq's involvement had been found. Asked in June, July, and August-September (Table 1), large percentages (45 to 52 percent) said they believed that the United States had "found clear evidence in Iraq that Saddam Hussein was working closely with the al-Qaeda [*sic*] terrorist organization."

Harris Interactive in June and August asked, "Do you believe clear evidence that Iraq was supporting al Qaeda has been found in Iraq or not?" In June, 48 percent said that clear evidence had been found, with just 33 percent saying that it had not and 19 percent saying they were not sure. Despite intensive discussion of the issue in the press, in August the numbers were essentially the same: 50 percent believed evidence had been found, 35 percent believed that it had not been, and 14 percent were unsure.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Before the war, overwhelming majorities believed that Iraq had WMD. Though it now appears likely that this belief was incorrect, it does not seem appropriate to call this a misperception because it was so widespread at the time, even within the intelligence community.

However, a striking misperception occurred after the war, when the United States failed to find any WMD or even any solid evidence of a WMD program. PIPA/KN first asked in May whether respondents thought that the United States has or has not "found Iraqi weapons of mass destruction" in Iraq, and 34 percent said the United States had (another 7 percent did not know). In June, Harris Interactive subsequently asked, "Do you believe clear evidence of weapons of mass destruction has been found in Iraq or not?" and 35 percent said that it had.

PIPA/KN asked again in late June—during a period with much discussion in the press about the absence of WMD—and found that the percentage hold-

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TABLE 2

Existence of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq
(percentages)

Since the war with Iraq ended, is it your impression that the US has or has not found Iraqi weapons of mass destruction?

	9/03	7/03	6/03	3/03	(6/03–9/03)
US has	24	21	23	34	22
US has not	73	76	73	59	75
(No answer)	3	3	4	7	3

Source: Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks.

ing this belief had dropped to 23 percent. This number then stayed roughly the same in July and early September. In late July, NBC/*Wall Street Journal* asked whether the United States has been successful in "finding evidence of weapons of mass destruction," and 22 percent said that it had. Harris asked again in mid-August and found 27 percent saying that evidence of WMD had been found (Table 2).

Americans have also incorrectly believed that Iraq actually *used* WMD in the recent war with the United States. PIPA/KN asked respondents whether "Iraq did or did not use chemical or biological weapons in the war that had just ended." In May, 22 percent of respondents said that it had. In mid-June, ABC/*Washington Post* presented a slightly adapted version of the question and found 24 percent said that that they thought it had. When asked by PIPA/KN again in August-September, the percentage saying that Iraq had used such weapons slipped only slightly to 20 percent.

World Public Opinion

A key factor in American public support for going to war with Iraq has been its international legitimacy. Right up to the period immediately before the war, a majority favored taking more time to build international support. A key question, then, is how the public perceived world public opinion on going to war with Iraq.

PIPA/KN polls have shown that Americans have misperceived world public opinion on the U.S. decision to go to war and on the way that the United States is generally dealing with the problem of terrorism. This has been true during and after the war and applies to perceptions about world public opinion as a whole, European public opinion, and public opinion in the Muslim world.

In March 2003, shortly after the war started, PIPA/KN asked respondents "how all of the people in the world feel about the US going to war with Iraq." Respondents perceived greater support for the war than existed at the time or has existed since.[6] Only 35 percent perceived correctly that the majority of

[6] Gallup International conducted two international polls (in January and April-May 2003) and Pew Research Center conducted one (in April-May 2003), which included poll questions that directly measured support or opposition to the Iraq war. In the three polls taken together, fifty-six countries were

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TABLE 3

World Opinion about the U.S. Decision to Go to War
(percentages)

Thinking about how all the people in the world feel about the US going/having gone to war with Iraq, do you think	9/03	7/03	6/03	3/03	(6/03–9/03)
The majority of people favor it	27	24	25	31	25
The majority of people oppose it	38	42	41	35	41
Views are evenly balanced	33	30	32	31	31
(No answer)	2	4	2	3	3

Source: Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Network.

people opposed the decision. Thirty-one percent expressed the mistaken assumption that views were evenly balanced on the issue, and another 31 percent expressed the egregious misperception that the majority favored it. Asked again in June, July, and August-September, these views changed very little (Table 3).

Perceptions have been a bit more accurate when it comes to perceiving European public opinion, but still there are widespread misperceptions. Asked in June and August-September, nearly half (48 to 49 percent) correctly said that the "majority of people oppose the United States having gone to war." But 29 to 30 percent believed incorrectly that views are evenly balanced, and 18 percent believed that the majority even favors it.[7]

A substantial number of Americans also misperceive attitudes in the Islamic world toward U.S. efforts to fight terrorism and its policies in the Middle East. Respondents were asked in August-September whether they thought "a majority of people in the Islamic world favor or oppose U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism." A plurality of 48 percent incorrectly assumed that a majority of Islamic people favors U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism, while 46 percent assumed that they do not. When asked whether respondents thought "a majority of people in the Islamic world think U.S. policies in the Middle East make the region more or less stable," 35 percent incorrectly assumed that the majority of people

surveyed. The January Gallup International poll asked, "Are you in favor of military action against Iraq: under no circumstances; only if sanctioned by the United Nations; unilaterally by America and its allies?" Of the thirty-eight countries polled (including twenty European countries), not a single one showed majority support for unilateral action, and in nearly every case the percentage was very low. When asked, "If military action goes ahead against Iraq, do you think [survey country] should or should not support this action?" in thirty-four of the thirty-eight countries polled (seventeen out of twenty in Europe), a majority opposed having their country support this action. In April-May, the Pew Global Attitudes Survey asked respondents in eighteen countries how they felt about their country's decision to participate or not participate in "us[ing] military force against Iraq." Among the thirteen countries that had not participated, in every case, a large to overwhelming majority approved of the decision. For the three countries that contributed troops, in the United Kingdom and Australia, a majority approved; in Spain, a majority was opposed. For the two countries that had allowed the United States to use bases, in Kuwait, the majority approved; in Turkey, the majority was opposed. For full results, see www.gallup-international.com and www.people-press.org.

[7] Ibid.

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FIGURE 1
Percentage Having Key Misperceptions:
Evidence of Links to al Qaeda, WMD Found, and World Public Opinion Favorable



Source: Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks, October 2003.

in the Islamic world feel that U.S. policies make the region more stable, while 60 percent perceived attitudes correctly.[8]

Combined Analysis

Most specific misperceptions are held by a minority of respondents. However, this does not tell us if these misperceptions are held by the same minority or if large percentages have at least one misperception. To find out, we repeated three key perception questions over three polls, conducted in June, July, and August-September with 3,334 respondents.

The three key perception questions used were the ones that found the most egregious misperceptions, and to qualify as a misperception the most extreme form of the misperception was used. These were the beliefs:

- Clear evidence that Saddam Hussein was working closely with al Qaeda has been *found.*
- Weapons of mass destruction have been *found* in Iraq.
- World public opinion *favored* the United States going to war with Iraq.

To determine the pervasiveness of misperceptions, we focused on the 1,362 respondents who heard all three of the perception questions.

Misperceptions were not limited to a small minority that had repeated misperceptions. A majority of 60 percent had at least one of these three unambiguous misperceptions, and only 30 percent had no misperceptions (Figure 1). An-

[8] The Pew Global Attitudes survey in summer 2002 and May 2003 asked in seven countries with primarily Muslim populations (Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco, plus the Palestinian Authority): "Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view? I favor

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other 10 percent had the more modest misperception that world public opinion was evenly balanced between support and opposition to the Iraq war.

Misperceptions and Support for War

The misperceptions about the war appear to be highly related to attitudes about the decision to go to war, both before and after the war. In every case, those who have the misperception have been more supportive of the war. As the combined analysis of the three key misperceptions will show, those with none of the key misperceptions have opposed the decision while the presence of each additional misperception has gone together with sharply higher support.

Close Links to al Qaeda

Before the war, those who believed that Iraq was directly involved in September 11 showed greater support for going to war even without multilateral approval. In the January PIPA/KN poll, among those who wrongly believed that they had "seen conclusive evidence" that "Iraq played an important role in September 11 attacks," 56 percent said they would agree with a decision by the President to proceed to go to war with Iraq if the UN Security Council refused to endorse such an action. Among those who said they had not seen such evidence but still believed that Iraq was involved in September 11, 42 percent said they would support such a decision. Among those who said they had not seen such evidence and were not convinced that it was true, only 9 percent said they would agree with such a decision.

In the February PIPA/KN poll, support for going to war was high among those who believed that Saddam Hussein was directly involved in September 11 but was progressively lower as the perceived link between Iraq and al Qaeda became more tenuous. Among those who believed that Iraq was directly involved in September 11, 58 percent said they would agree with the President deciding to go to war with Iraq even without UN approval. Among those who believed that Iraq had given al Qaeda substantial support but was not involved in September 11, support dropped to 37 percent. Among those who believed that a few al Qaeda individuals had contact with Iraqi officials, 32 percent were

the US-led efforts to fight terrorism, or I oppose the US-led efforts to fight terrorism." In six of the eight cases, strong majorities ranging from 56 to 85 percent in summer 2002, and rising to 67 to 97 percent in May 2003, said they opposed "US-led efforts to fight terrorism." In only one case—Kuwait in May 2003—did a majority say they favored U.S. efforts. In the case of Pakistan, a plurality of 45 percent opposed U.S. efforts in the summer of 2003, rising to 74 percent in May 2003. In May 2003, respondents were asked: "Do you think US policies in the Middle East make the region more stable or less stable?" In six of the eight cases, majorities said that U.S. policies in the Middle East make the region less stable. These majorities ranged from 56 percent in Lebanon to 91 percent in Jordan. In Pakistan, 43 percent said U.S. policies make the Middle East less stable, but another 43 percent said U.S. policies either "made no difference" (12 percent) or that they did not know (31 percent). In Kuwait, a 48 percent plurality said U.S. policies made the Middle East more stable.

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FIGURE 2
Support for War and Misperception of Evidence of Iraqi Links to al Qaeda



Source: Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks, October 2003.
Note: The question also offered respondents the option of saying that they did not know if going to war was the best thing to do, but that they nonetheless supported the President. Here and in comparisons discussed later, we have limited our analysis to those who took an unequivocal position in favor or against the decision to go to war.

supportive, while just 25 percent expressed support among those who believed that there was no connection.

During the war, Americans who supported the war also said that the supposed link was a major reason for supporting the decision to go to war. An April poll for *Investor's Business Daily* and the *Christian Science Monitor* asked the 72 percent who said they supported the war to rate the importance of a number of reasons for their support. "Iraq's connection with groups like Al-Qaeda" was rated as a major reason by 80 percent.

After the war, nearly half of the respondents mistakenly believed that clear evidence that Saddam Hussein was working closely with al Qaeda had been found. PIPA/KN found a strong relationship between the belief that evidence of such links has been found and support for the decision to go to war. Combining data from June through September, among those with the misperception, 67 percent held the view that going to war was the best thing to do, while only 29 percent expressed support among those who did not have the misperception (Figure 2). Among those without the misperception, 52 percent said it was the wrong decision.

Just as before the war, in the postwar period there was also a strong relationship between beliefs about the nature of the connection between al Qaeda and Iraq and support for the war. Among those who believed that Saddam Hussein was directly involved in September 11, 69 percent said going to war was the best thing to do. Among those who believed that Iraq had given al Qaeda substantial support but was not involved in September 11, approval dropped

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FIGURE 3
Support for the War and Misperception that Iraqi WMD Found



Source: Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks, October 2003.

to 54 percent. Among those who believed that a few al Qaeda individuals had contact with Iraqi officials, 39 percent were supportive, while just 11 percent expressed support among those who believed that there was no connection. Among those who believed that there was no connection, 73 percent thought that going to war was the wrong decision.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

The mistaken beliefs that WMD have been found in Iraq, or that Iraq used WMD in the war, have been highly related to support for the decision to go to war. Consolidating all respondents asked by PIPA/KN in four polls conducted from May through September, among those who believed that WMD have been found, 73 percent thought that going to war was the best decision (Figure 3). Among those who did not have this misperception, only 41 percent held this view.

Similarly, consolidating two polls conducted in May and August-September, among those who believed that Iraq had used chemical and biological weapons in the war, 64 percent said they thought going to war was the best thing to do. Among those who did not have this belief, only 48 percent thought it was the best thing to do.

World Public Opinion

Perceptions of world public opinion on going to war with Iraq have been significantly related to support for the war. This has been true during and after the war.

In the PIPA/KN poll conducted in late March, shortly after the onset of the war, among those who wrongly believed that the majority of the people in the

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FIGURE 4
Views of World Public Opinion and Support for War During and After the War



Source: Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks, October 2003.

world favored the United States going to war with Iraq, an overwhelming 81 percent said they agreed with the President's decision to go to war with Iraq, despite his failure to garner UN Security Council approval. Among those who—also incorrectly—believed that views were evenly balanced on this question, 58 percent said they agreed. Among those who correctly believed that the majority of people opposed it, only 28 percent said they agreed with the President's decision. When polled after the war (May-September) the pattern was basically the same, though a different question was used to measure support for the war (Figure 4).

Combined Analysis

To determine the cumulative strength of the relationship between various misperceptions and support for the war, we analyzed those who had been asked all of the three key misperception questions—whether evidence of links between Iraq and al Qaeda have been found, whether WMD have been found in Iraq, and whether world public opinion favored the United States going to war with Iraq—in three polls conducted from June through September. These polls revealed a strong cumulative relationship (Figure 5).

Multivariate Analysis

To determine how strong a factor misperceptions are in predicting support for the war as compared to other factors, a binary logistic regression analysis was

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FIGURE 5
Cumulative Effect of Having Key Misperceptions on Support for the War



Source: Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks, October 2003.
Note: Misperceptions included were that clear evidence of Iraq-al Qaeda links have been found, WMD have been found, and world public opinion favored the Iraq war.

performed together with eight other factors. Four of the factors were demographic: gender, age, household income, and education. Two other categorical factors were party identification and intention to vote for the President in the next election as opposed to an unnamed Democratic nominee. In addition, there were the factors of how closely people follow events in Iraq and their primary news source. The odds ratio statistic was used to determine the relative likelihood that respondents would support the war. Support for the war was defined as the respondent saying that he or she thought the war was the right decision and the best thing to do, not that he or she was just supporting the President. For this analysis, the number of respondents was 1,219.

When all respondents with one or more of the three key misperceptions were put into one category and compared to those with none of these misperceptions, the presence of misperceptions was the most powerful predictor of support for the war, with those misperceiving being 4.3 times more likely to support the war than those who did not misperceive. The second most powerful predictor was the intention to vote for the President, with those intending to vote for the President being 3 times more likely to support the war than those who planned to vote for the Democratic nominee. Those who intended to vote for the Democratic nominee were 1.8 times less likely to support the war. All other factors were far less influential. Those who followed the news on Iraq very or somewhat closely were 1.2 times more likely to support the war than those who followed it "not very closely" or "not at all." Men were 1.5 times more likely to support the war than women. Those with higher incomes were very slightly more likely to support the war. All other factors were insignificant,

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including education and age. Party identification by itself would be predictive, but when intention to vote for the President is included, party identification also becomes insignificant.

To determine the cumulative strength of misperceptions as a predictor of war support, the smaller sample that received all of the three key misperceptions questions was analyzed. Respondents were divided into four categories of no misperceptions, exactly one misperception, exactly two misperceptions, and all three misperceptions. Those with just one misperception were 2.9 times more likely to support the war, rising to 8.1 times more likely among those with exactly two misperceptions and to 9.8 times more likely among those with all three misperceptions. In this sample, all other factors remain essentially unchanged, with those intending to vote for the President being 2.8 times and men 1.5 times more likely to support the war. Those intending to vote for the Democratic nominee were 1.6 times less likely to support the war. Attention to news coded as a binary form, however, became insignificant while remaining significant as a continuous variable.

When the three key misperceptions are treated as separate factors, there is wide variation in their power to predict support for the war. By far, the strongest is the perception of world public opinion, with those who perceive the world public opinion as approving of the war being 3.3 times more likely to support the war themselves. Those with the perception that evidence of links to al Qaeda have been found were 2.5 times more likely to support the war, and those who perceived that evidence of WMD have been found were 2.0 times more likely.

Misperceptions as a Function of Source of News

The widespread presence of misperceptions naturally raises the question of whether they are to some extent a function of an individual's source of news. To find out, in three different PIPA/KN polls conducted in June, July, and August-September, an aggregate sample of 3,334 respondents was asked, "Where do you tend to get most of your news?" and offered the options of "newspapers and magazines" or "TV and radio." Overall, 19 percent said their primary news source was print media, while 80 percent said it was electronic. Respondents were then asked, "If one of the networks below is your primary source of news please select it. If you get news from two or more networks about equally, just go on to the next question." The networks offered were ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, Fox News, PBS, and NPR. Because the PBS and NPR viewers were such a small percentage, we combined them into one category of public networks. In the case of ABC, CBS, and NBC, we do not know how many people primarily got their news from local affiliates and how many from national news shows. Likewise, we do not know if all of those who said that they got their news from

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TABLE 4

Frequency of Misperceptions per Respondent: WMD Found, Evidence of al Qaeda Link, and World Majority Support for War (percentages)

Number of misperceptions per respondent	*Fox*	*CBS*	*ABC*	*CNN*	*NBC*	*Print Media*	*NPR/PBS*
None of the three	20	30	39	45	45	53	77
One or more misperception	80	71	61	55	55	47	23

Source: Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks.

Fox News primarily got their news from the national cable news network and how many from local Fox affiliates.[9]

The same respondents were also asked about their perceptions, with 1,362 respondents receiving all three key perception questions and 3,334 respondents receiving at least one of them—that is, whether evidence of close links between Iraq and al Qaeda has been found, whether WMD have been found in Iraq, and whether world public opinion approved of the United States going to war with Iraq.

Combined Analysis

Because it provides the best overview of the relationship between media sources, this article first analyzes the relationship between media sources and the presence of multiple misperceptions to explore the variation in the level of misperceptions according to the respondents' news source. Afterward, it analyzes the variance for specific misperceptions.

An analysis of those who were asked all of the key three perception questions does reveal a remarkable level of variation in the presence of misperceptions according to news source. Standing out in the analysis are Fox and NPR/PBS, but for opposite reasons. Fox was the news source whose viewers had the most misperceptions. NPR/PBS are notable because their viewers and listeners consistently held fewer misperceptions than respondents who obtained their information from other news sources. Table 4 shows this clearly. Listed are the breakouts of the sample according to the frequency of the three key misperceptions (that is, the beliefs that evidence of links between Iraq and al Qaeda has been found, that WMD have been found in Iraq, and that world public opinion approved of the United States going to war with Iraq) and their primary news source. In the audience for NPR/PBS, there was an overwhelming majority who did not have any of the three misperceptions, and hardly any had all three.

[9] Numbers for those naming a network as their primary news source were as follows: Fox, 520; CBS, 258; CNN, 466; ABC, 315; NBC, 420; NPR/PBS, 91. All findings in this section were statistically significant at the $p<0.05$ level, except where noted.

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TABLE 5

Average of Three Misperception Rates among Viewers and Listeners: WMD Found, Evidence of al Qaeda Link, and World Majority Support for War (percentages)

News Source	*Average Rate per Misperception*
Fox	45
CBS	36
CNN	31
ABC	30
NBC	30
Print Media	25
NPR/PBS	11

Source: Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks.

To check these striking findings, the data were analyzed a different way by using the larger sample of 3,334 who had answered at least one of the three questions just mentioned. For each misperception, it was determined how widespread it was in each media audience, and then for each media audience this frequency was averaged for the three misperceptions. Table 5 shows the averages from lowest to highest. Again, the Fox audience showed the highest average rate of misperceptions (45 percent) while the NPR/PBS audience showed the lowest (11 percent).

Close Links to al Qaeda

The same pattern in the distribution of misperceptions among the news sources was obtained in the cases of each specific misperception. When asked whether the United States has found "clear evidence in Iraq that Saddam Hussein was working closely with the al-Qaeda terrorist organization," among the combined sample for the three-month period, 49 percent said that such evidence had been found (Table 6). This misperception was substantially higher among those who get their news primarily from Fox, 67 percent. Once again the NPR/PBS audience was the lowest at 16 percent.

TABLE 6

Viewers' Beliefs on Whether the United States Has Found Evidence of an al Qaeda-Iraq Link (percentages)

Clear Evidence of al Qaeda Link	*NBC*	*CBS*	*ABC*	*Fox*	*CNN*	*NPR/PBS*	*Print Media*
US has found	49	56	45	67	48	16	40
US has not found	45	41	49	29	47	85	58

Source: Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks.

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TABLE 7

Perception that the United States Has or Has Not Found WMD (percentages)

Weapons of Mass Destruction	*NBC*	*CBS*	*ABC*	*Fox*	*CNN*	*NPR/PBS*	*Print Media*
US has found	20	23	19	33	20	11	17
US has not found	79	75	79	64	79	89	82

Source: Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks.

Variations were much more modest on the perception that Iraq was directly involved in September 11. As discussed, the view that Iraq was directly involved in September 11 is not a demonstrable misperception, but it is widely regarded as fallacious by the intelligence community. In this case, the highest level of misperceptions was in the CBS audience (33 percent) followed by Fox (24 percent), ABC (23 percent), NBC (22 percent), and CNN (21 percent). Respondents who got their news primarily from print media (14 percent) and NPR or PBS (10 percent) were less likely to choose this description.

Combining the above group with those who had the less egregious but still unproven belief that Iraq gave substantial support to al Qaeda, the pattern was similar. Among CBS viewers, 68 percent had one of these perceptions, as did 66 percent of Fox viewers, 59 percent of NBC viewers, 55 percent of CNN viewers, and 53 percent of ABC viewers. Print readers were nearly as high at 51 percent, while NPR/PBS audiences were significantly lower at 28 percent.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

When respondents were asked whether the United States has "found Iraqi weapons of mass destruction" since the war had ended, 22 percent of all respondents over June through September mistakenly thought this had happened. Once again, Fox viewers were the highest with 33 percent having this belief. A lower 19 to 23 percent of viewers who watch ABC, NBC, CBS, and CNN had the perception that the United States has found WMD. Seventeen percent of those who primarily get their news from print sources had the misperception, while only 11 percent who watch PBS or listen to NPR had it (Table 7).

World Public Opinion

Respondents were also asked to give their impression of how they think "people in the world feel about the US having gone to war with Iraq." Over the three-month period, 25 percent of all respondents said, incorrectly, "the majority of people favor the US having gone to war" (Table 8). Of Fox watchers, 35 percent said this. Only 5 percent of those who watch PBS or listen to NPR misperceived world opinion in this way. As usual, those who primarily get their

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TABLE 8

World Public Opinion on the United States Going to War
(percentages)

Majority of people in world . . .	*NBC*	*CBS*	*ABC*	*Fox*	*CNN*	*NPR/PBS*	*Print Media*
Favor US going to war in Iraq	20	28	27	35	24	5	17

Source: Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks.

news from print media were the second lowest, with 17 percent having this misperception.

Numerous respondents also chose the option of saying that in world public opinion, views are evenly balanced between favoring and opposing going to war—a misperception, though less egregious. Combining those who said views were evenly balanced with those who assumed that the majority favored the Iraq war—a more inclusive definition of misperception—the same pattern obtained. Fox viewers had the highest level of misperceiving (69 percent) and NPR/PBS the lowest (26 percent). The others also formed a familiar pattern: CBS viewers at 63 percent, ABC at 58 percent, NBC at 56 percent, CNN at 54 percent, and print media at 45 percent.

The same question was asked about European opinion. Perceptions of European views are more accurate among the U.S. public: only 17 percent thought there had been majority support among Europeans for the war. Over the three months, CBS viewers most frequently misperceived European opinion (24 percent); Fox viewers were second (20 percent). The NPR/PBS audience and those relying on printed media were lowest, both at 13 percent.

If one adds together those who thought there was European majority support with those who thought views in Europe were evenly balanced, 47 percent misperceived European opinion; CBS viewers were highest at 56 percent, NBC and Fox viewers were next at 52 percent and 51 percent respectively, while the NPR/PBS audience was lowest at 29 percent. ABC viewers and those using print sources were tied for second lowest at 41 percent.

The Effect of Variations in Audiences

The question thus arises of whether the variation in misperceptions is a function of variations in the demographics or political attitudes of the audience. Some audiences varied according to education, party identification, and support for the President. However, as is evident in the regression analysis, when all of these factors are analyzed together, the respondent's primary source of news is still a strong and significant factor; indeed, it was one of the most powerful factors predicting misperceptions.

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Misperceptions as a Function of Level of Attention to News

It would seem reasonable to assume that misperceptions are due to a failure to pay attention to news and that those who have greater exposure to news would have fewer misperceptions. All respondents were asked, "How closely are you following the news about the situation in Iraq now?" For the summer as a whole (June, July, August-September), 13 percent said they were following the news very closely, 43 percent somewhat closely, 29 percent not very closely, and 14 percent not closely at all.

Strikingly, overall, there was no relation between the reported level of attention to news and the frequency of misperceptions. In the case of those who primarily watched Fox, greater attention to news modestly *increased* the likelihood of misperceptions. Only in the case of those who primarily got their news from print did misperceptions decrease with lower levels of attention, though in some cases this occurred for CNN viewers as well.

The most robust effects were found among those who primarily got their news from Fox. Among those who did not follow the news at all, 42 percent had the misperception that evidence of close links to al Qaeda has been found, rising progressively at higher levels of attention to 80 percent among those who followed the news very closely. For the perception that WMD have been found, those who watched very closely had the highest rate of misperception at 44 percent, while the other levels of attention were lower, though they did not form a clear pattern (not at all, 34 percent; not very, 24 percent; somewhat, 32 percent). Among those who did not follow the news at all, 22 percent believed that world public opinion favored the war, jumping to 34 percent and 32 percent among those who followed the news not very and somewhat closely, respectively, and then jumping even higher to 48 percent among those who followed the news very closely.

With increasing attention, those who got their news from print were less likely to have all three misperceptions. Of those not following the news closely, 49 percent had the misperception that evidence of close links has been found, declining to 32 percent among those who followed the news very closely. Those who did not follow the news at all were far more likely to misperceive (35 percent) that WMD had been found than the other levels (not very, 14 percent; somewhat, 18 percent; very, 13 percent). Twenty-five percent of those who did not follow the news at all had the misperception that world public opinion favored the war, dropping to 16 percent for all other categories.

CNN viewers showed slightly, but significantly, lower levels of misperception on finding WMD and world public opinion at higher levels of attention, though not on evidence of links to al Qaeda.

Misperceptions as a Function of Political Attitudes

Not surprisingly, political attitudes did play a role in the frequency of misperceptions. The intention to vote for the President was highly influential. Party

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FIGURE 6
Support for President and Frequency of Misperceptions



Source: Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks, October 2003.

identification was also influential; however, this effect disappeared after controlling for intention to vote for the President.

Intention to Vote for the President

The polls of June, July, and August-September all included a question, placed near the end, asking whether the respondents thought they would vote for Bush or for the Democratic nominee in the presidential election (Figure 6). In all cases, the responses were very similar to those in numerous other polls at the same time—and showed either a slight edge for Bush or a statistical tie. Only 10 percent did not answer the question. When Bush supporters and supporters of a Democratic nominee are compared, it is clear that supporters of the President are more likely to have misperceptions than are those who oppose him. Multivariate analysis indicates that intention to vote for the President is the single most powerful predictor of misperceptions.

Taking the averages of the percentage that had each of the three key misperceptions—evidence of al Qaeda links found, WMD found, and world public opinion favors war—those who said they would vote for the President were far more likely to misperceive. On average, those who would vote for the President held misperceptions 45 percent of the time, while those who say they will vote for a Democrat held misperceptions, on average, 17 percent of the time (Figure 6).

Looking at the specific cases, in response to the question "Has the US found clear evidence Saddam Hussein was working closely with al-Qaeda?" a strikingly large 68 percent of Bush supporters believed that the United States has

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found such evidence. On the other side, an equally striking 66 percent of supporters of a Democratic nominee knew that such evidence has not been found. When asked to characterize the relationship between the previous Iraqi government and al Qaeda given four choices, 29 percent of Bush supporters said, "Iraq was directly involved in the 9/11 attacks." Only 15 percent of Democratic supporters chose this description.

Only minorities of either Bush supporters or supporters of a Democratic nominee believe that the United States has found evidence of WMD in Iraq. However, three times as many Bush supporters as Democrat supporters hold this misperception. Thirty-one percent of Bush supporters think the United States has found such evidence, while only 10 percent of Democrat supporters think this.

When asked, "How do you think the people of the world feel about the US having gone to war with Iraq?" Bush supporters were more than three times more likely than supporters of a Democratic nominee to believe that "the majority of people favor the US having gone to war." Thirty-six percent of Bush supporters had this misperception, while only 11 percent of Democratic supporters did.

The PIPA/KN polls asked the same question about Europe, on which misperceptions are less widespread among Americans. Twenty-six percent of Bush supporters mistakenly thought that a majority of Europeans favored the war, while only 7 percent of supporters of a Democratic nominee believed this.

Party Identification

Republicans are also more likely than Democrats or independents to have misperceptions. However, when the analysis controls for support for the President, this party difference largely disappears. For example, among Bush supporters, Republicans, Democrats, and independents were similarly likely to believe that the United States has found clear evidence that Saddam Hussein was working closely with al Qaeda (pro-Bush Republicans, 68 percent; pro-Bush Democrats, 77 percent; pro-Bush independents, 67 percent). On whether the United States has found evidence of WMD, the same pattern among Bush supporters was present (31 percent of pro-Bush Republicans believing such evidence has been found, 29 percent of pro-Bush Democrats believing this, and 29 percent of pro-Bush independents believing this). The same pattern appeared in all cases tested.

Relative Strength of Various Factors Related to Level of Misperception

To determine which factors had the most power to predict the likelihood of misperceiving, we performed a binary logistic regression analysis, together with eight other factors. Four of the factors were demographic: gender, age, house-

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hold income, and education. Two other categorical factors were party identification and intention to vote for the President in the next election, as opposed to an unnamed Democratic nominee. In addition, we included the factors of how closely people follow events in Iraq and what their primary news source was. The odds ratio statistic was used to determine the likelihood that respondents would have misperceptions.

In the regression analysis, the most powerful factor was the intention to vote for President Bush. As compared to those who intended to vote for the Democratic nominee or were undecided, those who intended to vote for the President were 2.9 times more likely to believe that close links to al Qaeda have been found, 3.0 times more likely to believe that WMD had been found, and 2.6 times more likely to believe that world public opinion was favorable to the war. Overall, those who intended to vote for the President were 3.7 times more likely to have at least one of these misperceptions.

The second most powerful factor was one's primary source of network news. Analysis shows the factor to be highly significant, but assessing each network is difficult. Though several networks are significant, others are not. To determine the relative importance of each network as a primary source of news, another regression was performed, treating each network as a binary variable and comparing each network's respondents to other respondents. When this analysis is performed, having Fox, CBS, or NPR/PBS as one's primary news source emerges as the most significant predictor of a particular misperception and of misperceptions in general.

To determine the overall importance of one factor to another, a comparison of statistical measures is necessary.[10] Overall, Fox viewing has the greatest and most consistent predictive power in the analysis on a variety of these statistical measures. Table 9 presents the results.

Fox is the most consistently significant predictor of misperceptions. Those who primarily watched Fox were 2.0 times more likely to believe that close links to al Qaeda have been found, 1.6 times more likely to believe that WMD had been found, 1.7 times more likely to believe that world public opinion was favorable to the war, and 2.1 times more likely to have at least one misperception. Interestingly, when asked how the majority of people in the world feel about the war, if the response "views are evenly balanced" is included as a misperception along with "favor," only Fox is a significant predictor of that misperception.

Those who primarily watched CBS were 1.8 times more likely to believe that close links to al Qaeda have been found, 1.9 times more likely to believe that world public opinion was favorable to the war, and 2.3 times more likely to have at least one misperception. However, they were not significantly different on beliefs about the uncovering of WMD.

On the other hand, those who primarily watched PBS or listened to NPR were 3.5 times less likely to believe that close links to al Qaeda have been

[10] PIPA compared two statistical measures, the Wald statistic and the difference in the −2 log likelihood if the factor is removed from the analysis.

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TABLE 9

Significant Variances in Misperceptions by Primary News Source

	Primary Media Source	*Odds/Ratio*	*N*
US has found WMD	Fox	1.6	361
(N = 2,202)	CBS*	1.4	182
	NPR/PBS*	−1.3	53
US has found clear evidence of	Fox	2.0	366
Iraqi link to al Qaeda	CBS	1.8	188
(N = 2,202)	NPR/PBS	−3.5	59
Majority of world favors US	Fox	1.7	294
having gone to war with Iraq	CBS	1.9	168
(N = 1,827)	NPR/PBS	−5.6	55
At least one misperception	Fox	2.1	414
(N = 2,506)	CBS	2.3	213
	NPR/PBS	−3.8	66

Source: Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks.

* Not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. All other media sources did not vary significantly. For data, please contact the authors.

found, 5.6 times less likely to believe that world public opinion was favorable to the war, and 3.8 times less likely to have at least one misperception. However, they were not significantly different on the issue of WMD.

Level of attention to news was not a significant factor overall, with the exception of those who primarily got their news from Fox. This is consistent with the finding that Fox viewers were more likely to misperceive the more closely they followed events in Iraq. Multiplicative variables were derived for each network by multiplying attention to news by each network dummy variable. A multivariate analysis was performed on misperceptions in which each new combined network-attention level variable was added to the previous model. The results show that Fox viewers are the only ones to be significantly more likely to misperceive with higher levels of attention to news.

The third most powerful factor was intention to vote for the Democratic nominee. As compared to those who intended to vote for President Bush or were undecided, those who intended to vote for the Democratic nominee were 2.0 times less likely to believe that close links to al Qaeda have been found and 1.8 times less likely to believe that world public opinion was favorable to the war. Overall, those who intended to vote for the Democratic nominee were 1.8 times less likely to have at least one of these misperceptions, but did not quite achieve significance on the WMD question.

The fourth most powerful factor was education. Those who had no college, as compared to those had at least some college, were 1.3 times more likely to believe that close links to al Qaeda have been found and 1.4 times more likely to have at least one misperception, but did not quite achieve significance on the other misperceptions.

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Age was a very weak factor, with older people being very slightly less likely to misperceive. All other factors—gender, party identification (when intention to vote for the President was included), level of attention to news, and income—were not significant. In a separate analysis, region of the country was included and also not found to be significant.

Analysis

These data lead to the question of why so many Americans have misperceptions that appear to be having a significant impact on attitudes about the Iraq war and why these misperceptions vary according to one's source of news and political attitudes. This analysis starts with possible explanations based on exogenous factors and then moves inward.

The first and most obvious reason that the public had so many of these misperceptions is that the Bush administration made numerous statements that could easily be construed as asserting these falsehoods. On numerous occasions the administration made statements strongly implying that it had intelligence substantiating that Iraq was closely involved with al Qaeda and was even directly involved in the September 11 attacks. For example, in his 18 March 2003 Presidential Letter to Congress, President Bush explained that in going to war with Iraq he was taking "the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001."[11] When Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the UN Security Council on 5 February 2003, he presented photographs that were identified as al Qaeda training camps inside Iraq, leaving unclear the fact that the camp in question was in the northern part of Iraq, not under the control of the central Iraqi government.[12] Administration figures continued to refer to the purported meeting between Mohammed Atta and an Iraqi official in Prague even after U.S. intelligence agencies established that Atta was in fact in the United States at the time.[13] More recently, on 14 September 2003, Vice President Richard Cheney made the following ambiguous statement: "If we're successful in Iraq . . . so that it's not a safe haven for terrorists, now we will have struck a major blow right at the heart of the base, if you will, the geographic base of the terrorists who have had us under assault now for many years, but most especially on 9/11."[14] Sometimes the association has been established by inserting a reference to September 11 that is a non sequitur and

[11] President George W. Bush, "Presidential Letter," 18 March 2003, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-1.html.

[12] Secretary Colin L. Powell, "Remarks to the United Nations," New York City, 5 February 2003, available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/17300.htm, 12 October 2003.

[13] Dana Priest and Glenn Kessler, "Iraq, 9/11 Still Linked By Cheney," *Washington Post*, 29 September 2003.

[14] Vice President Richard Cheney, "Meet the Press," 14 September 2003.

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then simply moving on, or implying that the connection is so self-evident that it does not require explanation. For example, President Bush's own remarks at his press conference of 28 October 2003 could appear to reinforce multiple misperceptions:

> The intelligence that said he [Saddam Hussein] had a weapon system was intelligence that had been used by a multinational agency, the U.N., to pass resolutions. It's been used by my predecessor to conduct bombing raids. It was intelligence gathered from a variety of sources that clearly said Saddam Hussein was a threat. And given the attacks of September the 11th—it was—you know, we needed to enforce U.N. resolution (sic) for the security of the world, and we did. We took action based upon good, solid intelligence. It was the right thing to do to make America more secure and the world more peaceful.[15]

Here the listener could mistakenly interpret the President's comments as meaning that the same intelligence that determined the United States' policy on war had been accepted as correct by the UN Security Council in its deliberations and that the September 11 attacks, a UN Security Council resolution, and the choice to invade Iraq all followed a logical progression ("given the attacks of September the 11th—it was—you know").

In any case, it is quite clear that the public perceived that the administration was asserting a strong link between Iraq and al Qaeda, even to the point of Iraqi direct involvement in September 11. When PIPA/KN asked in June, "Do you think the Bush administration did or did not imply that Iraq under Saddam Hussein was involved in the September 11th attacks?" 71 percent said that it had.

The administration also made statements that came extremely close to asserting that WMD were found in postwar Iraq. On 30 May 2003, President Bush made the statement, ". . . for those who say we haven't found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they're wrong. We found them."[16]

Another possible explanation for why the public had such misperceptions is the way that the media reported the news. The large variation in the level of misperceptions does suggest that some media sources may have been making greater efforts than others to disabuse their audiences of misperceptions they may have had so as to avoid feeling conflict about going or having gone to war. Of course, the presence or absence of misperceptions in viewers does not necessarily prove that they were caused by the presence or absence of reliable reporting by a news source. Variations in the level of misperceptions according to news source may be related to variations in the political orientations of the audience. However, when political attitudes were controlled for the variations

[15] Full transcript: "Bush Defends Foreign Policy," *Washington Post*, online edition, 28 October 2003, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A29127-2003Oct28&notFound=true.

[16] Mike Allen, "Bush: 'We Found' Banned Weapons; President Cites Trailers in Iraq as Proof," *Washington Post*, 31 May 2001.

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between the networks and the same attitudes still obtained, it suggests that differences in reporting by media sources were playing a role.

There is also evidence that in the run-up to, during, and for a period after the war, many in the media appeared to feel that it was not their role to challenge the administration or that it was even appropriate to take an active pro-war posture. Fox News' programming on the war included a flag in the left-hand corner and assumed the Defense Department's name for the war: "Operation Iraqi Freedom." When criticized in a letter for taking a pro-war stance, Fox News' Neil Cavuto replied, "So am I slanted and biased? You damn well bet I am. . . . You say I wear my biases on my sleeve? Better that than pretend you have none, but show them clearly in your work."[17] Interestingly, even CBS News, which tends to have a more liberal reputation, seemed to think along these lines. CBS anchor Dan Rather commented in a 14 April 2003 interview with Larry King, "Look, I'm an American. I never tried to kid anybody that I'm some internationalist or something. And when my country is at war, I want my country to win. . . . Now, I can't and don't argue that that is coverage without a prejudice. About that I am prejudiced."[18]

A study of the frequencies of pro-war and anti-war commentators on the major networks found that pro-war views were overwhelmingly more frequent.[19] In such an environment, it would not be surprising that the media would downplay the lack of evidence of links between Iraq and al Qaeda, the fact that WMD were not being found, and that world public opinion was critical of the war. Furthermore, the fact shown in the present study that the audiences of the various networks have varied so widely in the prevalence of misperceptions lends credence to the idea that media outlets had the capacity to play a more critical role, but to varying degrees chose not to.

Reluctant to challenge the administration, the media can simply become a means of transmission for the administration, rather than a critical filter. For example, when President Bush made the assertion that WMD had been found, the 31 May 2003 edition of the *Washington Post* ran a front page headline saying, "Bush: 'We Found' Banned Weapons."[20]

There is also striking evidence that the readiness to challenge the administration is a variable that corresponds to levels of misperception among viewers. The aforementioned study of the frequency of commentary critical of the war found that the two networks notably least likely to present critical commentary were Fox and CBS—the same two networks that in the present study had view-

[17] David Folkenflik, "Fox News defends its patriotic coverage: Channel's objectivity is questioned," *Baltimore Sun*, 2 April 2003.

[18] Dan Rather, during the 4 April 2003 *Larry King Show*. Quoted in Steve Rendell and Tara Broughel, "Amplifying Officials, Squelching Dissent: FAIR study finds democracy poorly served by war coverage," *Extra!* (May/June 2003), Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, available at www.fair.org/extra/0305/warstudy.html.

[19] Steve Rendell and Tara Broughel, "Amplifying Officials, Squelching Dissent."

[20] Allen, "Bush: 'We Found' Banned Weapons," 31 May 2001.

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ers most likely to have misperceptions. This is clarified by statistics from Rendell and Broughel's content analysis of network coverage: "The percentage of U.S. sources that were officials varied from network to network, ranging from 75 percent at CBS to 60 percent at NBC. . . . Fox's Special Report with Brit Hume had fewer U.S. officials than CBS (70 percent) and more U.S. anti-war guests (3 percent) than PBS or CBS. Eighty-one percent of Fox's sources were pro-war, however, the highest of any network. CBS was close on the Murdoch network's heels with 77 percent. NBC featured the lowest proportion of pro-war voices with 65 percent."[21]

Another contributing factor may also have been a dynamic in reporting that is not unique to the Iraq war: the absence of something does not constitute a compelling story, while even the prospect of the presence of something does. Thus, shortly after the end of the war, numerous headlines trumpeted even faint prospects that evidence of WMD were about to be found. However, when these prospects failed to materialize, this did not constitute a compelling story and, thus, reporting on it was given a far less prominent position. The cumulative effect of repeatedly hearing the expectation that weapons were about to be found, while hearing little or no disconfirmation, could well contribute to the impression that at least one of these leads was indeed fruitful.

Other more subtle dynamics may also have been at work. The fact that world public opinion was so opposed to the United States going to war with Iraq may have been obscured by giving such high visibility to the U.S. conflict with France in the Security Council. The key story became one of French obstructionism, eclipsing the fact that polls from around the world, as well as the distribution of positions in the UN Security Council, showed widespread opposition to U.S. policy.[22]

One could well argue that this plethora of exogenous factors obviates the need for any explanations based on endogenous factors. Indeed, the fact that no particular misperception studied was found in a clear majority of the public and the fact that 40 percent had none of the key misperceptions buttress confidence in the capacity of the public to sort through misleading stimuli. At the same time, a majority had at least one major misperception, raising the question of why so many people have been susceptible.

The seemingly obvious explanation—that the problem is that people just do not pay enough attention to the news—does not hold up. As discussed,

[21] See footnote 19. Forthcoming studies by Susan Moeller are likely to offer a much more comprehensive view of these dynamics than is available at the time of writing. A report on media coverage of WMD under the aegis of the Center for International and Strategic Studies at the University of Maryland is in preparation for release in early 2004. See also Susan Moeller, "A Moral Imagination: The Media's Response to the War on Terrorism" in Stuart Allen and Barbie Zelizer, eds., *Reporting War* (London: Routledge, forthcoming). On the issue of embedded reporters, see a content analysis by the Project for Excellence in Journalism, "Embedded Reporters: What Are Americans Getting?" at www.journalism.org/resources/research/reports/war/embed/default.asp.

[22] See footnote 6.

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higher levels of attention to news did not reduce the likelihood of misperception, and in the case of those who primarily got their news from Fox News, misperceptions increased with greater attention. Furthermore, the presence of misperceptions was not just noise found randomly throughout an inattentive public—the presence of misperceptions formed strong patterns highly related to respondents' primary source of news.

Perhaps the most promising explanation is that the misperceptions have performed an essential psychological function in mitigating doubts about the validity of the war. Polls have shown that Americans are quite resistant to the idea of using military force except in self-defense or as part of a multilateral operation with UN approval.[23] Even if a country is developing nuclear weapons, there is not a consensus in the public that the United States would have the right to use military force to prevent it, though a very strong majority agrees that the UN Security Council would have this prerogative.[24]

Thus, to legitimate the war without UN approval, the President had to make the case that the war would be an act of self-defense. The war against the Taliban had been overwhelmingly approved as legitimate because the Taliban had provided support to al Qaeda and, thus, was a party to the September 11 attack on the United States. Americans showed substantial receptivity to the administration's assertion that Iraq also had links to al Qaeda and that the possibility that Iraq was developing WMD that could be passed to al Qaeda, creating a substantial threat to the United States. But the public also appeared to recognize that the evidence was circumstantial—and this was not a president who commanded so much respect in foreign policy realms that they could simply take his word for it.

The public felt the need for UN approval as an alternate normative basis for war. Early polls showed that a very strong majority was ready to act with UN approval, but less than a third were ready to act unilaterally, and even days before the war a majority was still saying that the United States needed to wait for UN approval.[25] But even months before the war, a clear majority of the pub-

[23] Evidence from the 1990s is reviewed in Steven Kull and I.M. Destler, *Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 42–57, 67–80, 94–110. The public's views at the outset of the current Iraq experience are documented and analyzed in the report "Iraq Debate 2002," available at www.americans-world.org.

[24] In January 2003, PIPA/KN asked a series of general questions about whether a right existed "to use military force to prevent a country that does not have nuclear weapons from acquiring them." Only 46 percent thought that, without UN approval, a country had the right to use military force on another country in this situation; virtually the same number (48 percent) thought the United States had this right. Seventy-six percent thought the UN Security Council had the right to authorize military force for this purpose. PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll, "Americans on Iraq and the UN Inspections I," 27 January 2003, available at www.pipa.org/online_reports.html.

[25] For early polls, see footnote 1. Just days before the war in a CBS News poll conducted 4–5 March, only 36 percent agreed that "Iraq presents such a clear danger to American interests that the United States needs to act now," while 59 percent agreed that "The US needs to wait for approval of the United Nations before taking any action against Iraq."

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lic said that if the President were to decide to go to war without UN approval they would support him,[26] and when the time came they did. This was a standard rally-round-the-president effect, no doubt intensified by a felt imperative to close ranks in the post-September 11 environment.[27]

Such rally effects, though, are fairly superficial. Even during and after the war, when asked whether they really approve of the decision to go to war as distinguished from just supporting Bush "because he is the president," only about half or less have said they think that going to war was the best thing, while another 15 to 22 percent have said that their approval of the war was just a way to support the president.[28]

Americans had expected that once the United States went into Iraq, they would find evidence that Iraq was linked to al Qaeda and was developing WMD, thus vindicating the decision to go to war as an act of self-defense. Therefore, it is not surprising that many have been receptive when the administration has strongly implied or even asserted that the United States has found evidence that Iraq was working closely with al Qaeda and was developing WMD, and when media outlets—some more than others—have allowed themselves to be passive transmitters of such messages.

Conclusion

From the perspective of democratic process, the findings of this study are cause for concern. They suggest that if the public is opposed to taking military action

[26] In December 2002, January 2003, and February, PIPA/KN presented respondents the following scenario: "Imagine that President Bush moves that the UN approve an invasion of Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein, but most of the other members of the UN Security Council want to continue to use threats and diplomatic pressure to get Iraq to comply, and the motion does not pass. President Bush then decides that the US will undertake an invasion of Iraq, even if the US has to do so on its own. Just based on this information, what do you think your attitude would be about this decision?" Respondents were offered the option of agreeing with the President's choice, disagreeing, or choosing "I would not agree with this decision, but I would still support the President." In all cases only a minority of 33 to 43 percent said they would agree, but another 25 to 27 percent said they would support but not agree, thus creating a majority ready to support the President should he decide to proceed.

[27] On the rally effect, see Richard A. Brody, "Crisis, War and Public Opinion: The Media and Public Support for the President" in W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz, *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); R.A. Brody and C.R. Shapiro, "A Reconsideration of the Rally Phenomenon in Public Opinion" in S. Long, ed., *Political Behavior Annual*, vol. 2 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989); and John E. Mueller, *War, Presidents and Public Opinion* (New York: Wiley, 1973): 208–213.

[28] Seven times in March and April 2003, Pew Research Center for the People and the Press asked, "Do you think the US made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military force against Iraq?" Those who said it was the right decision were asked whether they supported going to war because they think it was "the best thing for the US to do" or whether they were not sure if it was the best thing to do but they "support Bush's decision, because he is the president." During the war, 69 to 74 percent said the United States made the right decision, of which 48 to 54 percent thought it was the best thing to do, while 15 to 22 percent were unsure of this but supported the President. Each month from May through September, PIPA/KN repeated this question. Over this period, 45 to 53 percent thought that the war was the best thing to do, and 14 to 18 percent were unsure but supported the President.

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without UN approval and the President is determined to do so, he has remarkable capacities to move the public to support his decision. This in itself is not worrisome—to the degree it is the product of persuasion, based on the merits of an argument. What is worrisome is that it appears that the President has the capacity to lead members of the public to assume false beliefs in support of his position. In the case of the Iraq war, this dynamic appears to have played a critical role: among those who did not hold the key false beliefs, only a small minority supported the decision to go to war. In a regression analysis, the presence of misperceptions was the most powerful factor predicting support for the war, with intention to vote for the President close behind. This does not prove that the misperceptions alone caused support for the war. It is more likely that it is one key factor that interacted with the desire to rally around the President and the troops. However, it does appear that it would have been significantly more difficult for the President to elicit and maintain support for the decision to go to war if the public had not held such misperceptions.

The President's influence is not limitless. He does not appear to be capable of getting the public to go against their more deeply held value orientations. If he did, then it would not be necessary for the public to develop false beliefs. But he is capable of prompting the public to support him by developing the false beliefs necessary to justify the administration's policies in a way that is consistent with the public's deeper value orientations.

It also appears that the media cannot necessarily be counted on to play the critical role of doggedly challenging the administration. The fact that viewers of some media outlets had far lower levels of misperceptions than did others (even when controlling for political attitudes) suggests that not all were making the maximal effort to counter the potential for misperception.

To some extent, this period may be regarded as unique. We are still living in the aftermath of September 11. With the persisting sense of threat, the public may be more prone to try to accommodate the President, and the media may be more reluctant to challenge the President or to impart news that calls into question the validity of his decisions. And yet, it is also at times of threat that the most critical decisions are likely to be made.

It is likely that with time, public misperceptions will tend to erode. For example, after media coverage of David Kay's interim progress report on the activities of the Iraq Survey Group, the belief that WMD have been found dropped to 15 percent, although the belief that evidence of links to al Qaeda has been found did not drop. At the same time, there was a significant rise in the percentage that said they thought that the President at least stretched the truth when he made the case for war based on Iraq having a WMD program.[29] However, when the mechanisms for informing the public are in some way compromised, the process of the public gradually catching on is a slow one. In the meantime, the administration, by giving incorrect information, can gain sup-

[29] See Steven Kull, "Americans Reevaluate Going to War with Iraq," PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll, 13 November 2003, available at www.pipa.org.

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port for policies that might not be consistent with the preferences held by the majority of Americans.

APPENDIX

Methodology

The poll was fielded by Knowledge Networks—a polling, social science, and market research firm in Menlo Park, California—with a randomly selected sample of its large-scale nationwide research panel. This panel is itself randomly selected from the national population of households having telephones and subsequently provided internet access for the completion of surveys (and, thus, is not limited to those who already have internet access). The distribution of the sample in the web-enabled panel closely tracks the distribution of United States Census counts for the U.S. population on such variables as age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, geographical region, employment status, income, and education. The panel is recruited using stratified random digit-dial (RDD) telephone sampling. RDD provides a non-zero probability of selection for every U.S. household having a telephone. Households that agree to participate in the panel are provided with free Web access and an Internet appliance that uses a telephone line to connect to the Internet and uses the television as a monitor. In return, panel members participate in surveys three to four times a month. Survey responses are confidential, and identifying information is never revealed without respondent approval. When a survey is fielded to a panel member, he or she receives an e-mail indicating that the survey is available for completion. Surveys are self-administered. For more information about the methodology, please go to www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp.

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Issue Ownership and Presidential Campaigning, 1952–2000

JOHN R. PETROCIK
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The problems facing the country and the issues of concern to the voters shape the competitive environment of an election. Democrats "own" some issues; Republicans "own" others. Democrats have an electoral advantage when problems and issues associated with social welfare and intergroup relationships are salient. Republicans have an advantage when issues related to taxes, spending, and the size of government are high on the public agenda. Performance issues, such as the conduct of government officials, the state of the economy, or the country's status and security among other nations, are not automatically owned by a single party, but can provide an advantage to a candidate when events, official behavior, and policy successes and failures allow the candidate to claim credit for good times or blame the opposition for bad times. Thus, candidates campaign on issues that confer an advantage in order to prime their salience in the decisional calculus of the voters.[1]

[1] Iyengar and Kinder have persuasive experimental evidence that demonstrate voter susceptibility to issue priming. See Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder, *News that Matters: Television and American Public Opinion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). Also see John R. Petrocik, "Divided Government: Is It All in the Campaigns" in Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell, eds., *The Politics of Divided Government* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 13; John R. Petrocik, "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study," *American Journal of Political Science* 40 (August 1996): 825–850; Patrick J. Sellers, "Strategy and Background in Congressional Campaigns," *American Political Science Review* 92 (March 1998): 159–171; Gary C. Jacobson, *The Electoral Origins of Divided Government* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); Morris P. Fiorina, *Congress: Keystone of the Wash-*

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The dynamics of this characteristic of campaigning have been described as the issue-ownership theory of voting. Similar conceptualizations, directional theory as it is presented by George Rabinowitz and Stuart Macdonald and the selective emphasis formulation of Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, share a core proposition that the concerns of voters confer an advantage because parties have distinct issue reputations. They depart on what provides this reputation, however, and they have different interpretations about what voters see as an incentive to support a party.[2]

The analysis presented here uses the issue-ownership formulation to examine presidential elections from 1952 through 2000. It includes a direct measure of the campaign rhetoric of presidential candidates between 1952 and 2000 in order to fill out the empirical foundations of issue-ownership campaigning. It presents new data and some unanticipated findings from a computer-aided content analysis of the acceptance addresses and television spot advertisements of presidential candidates from 1952 through 2000. Four questions are analyzed. First, is the content of each candidate's TV spot ads and nomination acceptance speech focused on issues that his or her party normally owns, as the theory of issue-ownership expects? Second, are the issues raised by each candidate's campaign reported by the media in roughly the proportions in which the candidates emphasize them? Third, do the issue emphases of the candidates match the issue problems important to voters? Finally, does the vote among elections vary with the issue concerns of the electorate?

The original contributions of the analysis are its direct measurement of the content of the campaign and the illumination of what appears to be a discrepancy between the issue agenda of the campaigns and the media's report of the issues emphasized by the candidates. Previous analyses of issue-ownership dynamics have relied on reports by the media or survey respondents of what issues were raised in speeches and advertisements to determine whether candidates engaged in issue-ownership campaigning.[3] A content analysis of ads and acceptance speeches allows this analysis to measure directly the issues raised by the candidates, the issues reported by the media, and the issue concerns of the voters. The result is a more reliable and valid test of the propositions that candidates are issue-ownership campaigners, that the media extends the reach of the candidates by repeating the content of the campaign, and that the issue emphases of the candidates are echoed by the weight voters assign to these issues in their judgments about the candidates.

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ington Establishment, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1989); Paul S. Herrnson and Kelly D. Patterson, "Agenda Setting and Campaign Advertising in Congressional Elections" in J. A. Thurber, C. J. Nelson, and D. A. Dulio, eds., *Crowded Airwaves: Campaign Advertising in Elections* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 96.

[2] George Rabinowitz and Stuart Macdonald, "A Directional Theory of Voting," *American Political Science Review* 83 (March 1989): 93–122. The selective emphasis formulation of the idea is found in Ian Budge and Dennis J. Farlie, *Explaining and Predicting Elections* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1983).

[3] Petrocik, "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study" and Sellers, "Strategy and Background in Congressional Campaigns."

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The paper is organized into three parts. It begins with a brief description of the theory of issue-ownership, with particular attention to its relationship to the agenda-setting function that is attributed to the media. The second part of the paper describes the data and measures. The final part reports the findings.

How Issue Ownership Allows Campaigns to Influence Voters

Voters assign importance, often very high importance, to almost all issues, and they assume differences in the ability of political parties to "fix" them. Ideologically motivated voters may have clear ideas about what policies best handle a problem, but the majority are pragmatic and instrumental, mostly interested in "fixing" problems, and they see differences in the parties' ability to fix them.[4] Issue ownership is a major asset to a candidate's effort to persuade voters because mere association with a party is an indicator of an ability to implement superior policies and programs for dealing with the problems owned by the party. The reputation matters because a significant determinant of candidate choice is the problems (medical care needs, high taxes, improvement of national security, and so forth) that voters want the government to address, not the policies the candidates promise to pursue.[5] A concern with problems that are viewed as better handled by Democrats reinforces Democratic identifiers, provokes defection among Republicans, and catalyzes a Democratic tide among independents. Concern with issues regarded as better handled by the GOP has the opposite effect.[6] The ability to "handle" is a good reputation to have, since it implies skill in dealing with an issue. The reputation results from a history of attention, initiative, and innovation toward these issues, and it leads voters to believe that the party's candidates are more sincere and committed to doing something about them.[7] As a result, the issue concerns of the voters

[4] Jacobs and Shapiro also see an ability by candidates to shape the issue concerns and preferences of voters, albeit in a rather different way than is advanced here. Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, *Politicians Don't Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

[5] Petrocik, "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study," Tables 5 and 6.

[6] The proposition behind this analysis is that campaigns influence the perceptions and behavior of voters and the outcome of elections. Two recent papers by Daron Shaw provide compelling evidence that campaigns influence voters. Daron Shaw, "The Effect of TV Ads and Candidate Appearances on Statewide Presidential Votes, 1988–1996," *American Political Science Review* 93 (June 1999): 345–361 and Daron Shaw, "A Study of Presidential Campaign Event Effects from 1952 to 1992," *Journal of Politics* 61 (May 1999): 387–422. Christopher Blunt shows that campaigns increase salience and increase the consistency between candidate choice and policy priors. Christopher C. Blunt, *Producing Responsibility: The Role of Campaigns in Subpresidential Elections.* (Ph.D. diss., UCLA, 2002). The debate about campaigns can be sampled in Andrew Gelman and Gary King, "Why Are American Presidential Election Campaign Polls so Variable When Votes Are so Predictable?" *British Journal of Political Science* 23 (October 1993): 409–451 and Thomas Holbrook, *Do Campaigns Matter?* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996).

[7] Rabinowitz and Macdonald, in their "A Directional Theory of Voting," have similar notions about the importance of commitment.

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define the critical difference among elections. The voter's susceptibility to be persuaded that a problem deserves attention provides the candidate with the opportunity to create a winning plurality. A key empirical underpinning of the theory of issue-ownership is that what the electorate believes to be the most important problems changes in response to what they believe is happening in the world, while their core attitudes and related policy preferences change slowly.[8]

Sincerity, internal party imperatives, and strategic calculations lead a campaign to attempt to increase the salience of issues owned by the candidate's party (or, in some cases, the candidate uniquely).[9] Sincerity matters because typical Democrats (or Republicans) believe in the concerns of their party. Internal party imperatives are significant because constituent groups press particular issues and policies into the campaigns of the party's candidates. Finally, strategic calculation is a factor because candidates recognize their issue-handling advantages and the opportunity they present to gain an advantage over the opposition.[10]

The Variability of Issue-handling Reputations

Issue-handling reputations are not eternal or even invariant. A party can lose an advantage on a constituency-based issue when major shifts occur in the party coalitions. Short-term circumstances can change the advantage on performance issues when, for example, foreign policy failures or economic downturns occur. Candidates or parties can even lose control of their issues in the short term because dissatisfied voters will be inclined to deny the party or candidate with whom they are unhappy any redeeming qualities. A candidate who is especially well-liked can be viewed as able to handle a problem that is not usually an issue strength of his (or her) party. During the first year of Ronald Reagan's presidency, for example, the Democrats and the GOP were viewed as equally good at reducing unemployment (an issue Democrats are normally judged better able to handle). During the 1992 election cycle, Democrats and Republicans were viewed as equally competent at handling crime and taxes (issues Democrats are usually not thought to handle well). Campaign data from 1996 found similar results.[11]

[8] The long-term stability of attitudes and preferences is well documented in Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in American Policy Preferences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). William G. Mayer, in *The Changing American Mind: How and Why American Public Opinion Changed Between 1960 and 1988* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), observes more change, albeit over a lengthy time period.

[9] A candidate can own an issue, as, for example, a famous and successful prosecutor might have high credibility of the issue of crime. See Sellers, "Strategy and Background in Congressional Campaigns."

[10] William H. Riker, "Rhetorical Interaction During the Ratification Campaign," in William H. Riker, ed., *Agenda Formation* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993).

[11] This information came by way of personal communications of acquaintances who were working for the Bush, Dole, and Clinton campaigns in 1992 and 1996.

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There is a stable and long-term equilibrium to issue-handling reputations, however. Performance-issue reputations (who can assure a strong economy, for example) can be gained and lost in short periods of time (in concert with, for example, changes in the economy). Constituency-based issues (the sort that are the focus of this analysis) are more stable, although events and personalities can induce some shifts. Constituency pressures within and between the parties, constant party rhetoric, and recurring policy initiatives reinforce issue reputations and keep them intact over long periods of time. As a result, Republicans are viewed as likely to protect traditional American values, keep taxes low, government small, and national security strong. Democrats are expected to help the elderly, protect Social Security, reduce unemployment, protect the environment, and ensure fair treatment of minorities.

The Prospects for Issue Priming in Campaigns

Agenda-setting influences on voters were first measured in media studies.[12] Probably the most persuasive demonstration of media agenda setting was offered by Iyengar and his colleagues who used experiments to document a correlation between the problems covered in newscasts and the importance their subjects assigned to the problems and the fact that problems covered in the media were more correlated with candidates' evaluations and the vote than problems not covered by the media.[13] So, for example, those exposed to news about foreign policy issues were more likely to predicate their evaluation of public officials and their vote on their foreign policy preferences. Krosnick and Kinder replicated these results in their independent study of attitudes toward Reagan and the Iran-Contra affair.[14] John Zaller's work on question effects in

[12] Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald Shaw, "The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 36 (Summer, 1972): 18–22; G. Ray Funkhouser, "The Issues of the Sixties: An Exploratory Study of the Dynamics of Public Opinion," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 37 (Spring 1973): 62–75; Wenmouth Williams and David C. Larsen, "Agenda-Setting in an Off-Election Year," *Journalism Quarterly*, 54 (Winter 1977): 744–749; Lutz Erbring, Edie N. Goldenberg, and Arthur Miller, "Front Page News and Real-World Cues: A New Look at Agenda-Setting by the Media," *American Journal of Political Science* 24 (February 1980): 16–49; Gerald Stone and Maxwell McCombs, "Tracing the Time Lag in Agenda-Setting," *Journalism Quarterly*, 58 (Spring 1981): 151–155; David Weaver, Doris A. Graber, Maxwell McCombs, and Chaim Eyal, *Media Agenda-Setting in a Presidential Election: Issues, Images, and Interest* (New York: Praeger, 1981); Shanto Iyengar, *Is Anyone Responsible?: How Television Frames Political Issues* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Klaus Schoenbach and Holli Semetko, "Agenda-Setting, Agenda-Reinforcing or Agenda-Deflating? A Study of the 1990 German National Election," *Journalism Quarterly* 69 (Winter 1992): 837–847.

[13] Shanto Iyengar, Mark Peters, and Donald Kinder, "Experimental Demonstrations of the 'Not-So-Minimal' Consequences of Television News Programs," *American Political Science Review*, 76 (December 1982): 848–858; Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder, *News that Matters: Television and American Public Opinion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

[14] Jon Krosnick and Donald Kinder, "Altering the Foundations of Support for the President Through Priming," *American Political Science Review* 84 (June 1990): 497–512.

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surveys represents a strong generalization about framing effects in politics.[15] Collectively, these data present a strong *prima facie* case for the ability of a campaign to regulate the salience of issues and, by way of that, the vote.

Candidates can also help to shape what voters think about because media reports of candidate speeches, activity, and campaign advertising broadcast a candidate's discussion of the issues and problems facing the country, and the resulting elite discussion helps to create the public agenda. Over forty years ago, Katz and Feldman reviewed survey research after the 1960 presidential debates and concluded that "[t]here seems to be little doubt that the debates made some issues more salient."[16] Swanson and Swanson similarly observed that the first 1976 presidential debate exerted an agenda-setting effect that was distinguishable from any agenda-setting effects of watching new coverage of the debate.[17] In a more recent summary, Herrnson and Patterson concluded that "[t]elevision ads, which nearly half of all voters cite as their most important source of information on House candidates, are better suited to setting an agenda and conveying images than to presenting policy alternatives."[18] This agenda-setting and priming effect is significant because most voters are uncertain about what represents a serious problem, lack a clear preference about most social and policy issues, are normally disinclined to impose thematic or ideological consistency on issues, and are inclined to view elections as choices about collective goods and resolving problems rather than a venue for choosing among policy specifics. Experimental studies have corroborated the priming effects of television spots.[19]

[15] John Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, eds., *Choices, Values, and Frames* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[16] Elihu Katz and J. L. Feldman, "The Debates in Light of Research: A Survey of Surveys" in Sidney Kraus, ed., *The Great Debates: Kennedy vs. Nixon, 1960* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962).

[17] Linda L. Swanson and David L. Swanson, "The Agenda-Setting Functions of the First Ford-Carter Debate," *Communication Monographs* 45 (November 1978): 347–353; but Lee B. Becker, David H. Weaver, Doris A. Graber, and Maxwell E. McCombs, "Influence on Public Agendas," in Sidney Kraus, ed., *The Great Debates: Carter vs. Ford, 1976* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979).

[18] Paul S. Herrnson and Kelly D. Patterson, "Agenda Setting and Campaign Advertising in Congressional Elections," in James A. Thurber, Candace J. Nelson, and David A. Dulio, eds., *Crowded Airwaves: Campaign Advertising in Elections* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 99.

[19] The longstanding debate about the level of issue consistency among voters may be resolvable in light of the insights of priming and framing. Voters may not have become more ideological in recent years, but it is entirely possible that levels of issue consistency do vary, as Nie et al. asserted, according to the salience of candidate conflict over issues. See Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter*, enlarged ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979). This, of course, is also the thesis that structures Zaller's analysis of opinion formation (Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*). In addition, there continues to be evidence that opinions are shaped by views expressed by persons in the media. Benjamin I. Page, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Glenn R. Dempsey, "What Moves Public Opinion?" *American Political Science Review* 81 (March 1987): 23–43. In principle, therefore, a campaign might alter attitudes toward some object as well as policy preferences. See John Schleuder, Maxwell McCombs, and Wayne Wanta, "Inside the Agenda-Setting Process: How Political Advertising and TV News Prime Viewers to Think About Issues and Candi-

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Testing of the Theory with Some New Data

In brief, there is persuasive evidence of different kinds that citizens' concerns are influenced by what candidates talk about and that their assessment of the candidates varies with the salience of problems. The question is whether this phenomenon is a feature of election campaigns. Specifically, do presidential candidates mostly campaign on issues they own and does doing so affect voters and explain election outcomes? Demonstrations that candidates behave as though they were conducting issue-ownership campaigns have been based on content analyses of new stories and survey respondent reports.[20] This analysis stands apart for its direct measure of the issue mentions in candidate advertising spots and acceptance addresses.

The Sample of Spots and the Acceptance Addresses

This analysis is based on a content analysis of candidates' acceptance speeches and television commercials for presidential elections from 1952 through 2000. Spot texts were obtained from a variety of sources: compilation tapes, a visit to the Political Communication Center at the University of Oklahoma, the Internet (for recent campaigns), and videotapes from television broadcasts. The sample of acceptance addresses consists of the text of every nomination acceptance address from the Republican and Democratic candidates for president from 1952–2000.

The length of the television spots varies considerably. For example, in 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower made at least twenty-nine 20-second "Eisenhower Answers America" spots. For 1956, we were able to locate only one 20-second spot for Eisenhower, along with a 2-minute spot, and five spots of about 4 minutes and 20 seconds. Historically, the most common formats for presidential television spots are 30- and 60-second ads. Thus, because television spots vary in length, comparing an equal number of spots from one campaign (or candidate) to another could yield misleading counts of issues mentioned. Thirty 60-second spots have twice as much opportunity to influence viewers as thirty 30-second spots. To adjust for this possible bias, the sample was defined to be 30 minutes of advertising (thirty 60-second spots, sixty 30-second spots, or other combination) from every Republican and Democratic candidate from 1952 through 2000 (see Appendix Table 1 for the length of spots analyzed).[21]

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dates" in Frank Biocca, ed., *Television and Political Advertising: Psychological Processes* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1991).

[20] Petrocik, "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study" and Sellers, "Strategy and Background in Congressional Campaigns."

[21] In some years, based on the holdings of the Oklahoma archive, thirty minutes of spots were either never produced or not preserved.

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Measurement of the Issue Content of the Spots and Acceptance Addresses

The issue content of the spots and acceptance addresses was measured with the *Concordance* software program. There were two basic steps in our textual analysis. First, we developed a list of search terms for Democratic and Republican issues. We began with texts from 918 general presidential television spots and the twenty-six presidential nomination acceptance addresses from 1952 through 2000.[22] We produced a list of every word appearing in these texts (a "full" concordance). Words from this list that pertained to policy topics were then grouped into Democratic and Republican issues (per Petrocik's categories).[23] For example, the word list for education (a Democratic issue) included classes, college, curriculum, educate, kindergarten, school, teach, and university. The word list for national defense (a Republican issue) included such words as ammunition, army, bomb, combat, Marines, military, navy, soldier, and troops (a complete list of search terms for each issue is available upon request). Because *Concordance* permits users to view the context (in our sample of texts) for each occurrence of each term, the texts were consulted when words with ambiguous references (for example, drugs was used to discuss both illegal drugs and prescription drugs) were searched for by the program. This intervention ensured that we did not under- or over-count issues that were actually raised in the texts.

Second, we also used *Concordance* to count the search list terms in the texts of TV spots and acceptance addresses of all Democratic and Republican candidates in all campaigns from 1952 through 2000. This exercise yielded the frequency with which each candidate, in a given campaign, employed the words on the search term list. We compiled data across campaigns to produce the frequency of issue mentions for Republicans and Democrats for each of the Republican and Democratic issues in their acceptance addresses and television spots. A caveat: word mentioning is not the same as mentioning an issue. However, the words are embedded in text which raises the general issue of education, health care, etc., so for convenience we are using the term "issue" rather than "word."

Because we employed computer content analysis in this study, there is no human coding, no variance in reliability, and no inter-coder reliability issue. We use words as a means for identifying the presence and frequency of issue mentions. While words (like tax, taxes, jobs, unemployed) are not identical with issues (taxation, unemployment), words do provide a clear index of the presence or absence of an issue. Given that our point is to provide comparisons of

[22] This sample is described in William L. Benoit, *Seeing Spots: A Functional Analysis of Presidential Television Advertisements, 1952–1996* (Westport: Praeger, 1999); William L. Benoit, John P. McHale, Glenn J. Hansen, P. M. Pier, and John P. McGuire, *Campaign 2000: A Functional Analysis of Acclaiming, Attacking, and Defending.* (Lanham, MD; Rowman and Littlefield, in press).

[23] Petrocik, "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study."

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the relative frequency of discussion of party-owned issue by Republican and Democratic nominees, rather than absolute measures of issues, we see no problem with using words.

Measurement of Media Reports of Candidate Issue Emphases

Media reports of candidate issue emphases are measured by a content analysis of candidate-generated stories about issues and public policy in the *New York Times* during October of each election year from 1952 through 2000. In the initial stage, the content analysis coded the stories into one of fourteen different categories.[24] The categories are similar to and inspired by the Budge and Farlie scheme, but have been modified to reflect the problems mentioned by respondents in the election surveys and features of the American party system not captured by their general codes.[25] Candidate-generated issue stories in the *Times* are those that report speeches or position papers by the candidates or their surrogates (for example, the vice-presidential candidate, national party officials, other party candidates and officials) that identify problems, issues, or policies. The stories can be positive or negative: positive when they involve proposals or an assessment, negative when they concentrate on the failures of the other party or candidate; or they can be some combination of the two. Positivity and negativity are not distinguished in this coding. Stories identified as Republican refer to stories about campaign issues better handled by Republicans; Democratic stories dealt with issues better handled by Democrats (see Appendix Table 2 for the categorizations).

Issue Ownership Campaigning by Presidential Candidates

The GOP ad sample produced 2,606 issue mentions; the Democratic ads yielded 2,611 issue mentions (see Appendix Table 3 for the data). As a result, party differences in the incidence of issue mentions cannot be a function of sample size. This control does not exist for the acceptance speeches, which could have substantially different lengths and produce unequal opportunities to mention issues. The total number of issue mentions by the Democrats (2,189) in their acceptance addresses is only slightly less than the total mentioned by the Republicans (2,316), however.

The frequencies of word-issue mentions show that Democrats and Republicans, but especially that latter, were issue-ownership campaigners. Democrats devoted 52 percent of the issue mentions in their TV spots to Democratic issues and 48 percent in their acceptance addresses. GOP-owned issues were 67 percent of all issue mentions in their TV spots and 69 percent of the issue mentioned in their nomination addresses. Looked at from the perspective of which

[24] Ibid.

[25] Budge and Farlie, *Explaining and Predicting Elections.*

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FIGURE 1
Issue Agenda of Presidential Candidates: 1952–2000



Note: Graph height represents the total number of issues mentioned. The numerical entries on each graph are the percentage share that each topic is of all the mentions.

campaign did the most to introduce an issue, each party was also the source of most of its own issues that were mentioned by either candidate. That is, Democrats made the majority of the references to Democratic issues, while Republicans were responsible for most of the references to GOP issues. For example, Democrats made 67 percent of all the references to education—a Democratic issue—in the nomination acceptance speeches. Similarly, taxes—a GOP issue—was mentioned 196 times in acceptance addresses, 67 percent of the time by the Republican. GOP candidates were responsible for 54 percent of the 1,947 references to Republican issues in their nomination acceptance speeches and 53 percent of the 2,151 references to GOP-owned issues in the ads (the differences between the parties in the rates at which they mentioned their issues are all highly significant statistically). For three issues—religion and morality, crime, and drug use—the non-ownership party mentions the issue a majority of the time. Democrats produced more references than the Republicans did to these GOP-owned issues. But, overall, the candidates made a majority of the references to issues their party owned in nineteen out of twenty-four comparisons.

Each candidate's relative emphasis on his own issues is apparent in Figure 1, which categorizes the issues into four groups. Three of the groups—defense policy; spending, taxes, and the deficit; and crime, drugs, and morality—are GOP-owned issues. Social welfare issues are owned by the Democrats (many issues qualify as social welfare issues, as shown in Appendix Table 2). Figure 1 is designed to display two features of the mentions: their total number and their relative frequency of mentions by the candidates. Fifty-one percent of the issue

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FIGURE 2
Issue Emphases in Acceptance Speeches and TV Advertisements: 1952–2000



mentions in Democratic TV ads dealt with one or more of the five social welfare issues; 47 percent of the issue content of their acceptance speeches dealt with social welfare. Defense issues, spending and taxes, and social order questions (crime, drugs, and morality) were each mentioned half as frequently by Democratic candidates—at best. Republicans were more focused than Democrats on the issues they owned. Only 36 percent of their TV ads dealt with social welfare questions; and social welfare issues were mentioned even less frequently—only 29 percent of the total—in nomination acceptance speeches.

The benefit that the GOP has received from its more focused issue-ownership campaigning is apparent in Figure 2, which categorizes the issues by party ownership. Again, column height indicates the raw incidence of the mentions. Republicans put two-thirds or more of their efforts into issues owned by them. Democrats, by contrast, by mentioning defense policy, spending and taxes, and social order issues in their acceptance speeches and TV ads, spent as much time raising Republican as Democratic issues. The net effect of the attention given to GOP issues is that slightly more than 60 percent of *all* the issues raised in acceptance speeches are GOP-owned and approximately 56 percent of all of the issues raised in presidential campaign TV ads are GOP-owned. Put differently, Democrats did not balance off the Republican campaign effort. On the contrary, they effectively promoted a Republican agenda by addressing questions of national defense, the social order, and taxes and spending. Most of the issues raised in the spots and the acceptance addresses were GOP-owned.

This Republican advantage may be structural. Democratic issues are consistently prominent in American politics, but they are relatively few in number. As a result, most of the problems that a president is expected to handle are GOP issue-handling specialties. Democrats' campaigns emphasize GOP issues more

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than they might prefer because they cannot ignore taxation, government spending levels, and national security. Of course, Republicans cannot ignore social welfare issues, but Republicans who divided their issue messages equally among social welfare, taxation, spending, and national security would still mention issues that advantage their candidacies 75 percent of the time. Conversely, Democrats who spent the majority of their efforts on social welfare areas would still be spending almost a majority of their campaigns addressing Republican issues.

Since presidential campaigns are usually equally energetic, the summary effect of the Democrat's need to pay attention to GOP-owned issues is that most of the issue mentions in an election advantage the Republican. Priming is, all things being equal, responsive to total exposure and that provides the GOP an advantage.[26]

The Partisan Balance of Issue Emphases, 1952–2000 Elections

This GOP advantage has been fairly consistent, although, as Figure 3 shows, its size has not been uniform. The figure, which plots the number of Democratic and Republican issue mentions by Democratic and GOP candidates in their nomination acceptance speeches and TV advertisements, shows notable differences between the parties, among the elections, and between TV ads and acceptance speeches.

First, Figure 3 shows that the basic feature of Figure 2 recurs in most elections: in eight of thirteen elections, the Democratic campaigns mentioned more Republican-owned than Democratic-owned issues in their television advertisements. Democratic acceptance speeches from 1952 through 2000 were even more likely to emphasize Republican issues. In 2000, Al Gore raised slightly more Democratic than Republican issues—making his acceptance speech the *most* Democratic of any Democratic acceptance speech from 1952 through 2000.

Second, while GOP TV ads and acceptance speeches are usually more focused on their own issues, the emphasis is not always as lopsided as it was in GOP TV ads in 1988, and it can be absent, as it was when George W. Bush's TV ads in 2000 were more focused on Democratic than Republican issues. Interelection differences also mark the Democrats' effort on TV. Democrats were "on message" in their TV ads in 1960, 1976, and all the time since 1988. They gave more emphasis to GOP issues in the other campaigns.

Third, nomination acceptance speeches, although more faithful than TV advertisements to issue-ownership, are not as partisan as conventional wisdom might suggest. Nomination acceptances are commonly thought to be events at

[26] The source of this advantage has several possible explanations. One common observation is the nature of the office. That is, the presidency and perhaps all executive offices deal with public goods, and the Democratic party's programmatic focus on redistributive goods gives it a disadvantage. Other offices, legislative ones for example, are more focused on distributive and redistributive issues—a fact that Jacobson and others argue gives an advantage to Democrats in legislative elections. A national versus local dimension may also play a role here.

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FIGURE 3
Party Ownership of Issues in TV Advertisements and Acceptance Speeches: 1952–2000



Note: Each graph plots the number of Democratic and Republican issues raised in each year by the candidates in their TV ads (top graphs) and acceptance speeches (bottom graphs).

which the candidates make a "visionary" agenda-setting appeal to the electorate and offer a siren call to fire up the party faithful. But such efforts are barely noticeable from the Democrats. On balance, nomination acceptance addresses by the Democrat almost never favored Democratic issues.[27] Republicans, in contrast, primed their issues by mentioning them more than they mentioned Democratic issues. In some years—1972 and 1996—the Republican candidates mentioned GOP issues by a three to one margin. In other elections—1956 and

[27] Candidates behave differently in their primary elections. In a companion study, Benoit and Hansen have observed a much heavier emphasis on owned issues in primary elections. That is, Democrats are substantially more focused on Democratic issues in primaries relative to the general election content; Republicans are similarly more focused on their issues in primaries than they are in general elections. See William L. Benoit and Glenn J. Hansen, "Issue Adaptation of Presidential Television Spots and Debates to Primary and General Election Audiences," *Communication Research Reports* 19 (Spring 2002): 138–145.

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FIGURE 4
The Balance of Party Ownership in TV Ads: 1952–2000



Note: This figure shows a numerical difference that is a recalculation of the issue emphases displayed in Figure 3. The Democratic values are obtained by subtracting the number of GOP issues mentioned by the Democratic candidate from the number of Democratic issues mentioned by the Democrat. The Republican values are obtained by subtracting the number of Democratic issues mentioned by the Republican candidate from the number of GOP issue mentions by the Republican.

1968—issue mentions were more balanced. The magnitude of the difference was not consistent in GOP campaigns, but it always favored Republican-owned issues and seems to have increased between 1952 and 2000.

It may be, as pundits so often note, that the candidates are busy establishing their vision on a wide range of issues. But if the priming effect exceeds the vision effect, this strategy may be counterproductive—especially for the Democrats who appear to prime issues on which their competence is generally suspect, occasionally (such as with defense) by a lopsided margin.

The Republican Bias in TV Advertising

Figure 4 summarizes the balance of GOP and Democratic issue mentions in each campaign's TV advertisements from 1952 through 2000. In the 2000 election, both Gore and Bush emphasized Democratic-owned issues more than Republican issues. The 2000 election is the only one in which the Republican candidate paid more attention to Democratic than Republican issues, although

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Reagan paid nearly equal attention to Democratic issues in 1980. Bush displaced Reagan as the Republican with the most Democratic campaign themes. Reagan's 1980 campaign was the "least" Republican before 2000. Democratic issues were (by a narrow margin) a majority of the issue references in the TV advertisements broadcast by the campaigns in 1960, 1976, and 1992; they were a substantial majority of the issue references in 2000. In the other nine presidential campaigns—and 1988 in particular—the net balance of issue rhetoric emphasized GOP-owned issues.

The Media's Response to the Campaigns

Figure 5 plots the coordinates for the net balance of Democratic-owned and GOP-owned issues mentioned by each campaign in their TV spots and the net balance of party-owned issues reported in the press.[28] It has two striking features.

The first is that mass media reports (as they are represented by the *New York Times*) of the balance of Democratic-owned and Republican-owned issues emphasized by presidential candidates do not correlate with the balance of party-owned issues in the TV spots. In addition, the Democratic points and the Republican points are unrelated differently. In their TV ads, the Democrats were as likely to emphasize Republican as Democratic issues (see the horizontal spread of the Democratic ads); but the *Times* stories about the Democratic campaigns showed the Democratic candidates and their surrogates emphasizing Democratic issues exclusively. Republican campaigns were (2000 excepted) always more likely to emphasize GOP issues, however, not in the way the *Times* reported them. Virtually all of the issue scores for the Republican TV spots are on the GOP side of the horizontal scale (but not in 2000), though usually not as strongly Republican as the *Times* reports. The *Times* stories are also much more variable than the campaigns. In some years, the *Times* accurately reported a Republican campaign *slightly* tilted toward GOP issues while in others its campaign stories reported a heavy GOP emphasis of Republican-owned issues that does not seem to have been there.[29]

Second, the *Times* tended to report the campaigns as more focused on owned issues than they appear to have been from the TV advertisements. The *Times* never observed a Democratic campaign that emphasized GOP issue themes. However, the TV ad data in Figure 5 indicate that most of the Democratic campaigns emphasized Republican issues. Also, while the Republican campaigns were more tilted to GOP than Democratic issues (with the exception of the 2000 Bush campaign), the issue partisanship of the Republican campaigns was relatively modest. The vertical spread of the *Times* report of the Republican campaigns make several of them (1964, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1992, and 1996) far more focused on GOP-issue themes than they were on in the ads.

[28] The *New York Times* content analysis is fully explained in Petrocik, "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study."

[29] References to the "campaign" hereafter refer to the issue mentions in the TV spots.

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FIGURE 5
Campaign Issue Content and News Reports



Note: In this presentation and all subsequent tables and figures, references to the campaign refer to the TV spots alone. The vertical axis is a percentage difference from Petrocik's 1996 paper (see note 28). The horizontal axis is a raw numerical count.

We have no certain explanation for this result, but we are struck by the extent to which news reports—unlike the ads—show a sharp party cleavage in the emphasis of each campaign. Assuming that the content analysis of the media stories and the ads is accurate and reliable (despite being in very different scales), the data in Figure 5 have three possible explanations. First, the issue content of TV ads may be different from the issues raised by candidates and their surrogates in the venues that provide story material for reporters; second, the issues emphasized by press reports reflect a tendency of the press to create party and issue consistency in their reporting because of the perceptions of the press about the issue agendas of the parties; and, third, there is a measurement error because the sample of issue coverage in the media is incomplete.

We do not have systematic tests to eliminate or corroborate these possibilities. However, we think that the discrepancy in Figure 5 is not a measurement

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or coding error because the pattern in the figure is (in our judgment) too substantial. Second, we think the pattern is probably accurate because it is consistent with other evidence of media exaggerations of some aspects of campaigns. Benoit and his colleagues, for example, show that newspaper reports of candidate debates consistently report attacks more frequently than they actually occur and positive statements less frequently.[30] In some, but not all debates, the news reported character statements more often than they occurred in the debates and policy utterances less frequently than they occurred in the debates. In other words, there is solid evidence that the press has systematic inaccuracies in the way it reports campaigns, and it has been seen for some time.[31] Political reporters generally subscribe to strong notions of what is typical of the parties, they are sensitive to issue differences between the candidates, and reports on campaigns are certainly conditioned by the these images and expectations. It is entirely reasonable to believe that reporters, in telling sensible stories about the campaigns, observe more consistency and less variability in the issue agendas of the candidates.

Third, because campaigns emphasize focus and consistency, it is unlikely that they will raise one group of issues and themes in their ads and a different group in their speeches and airport stopovers.[32] While partisans are over-represented in the audience at airport stopovers, the managers and speechwriters who shape the talking points for campaign events are the same staff who are working out the content of ads and writing the big speeches. In addition, the purpose of the airport stopover and quick visits to local fairs is to have the events reported in the local news. That is to say, campaign appearances are not designed just for the immediate audience. Similar considerations make it unlikely, but not impossible, that our October samples of the *Times* political stories is unrepresentative of the campaign.

In brief, we do not believe that the issue content of the ads and candidate utterances at campaign events are very different. We are inclined to believe that the press (as the *Times* represents it) operates from a more partisan perspective than the campaigns, emphasizing the issues that reinforce the party cleavage even more than the candidates do. If this interpretation is sound (as we believe it is), it modifies substantially the conventional notion that the media has a largely negative influence on the partisanship of the electorate.[33]

[30] William L. Benoit and Heather Currie, "Inaccuracies in Media Coverage of Presidential Debates," *Argumentation and Advocacy* 38 (Summer 2001): 28–39; Bryan H. Reber and William L. Benoit, "Presidential Debate Stories Accentuate the Negative," *Newspaper Research Journal* 22 (Summer 2001): 30–43.

[31] Doris A.Graber, *Mass Media and American Politics* (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1997).

[32] Barbara G. Salmore and Stephen A. Salmore, *Candidates, Parties, and Campaigns: Electoral Politics in America* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1989); Paul Herrnson, *Congressional Elections* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000).

[33] Martin P. Wattenberg, *The Decline of American Political Parties: 1952–1996* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); Dave D'Alessio and Mike Allen, "Media Bias in Presidential Elections: A Meta-Analysis," *Journal of Communication* 50 (March, 2000): 133–156.

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FIGURE 6
Effect of Campaigning on Voter Issue Concerns: 1960–2000



Note: The balance of issue mentions among the candidates is a second order difference that is calculated by subtracting the number of balance of issue mentions by the Republican candidate from the balance of issue mentions among the Democratic candidate. The balance for any candidate is described in footnote 9. The regression is: 0.18* (Campaign Issues score) + 20.3. The coefficient is highly significant ($p = 0.012$). The regression line and estimation do not include the 2000 election.

The Electorate's Response to the Campaigns

The independence of campaign issue communication and what appeared in the *Times* are not repeated with the electorate. Voters respond to the content of the campaigns. Figure 6 plots the relationship between the party-ownership balance of issue concerns in the electorate against the party-ownership balance of issue mentions by the candidates. The measure of the balance of issue concerns among voters is constructed from responses to the standard open-ended National Election Study question about the problems facing the country. It is calculated by subtracting the proportion of individuals who are more concerned about Democratic-owned issues from the proportion who are more concerned about Republican issues (see Appendix Table 2 for how specific issues are categorized). Positive values indicate a surplus of Republican mentions; negative numbers indicate a surplus of GOP-issue mentions. A similar algorithm is used to calculate the issue content of the campaigns. The number of Demo-

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cratic issues mentioned by the campaign in its TV spots is subtracted from the number of Republican-owned issues mentioned by the campaigns in their TV spots. Again, positive values indicate a surplus of GOP-issue mentions while negative values indicate more Democratic issues in the campaigns' TV spots.

The figure shows a substantial relationship prior to the 2000 election. The issue rhetoric of the candidates shaped the problem concerns of the electorate (assuming the causality is correctly specified by the theory). The calculation of the regression slope in the figure does not include the 2000 election, which stands apart for the unusually heavily Democratic-owned issue content of both George W. Bush's and Al Gore's campaigns and the comparatively modest popular concern with Democratic issues (more below). Except for the 2000 outlier, however, there is a creditable correlation (.74) between the content of the campaigns and the issue concerns of the electorate. The more a campaign's issue content is weighted to issues owned by the Democrats, the more the electorate is concerned with problems owned by the Democrats, regardless of how the media (the *Times* here) reports the election.

Just as the issue content of the campaign appears to predict the issue agenda of the electorate (Figure 6), the issue agenda of the electorate predicts the vote. Figure 7 plots the relationship between the vote and the issue-ownership bias of the problems of concern to the electorate. The effect is strong. A notable quirk indicated by the regression line in Figure 7 is that the Democrats require an issue advantage on the order of thirteen or fourteen points before they have a statistical assurance of defeating the Republican. This party difference may indicate a "weakness" in Democratic issues. There is some evidence that voters have reacted more strongly to GOP issues in the last three decades.[34] The social welfare issues owned by the Democrats seem to be the concern of "normal politics," and lack the strong reaction that is elicited by novel issues such as crime. Why novel issues provoke a stronger reaction than normal issues is not obvious. It is possible that a partisan filter moderates the issues normally dealt with by the party system more than novel issues. Alternatively, or in addition, the Republican bias in the issue effect graphed in Figure 7 may reflect the election-specific effects of performance issues. When the issue-ownership score for the election is recalculated to include each candidate's advantage on leased performance issues, the apparent anomalies largely disappear and the dependence of the election outcome on the issue concerns of voters has less of a GOP bias.[35]

The Issue Agenda and the Vote in 2000

Both 2000 campaigns emphasized Democratic issues. Bush voiced slightly more Republican than Democratic issues in his nomination acceptance, but his gen-

[34] That finding is not a part of the analysis, but see Petrocik, "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study."

[35] Ibid.

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FIGURE 7
Voter Issue Concerns and the Vote: 1960–2000



Note: The correlation is 0.65. The regression is: 0.26. *Issue Concerns of the Voters* + 46.4. The coefficient is highly significant ($p = 0.008$).

eral election campaign spots mentioned Democratic issues twice as frequently as they mentioned GOP issues. Gore was more focused on Democratic issues in his nomination acceptance speech and (especially) his advertising spots, which raised Democratic themes three times as often as Republican themes. Bush's emphasis on education explains most of the dominance of Democratic issues in his campaign. With education references removed, Bush's nomination acceptance address dealt with more Republican than Democratic issues and his TV spots were more balanced, albeit still slightly more Democratic (see Table 1).

The emphasis on Democratic-owned issues by the candidates during the campaign was echoed in the population (see Table 2). Social welfare issues (education, social security, health care, and so forth) were the principal concerns of Americans during the 2000 election. Two-thirds mentioned social welfare issues at least once; respondents averaged two social welfare issue mentions. Issues related to traditional morality, crime, and the condition of the social order were mentioned at least once by about 39 percent of the sample. The economy (18 percent), foreign relationships (17 percent), big government (15 percent), and defense policy (13 percent) comprised the third tier of issue concerns.

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TABLE 1

Issue Emphases of Bush and Gore

	Nomination Acceptance Speeches		*TV Campaign Spots*	
	Bush	*Gore*	*Bush*	*Gore*
Democratic Issues				
Total	81	197	175	302
Education	27	62	80	59
Health Care	7	51	38	132
Poverty	8	13	3	3
Elderly	19	30	40	69
Jobs/Labor	20	33	10	15
Environment	0	8	4	24
Republican Issues				
Total	96	162	86	110
Defense	22	17	6	17
Spending/Deficit	13	18	38	10
Taxes	12	14	22	24
Religion/Morality	31	81	17	37
Crime	14	30	2	22
Drug Abuse	4	2	1	0
Performance Issues				
Total	21	45	36	33
Foreign Policy	12	22	3	10
Economy	9	23	33	23
All Issue Mentions				
Total	198	405	297	445

Note: Figures indicate the number of times that the issue was referred to in the acceptance speeches and TV campaign spots of Bush and Gore.

Everything else was mentioned by fewer than ten percent. The pattern of mentions was substantially the same for the most important issue facing the country (the third data column in Table 2).

The pattern of party ownership of these issues is summarized in the bottom half of the table. Aggregated by party ownership, the pro-Democratic tilt of the issue environment in 2000 is obvious, whether the measure is how often a party's issue was mentioned at least once (first column), the total number of issue mentions (second column), or the importance assigned to the issues (third column).

However, the advantage is much smaller than one might have expected given the candidates' emphasis on Democratic issues. While the 2000 election campaign was the most pro-Democratic in its issue content, the issue concerns of the electorate were only in the middle of the distribution between the parties. If the pre-2000 election pattern (see Figure 6) had provided the template for Americans in 2000, the issue concerns of Americans would have been almost

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TABLE 2

The Electorate's Issue Agenda in the 2000 Presidential Election

	% Mentioned At Least Once	% Of All Responses	% Most Important Problem
Type of Issue Mentioned			
Education	32	15	14
Social Welfare	56	38	40
Civil and Social Order	38	25	27
Big Government/Taxes/Spending/Regulation	15	8	7
Foreign Policy/Defense	28	15	13
Total	#	100	100
*Party Ownership of the Issue Mentioned**			
Democratic Issue-Education	32	12	15
Democratic Issue-Others	62	37	35
Republican Issue	64	39	39
Performance Issue	26	12	11
	#	100	100

Multiple mentions exceed 100 percent of respondents. The total number of respondents is 903.
* This includes all problems mentioned, not just the four categories of issues above.
Source: 2000 NES Survey.

sixty points more Democratic than Republican, instead of the eleven to thirteen point Democratic advantage in Table 2.

A second notable feature of the 2000 election is the weakness of each party's ability to handle its issues (see Table 3). Respondents whose major concern was a Democratic-owned issue were more likely to believe that the Democrats would do the better job, and those most concerned with a GOP-owned issue thought that the Republicans would better handle the problem. But a plurality saw no difference in their ability to handle owned issues or performance issues (for example, the economy, functioning of the government). Almost half (49 percent) saw no difference between the parties in their ability to handle issues normally owned by the Democrats.

TABLE 3

Party Handling of the Most Important Issue in 2000

	Party Ownership of Most Important Issue Mentioned			
	Democratic Issue: Education	*Democratic Issue: All Others*	*Republican Issue*	*Performance Issue*
Party Selected as Better Able to Handle the Issue				
Republicans	18%	11%	35%	30%
Democrats	39	40	14	26
No difference	43	50	51	44
Total	100%	101%	100%	100%
N of Respondents	128	291	335	96

Source: 2000 NES Survey.

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TABLE 4

Effect of Issue Concerns on the Vote in 2000

	Democratic Vote			
	All Problems		Most Important Problem	
	% Expected	% Reported	% Expected	% Reported
Democratic Issues				
All	55	59	57	61
Education	54	56	58	61
Other Issues	57	59	59	61
Republican Issues	48	43	49	42
Performance Issues	50	41	48	40
Total	53	51	53	51

Note: Figures are the Democratic vote percentages. See the text below for a brief account of the expected vote. The total number of respondents is 537, with 266 mentioning Democratic issues, 211 mentioning Republican issues, and 59 mentioning performance issues.

Source: NES 2000 Survey.

This failure of party ownership to matter significantly may be partly a product of Bush's emphasis on education, but only partly. Table 3, which separates education references from other Democratic issues, does not provide much evidence for an hypothesis that Bush's emphasis on Democratic-owned issues minimized the expected effect of issue-ownership. While those who mentioned Democratic-owned issues other than education believed that Democrats were better able to handle the problem by a margin of 40 percent to 11 percent (compared with a 39 percent to 18 percent margin for education), most in both categories saw no difference between the parties in their ability to handle the problems. Also, Bush's 35 to 14 percent handling advantage on GOP issues—and the 51 percent who saw no handing difference between the parties—further erodes the plausibility of this *ad hoc* education explanation.

Issue-Ownership Voting in 2000

It is probably not surprising, therefore, that issue-ownership voting was also not particularly strong in 2000. As Table 4 shows, Gore's share of the two-party vote among those who were concerned with Democratic issues was only slightly greater than the Democratic vote expected from the partisanship of those concerned with Democratic issues.[36] Bush's vote among those concerned with GOP

[36] For the basis of the expected vote see Philip E. Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote" in Angus Campbell, et al. *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966); John R. Petrocik, "An Expected Party Vote: New Data for an Old Concept," *American Journal of Political Science* 33 (February 1989): 44–66.

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issues was slightly greater than what should have been expected from the partisanship of voters concerned with Republican issues. Separating those concerned with education as opposed to other Democratic-owned issues does not change the result. Performance issues had a slightly Republican tilt, since the departure from partisanship among those concerned with performance issues favored Bush.[37]

Conclusion and Summary

Six findings need to be stressed. First, this study measures, for the first time in the context of issue-ownership, the issues emphasized by presidential candidates in their campaign rhetoric. The result finds a substantial correlation between the balance of Democratic and Republican-owned problem concerns among Americans and the party-ownership balance of issues emphasized by the candidates, filling a significant lacuna in the empirical links postulated by the theory. The relationship is not proof that candidates create the problem concerns that help to shape the choices of voters. The influence could run in the opposite direction since campaigns try to inform themselves about the concerns of the electorate and then use those concerns to their advantage. But even in the latter case, there is a likely campaign influence because the campaigns prime these issues and make them more likely to influence the voter's judgment.

Second, it is striking that the issue content of the campaigns is uncorrelated with the issue content of the *Times* coverage of the campaigns, that the issue content of the *Times* coverage is uncorrelated with variation in the issue concerns of the electorate, but that the issue concerns of the electorate *are* correlated with the varying issue agendas of the candidates' campaigns. If, as the theory of issue-ownership proposes, candidates help to shape or only prime the issue concerns of voters, they do not seem to do it through the news media. This finding is something that needs further investigation because the news media have always been thought to provide information about what candidates are saying and doing in their campaigns—although Beck et al. have produced strong evidence that interpersonal communication through established personal networks is more influential than media content *per se*.[38]

[37] See the special post-election symposium in *PS: Political Science and Politics* (2000), especially the papers by Campbell, Holbrook, and Lewis-Beck and Tien. See also Michael Lewis-Beck and Tom W. Rice, *Forecasting Elections* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1992) for analysis of predictive models may also be a useful reference on the question of forecasting elections.

[38] Paul Allen Beck, Russell J. Dalton, Steven Greene, and Robert Huckfeldt, "The Social Calculus of Voting: Interpersonal, Media, and Organizational Influences on Presidential Choices," *American Political Science Review* 96 (March 2002): 57–74. Beck and his colleagues produce strong evidence that interpersonal communication through established personal networks is more influential than media content *per se.* Also see C. L. Brians and Martin P. Wattenberg, "Campaign Issue Knowledge and Salience: Comparing Reception from TV Commercials, TV News, and Newspapers," *American Journal of Political Science* 40 (February 1996): 172–193 for a stronger knowledge effect from campaign ads than from newspaper or TV news.

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We are not prepared to conclude that the media do not report campaign events with some accuracy. The data are consistent with a model asserting that campaigns succeed by emphasizing issues already of concern (determined through strategic information gathering via surveys and other techniques); and that the media, whatever else they report about the campaigns, raise the salience of already salient issues by reporting candidates' comments and proposals on them. However, it is at least plausible (see Figure 5) that the media are not very responsive to the party balance of the issue emphases of presidential candidates. It is possible that a prior image of the typical Democrat and Republican politician among reporters colors coverage of the candidates. Reporters expect to hear Republican issues from Republicans and that is the theme of their reporting; they expect to hear Democratic issues from Democratic candidates. They might be underreporting Democratic discourse that emphasizes Republican issues and Republican discourse on Democratic issues.

Third, we have some unanticipated data: in general, Democratic *and* Republican presidential candidates have tended to discuss Republican issues more frequently than Democratic issues. This may occur because most of the problems that presidential candidates are expected to address turn out to be Republican issues.[39] It is possible that Democrats tend to "own" fewer federal issues. Whatever the cause, GOP issues are treated in these messages more often than Democratic issues.

Fourth, despite clear evidence of issue-ownership campaigning across the thirteen elections represented in our sample, there is also evidence of interelection variability. The most striking, but not the only, example of this occurred came in the 2000 election. George W. Bush spent more time in his television spots on Democratic than Republican issues. We cannot tell whether these differences occur because of situational factors (for example, the condition of the economy) or from differences between individual candidates. However, the candidates are not equal in their emphasis on owned issues among elections.

Fifth, this analysis also reveals similarities and differences in the content of message forms: acceptance addresses and television spots. Issue ownership effects occur in both kinds of campaign discourse. However, there were instances in which differences occurred between these two kinds of messages. Figure 3 reveals differences between acceptances and television spots in the messages of John F. Kennedy (1960), Jimmy Carter (1976), Bill Clinton (1992, 1996), Al Gore (2000), and George W. Bush (2000).

Sixth, the 2000 election was an outlier. The agenda-setting impact of the campaigns seems to have been limited in 2000. The overwhelming emphasis on Democratic issues by both campaigns did not produce an electorate that was proportionately that much more concerned with Democratic-owned issues. If the Democratic-issue emphasis in 2000 had made Democratic issues more sa-

[39] See Jacobson's "institutional" theory of issue-ownership. Gary C. Jacobson, *The Electoral Origins of Divided Government* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990).

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lient or if Democratic issues had performed slightly better, Gore's numerical majority might have tipped another state into his column and the electoral vote margin might have corresponded to the popular vote. We have no good hypothesis for why Democratic issues underperformed in 2000. Bush's professed interest in (and an asserted record on) problems of education and health care might have minimized the Democratic advantage on these issues. Alternately, we might be looking at a result structured by an assessment of the candidates along lines other than the issues examined here. On the whole, however, even with this anomaly the issue-ownership dynamics are apparent in the vote in 2000. Candidate choice was correlated with the issue concerns that voters expressed (see Table 4) and the aggregate vote matched the balance of issue concerns among Americans in general (see Figure 7).*

APPENDIX

TABLE 1

TV Ad Samples
General Election Democrat and
Republican Presidential Spots

	Total Length of Spots Analyzed (in seconds)			
Election Year	Democrat		Republican	
1952	Stevenson	1,010	Eisenhower	820
1956	Stevenson	1,490	Eisenhower	1,525
1960	Kennedy	1,800	Nixon	1,800
1964	Johnson	1,810	Goldwater	1,800
1968	Humphrey	1,800	Nixon	1,800
1972	McGovern	1,800	Nixon	1,780
1976	Carter	1,820	Ford	1,800
1980	Carter	1,800	Reagan	1,800
1984	Mondale	1,800	Reagan	1,800
1988	Dukakis	1,800	Bush	1,550
1992	Clinton	1,575	Bush	980
1996	Clinton	1,620	Dole	1,530
2000	Gore	1,470	Bush	1,320
Total	Democrats	21,595	Republicans	20,305

* This paper was originally prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton San Francisco Hotel, San Francisco, CA, 30 August–2 September 2001. Our thanks go to Ben Bishin of Miami University for his thoughtful and extensive comments. Daron Shaw of the University of Texas also made useful comments. Special thanks go to an anonymous reviewer whose helpful comments allowed us to clarify parts of the presentation. All of the survey data are drawn from the National Election Study surveys of the indicated year. The data were made available by the ICPSR. That organization is not responsible for the analysis or interpretation.

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TABLE 2

Issue Ownership Coding

Topic/Issue	*Owned by*
Civil Liberties: rights of accused, freedom of speech, etc.	Democrats
Civil and Social Order: crime, life styles, traditional values, unconventional groups or movements, etc.	Republicans
Foreign Relations: reference to relations with other countries	Performance
Defense Spending and Policy: reference to the defense budget, weapons systems, or military policy—not including military treaties and aid, which are treated as foreign relations	Republicans
Civil Rights: reference to ethnic or racial matters or groups	Democrats
Social Welfare/Spending: reference to government social welfare activity that is not group specific; for example, blacks, women	Democrats
Farmers and Agriculture: references to activity on behalf of farmers, agriculture, or rural groups	Democrats
Social Class and Group Relationships: references to the needs of interests of groups in relation to other groups, for example, middle class vs. rich, big vs. small business, old vs. young, etc. This excludes priority that are named; for example, women, blacks	Democrats
Women: any reference to women, women's rights, gender equality	Democrats
Organized Labor: any reference to unions or labor	Democrats
Big Government: reference to government taxing and spending (not tied to a specific welfare policy) or regulation of the economy	Republicans
Economy: any reference to the economy or its condition	Performance
Government Functioning: any reference to government corruption or failures not classified elsewhere by substantive topic	Performance

Note: The content analysis of the *New York Times* acceptance speeches, television commercials, and the NES respondent's report of the most important problems facing the country applies the same basic scheme. Initially all references were coded into one of the fourteen categories above. The categories were then classified as Democratic, Republican, or performance issues based on whether the issue is tied to groups that are part of the party's coalition. Performance issues are defined as references to the economy, the conduct of foreign relations, and the functioning of the government.

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TABLE 3

Issue Emphases of Presidential Candidates: 1952–2000

	Nomination Acceptances Speeches		*TV Campaign Spots*	
	Democrats	*Republicans*	*Democrats*	*Republicans*
Democratic Issues				
Total	479	831	563	1,070
Education	110	228	145	262
Health Care	37	124	61	194
Poverty	45	74	33	76
Elderly	60	83	90	155
Jobs/Labor	223	289	307	324
Environment	4	33	17	59
Republican Issues				
Total	1,057	890	1,142	1,009
Defense	412	265	356	301
Spending/Deficit	113	87	180	112
Taxes	132	64	231	177
Religion/Morality	251	288	145	155
Crime	122	161	183	188
Drug Abuse	27	25	47	76
Performance Issues				
Total	780	468	811	532
Foreign Policy	506	290	332	260
Economy	274	178	479	272
All Issue Mentions				
Total	2,316	2,189	2,606	2,611

Note: The table summarizes the total number of times that fourteen issues were mentioned by the Democratic and Republican candidates in their acceptance speeches and in the TV ad samples for the 1952 through 2000 presidential elections. The actual number (as opposed to a percentage) is reported to permit an easier assessment of how candidates differ in their emphases and the degree to which an issue is more likely to be introduced into the campaign by the party that owns it. This presentation is possible because the sample of Democratic advertisements is virtually equal in size to the sample of GOP advertisements. As the presentation makes clear, the count is not an issue mention, but the number of times the word was mentioned. The table reports two performance issues (the economy and foreign policy references); however, the analysis is focused only on issues that emerge from the constituencies of the parties.

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Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity: Crime and Democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala

ORLANDO J. PÉREZ

Across Latin America, and in many other regions of the developing world, fear of crime and perceptions of social disorder are widespread. The failure of the state and its public order and criminal justice institutions to respond adequately by providing protection and basic security is apparent, and it may threaten democratic development. Nowhere is the security problem more apparent than in the Central American nations of El Salvador and Guatemala.

Out of the peace processes that ended the violent civil conflicts in El Salvador and Guatemala emerged significant reforms geared toward the construction of democratic institutions; among them was the separation of public security and military functions. During the period of the civil wars, the police function of each country was highly militarized and cruelly repressive, making the demilitarization of police functions a necessary component of the peace processes. Despite democratic transitions, however, police and judicial processes remain abusive, corrupt, and ineffective. In the post-transition environment, "citizen security" concerns have replaced direct threats to states or regimes by organized opposition groups. No longer are civil wars the predominant threat to the state; it is now crime and the resulting civil insecurity that endangers the nascent democratic government.

As governments seek to improve public security, they often resort to repressive measures, such as limitations on the right of *habeas corpus* and the declaration of states of emergency under which the police and army operate with few restrictions and where civil rights are curtailed. Moreover, in some countries, the response to police weakness and corruption is to re-engage the

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armed forces in internal security tasks, thus undermining hard-won restrictions on the military. Today, throughout much of Latin America, crime rates continue to rise despite policing tactics that are often repressive. Far from solving the problem, these tactics engender a spiral of corruption and violence which leads many citizens to opt for private measures, whether private security agencies or vigilantism.

In light of the repressive measures undertaken to combat crime, some analysts have pointed to the emergence of a model of constrained or uncivil democracy (coined *democradura*) in which elected civilian-led democracies continue to violate human rights despite considerable success in democratizing political institutions. Indeed, James Holston has asserted that during the "third wave" period (1972 to 1996), the proportion of uncivil democracies to the total number of electoral democracies doubled. Of the seventy-four countries that changed from nondemocratic to democratic rule since the mid-1970s, 48 (or 65 percent) of them were "uncivil" in 1996.[1]

> In such uncivil democracies, violence, injustice, and impunity are norms. As a result, uncivil electoral democracies share certain significant features of citizenship. Their institutions of law and justice undergo delegitimization; violent crime and police abuse escalate; the poor and the ethnically other are criminalized, dehumanized, and attacked; civility and civil protection in public space decline; people abandon the public to retreat behind private security; and illegal measures of control receive massive popular support. Across the nation-state, the civil components of citizenship are unevenly and irregularly distributed among citizens.[2]

For the average citizen, the police are the most visible instrument of government; their actions powerfully influence whether government is perceived to be legitimate. Thus, the police institution fundamentally affects the character of democratic development.[3] The failure to deepen democracy and the rule of law and to extend citizenship rights across all social sectors shakes public confidence in the police and judicial system, weakens the rule of law, and increasingly undermines support for democracy. As long as this skepticism is confined to poor and marginal social sectors, the political consequences to governments remain limited even as the institutions of criminal justice may continue to degenerate. When crime rates increase and produce broader social and economic effects, the attention of the middle and upper classes focuses on the failings of the police and criminal justice system. People feel unprotected or even further victimized by the system that is meant to protect them. At this point, governments experience a sharp rise in the political price they pay for ineffective, brutal, and corrupt law enforcement. Included in this price is a sharp decline in

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tary relations and is currently working on a book-length manuscript on the transformation of civil-military relations in post-authoritarian Central America.

[1] James Holston, "Citizenship in Uncivil Societies" (paper presented at the conference, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Institutionalizing Citizenship Rights in New Democracies, (McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 19–20 March 1998).

[2] Ibid.

[3] David H. Bayley, "A Foreign Policy for Democratic Policing," *Policing and Society* 5 (June 1995): 79.

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public support for the institutions of the state. In the seminal work on the breakdown of democratic regimes, Juan Linz defines legitimacy as "the belief that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the existing political institutions are better than any others that might be established. . . ."[4] According to Linz, the "efficacy" and "effectiveness" of the political system play a major role in determining its legitimacy. Efficacy refers to the ability of a regime to formulate adequate and acceptable policies for the nation's problems. Effectiveness is the capacity to implement those policies.[5] When the inability to formulate or implement adequate policies combines with a disloyal opposition, democratic governments tend to collapse.[6] To the extent that individuals view the job performed by democratic governments as effective, they will be less inclined to support extra-constitutional measures and an increased role for the armed forces. However, when legitimacy declines, citizens may be receptive to new political alternatives, even those that would undermine democracy.

Using public opinion surveys, this paper seeks to investigate how victimization from crime affects public attitudes toward democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala. As stated earlier, a key component of the efforts to build democratic governments has been the separation of military and police functions and the creation of a *Policia Nacional Civil* (National Civil Police). Therefore, this paper will also analyze public confidence toward the new civil police relative to other state institutions. The paper is divided into sections that analyze the following: the process by which public security and military functions were separated and the National Civil Police created, public attitudes toward the police and the impact of crime on those attitudes, and the effects of crime victimization on support for democracy.

Demilitarizing Internal Security: The Creation of the National Civil Police

The ideological and repressive nature of the militarized internal security regimes that existed in both El Salvador and Guatemala during their civil conflicts meant that broadening the democratic political spectrum clearly required massive reform to the public security functions. The internationally-mediated peace accords that brought an end to the civil wars in both countries called for the construction of police forces conducive to democratic governance. I argue that public attitudes toward the police and the effects of crime on democratic values are closely tied to the successes and failures of the efforts to demilitarize internal security.

[4] Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, & Reequilibration* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 16.

[5] Ibid., 18–23.

[6] Ibid., 27–38.

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El Salvador

In El Salvador, the peace accords that ended the civil conflict called for the abolition of the existing security and intelligence organizations and the creation of a *Policia Nacional Civil* (PNC). Also agreed upon were drafts of secondary legislation for the PNC and the new National Academy of Public Security, which were subsequently approved by the Legislative Assembly with minor changes.[7] The new civilian police was to be a "new body, with a new organization, new officers, new mechanisms of formation and training, and a new doctrine."[8] The mission of the new police organ was "to protect and guarantee the free exercise of the rights and liberties of persons, to prevent and combat all kinds of crimes, as well as to maintain internal peace, tranquility, order, and public security, in the urban environment as in the rural."[9] The accords specified that 20 percent of the new police force was to be comprised of members of the former militarized National Police, 20 percent of demobilized *Frente Faramundo Marti de Liberación Nacional* (FMLN) guerrillas, and 60 percent of new civilian recruits. The doctrine of the PNC as spelled out in the Peace Accords and ensuing legislation set a very high standard for the nascent police organization; in a matter of months, an organization once devoted to ideology and repression was to be gutted, and an entirely new force was to be created from almost nothing.

Implementing this doctrine has proven to be an almost impossible task. The need for expediency in creating the new force in order to combat growing levels of crime has compromised the success of the new civilian police, resulting in a failure to establish strong mechanisms of accountability within the police force, as well as the politicization and militarization of the PNC.[10] For example, the PNC has developed a legacy of crime and corruption in its short lifetime. PNC officers have been implicated in a variety of murders and numerous kidnappings of high-profile persons; the corruption is so prevalent that the office of the Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights (PDDH) established by the Constitution and the Peace Accords received more complaints in the period between June 1999 and May 2000 against the PNC than against any other institution of government (97, or 33.2 percent of all verified complaints).[11]

Despite the serious problems that remain, however, the restructuring of the Salvadorian civilian police force remains one of the most successful and far-reaching reforms undertaken by the peace accords in both El Salvador and

[7] See William Stanley, *Risking Failure: The Problems and Promises of the New Civilian Police in El Salvador* (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, September 1993).

[8] *Chapultepec Peace Accords*, signed 16 January 1992. Chapter 2, Introduction, accessed on the website of Centro de Paz, El Salvador at http://www.cepaz.org.sv/CEPAZ2000/biblioteca_mar.htm.

[9] Ibid., Section 1.a.

[10] See William Stanley, *Protectors or Perpetrators? The Institutional Crisis of the Salvadoran Civilian Police* (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, January 1996).

[11] *Procuraduria para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, Cuadros Estadisticos de Resoluciones firmadas de Junio 1999 a Mayo 2000*, accessed on the website of Republica de El Salvador at http://www.pddh.gob.sv/resol.htm.

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Guatemala. The new police academy that was created from scratch trained 5,700 police agents and officers by the 1994 deadline set forth in the Peace Accords.[12] By the end of 1999, the PNC had over 18,000 officers.[13] Moreover, the PNC has developed divisions to deal with financial crimes, customs, traffic, and other specialized functions. Police doctrine has also been changed to emphasize civilian control and protection of citizen rights rather than ideology, military hierarchy, counterinsurgency, and control of citizens. Despite troublesome reports of human rights violations, the PNC does not engage in the widespread or systematic torture and abuse for which its militarized predecessor was known. Lastly, the PNC leadership, also unlike its predecessor, has been willing to arrest and suspend even top-ranking officers.[14] Therefore, the Salvadorian police force has made an overall successful transition, despite its remaining problems.

Guatemala

Demilitarization of the Guatemalan public security function has not progressed at the level of that of El Salvador. Less specific than its Salvadorian counterpart, the Accord on Strengthening Civil Power and the Role of the Army in a Democratic Society calls for the creation of a single National Civilian Police and the promotion of amendments that would establish a clear separation between the police and military roles. The accord established a professional and autonomous civilian police as the only police body to handle matters of public order and internal security; it required the restructuring of all existing police units, as well as private security forces, under the control of the new PNC. The new police force, which would function under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, was slated to be fully in place by the end of 1999, with at least 20,000 agents. In its final form, the PNC was to reflect the multiethnic and multicultural composition of the Guatemalan population in its recruitment and selection of personnel. In addition, all members would be professionally trained in a new police academy.[15]

Since the signing of the peace accords, important advances have been made in building a revamped, civilian-led police force. The government of President Alvaro Arzú moved quickly to restructure and strengthen the police, passing new legislation; doubling police salaries; retraining previous National Police and Treasury Guard members; recruiting and training new PNC agents; and purchasing vehicles, weapons, and communications equipment.[16] An expanded,

[12] Stanley, *Protectors or Perpetrators?*

[13] U.S. Department of State. *Background Notes: El Salvador*, accessed at http://www.state.gov.www/background_notes/elsal_0008_bgn.html, August 2000.

[14] Stanley, *Protectors or Perpetrators?*

[15] *Accord on Strengthening of Civilian Power and Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society*, signed 19 September 1996. Complete text of the Agreement can be found at the website of the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala at www.Minuagua.guate.net/Acuerdosdepaz.

[16] Washington Office on Latin America, "Executive Summary: Rescuing Police Reform: A Challenge for the New Guatemalan Government," accessed at http://www.wola.org/guatepolicerptex.html, 2000.

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better paid, and better trained PNC now has at least a minimal presence in every one of the country's twenty-two departments. By October 1999, a force of 17,339 members had been deployed, of whom about 37 percent were new recruits. The gains made by the PNC are significant, especially when compared to the corruption and inefficiency of its predecessor. The new force is imbued with a more service-oriented spirit and appears to be at least somewhat more effective than its predecessor: arrests are up and violent deaths and kidnapings for ransom are down.[17]

However, these gains are made in the face of severe problems coming from two sources: expediency and a failed popular referendum. Pressured to combat the growing crime problem, the Guatemalan government decided to incorporate most of the old National Police and Treasury Guard into the PNC, meaning that all initial members of the PNC were agents and officers from previous security forces infamous for their corruption, abuse, and incompetence. Although newly incorporated police will eventually make up the majority of the force, the officer corps will consist of personnel drawn from the old forces, thereby increasing the likelihood of the continuing militarization and repression consistent with the former security forces. Another problem due to expediency affects the recruitment and selection of personnel; recruitment of new civilians for the PNC remains weak, with little publicity given to academy course openings. This means that no meaningful selection process can take place, entry standards end up lower, and the force is not representative of the country's diversity. Additional problems include little to no education of personnel in order to speed up the deployment process and faulty internal accountability mechanisms, leading to poor conduct of PNC members.[18] Although early reports on the PNC focused on its positive reception and service-oriented spirit, recently there has been growing concern about police abuse. In April 1999, members of the PNC riot police (known as the Special Police Forces) mutinied and the unit was dissolved. Also of grave concern, *Misión de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala* (MINUGUA) verified six cases of torture by PNC members during that same year. Moreover, reports of extra-judicial killings of detainees and street children continue to plague the Guatemalan PNC.[19]

Another troubling result of expediency is the continuing participation of the military in internal security. Although the peace accords are specific in giving the PNC sole authority for maintaining internal security, the Arzú and Portillo governments—in order to confront the growing crime problem—have made ample use of military personnel in joint patrols with police. In addition, as of yet there is no civilian intelligence capacity as required by the accords; rather, military intelligence is consistently used to investigate kidnapings and other high profile crimes.

[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.

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Quite troubling is the fact that constitutional reforms that would have consolidated the separation of police and military functions were defeated in a nation-wide referendum in May 1999, thus giving the Guatemalan military continued constitutional authority to be involved in internal security. Therefore, the future of the division of military and police roles remains unclear, and the ability of civilian authorities to control the public security function is in doubt.

Public confidence in the new police force is essential to building a strong and legitimate institution. If the public does not trust the National Civil Police and believes it to be a corrupt and inefficient agency, there will be increasing pressure to involve the armed forces in internal security matters. An expanded role for the military in internal security violates the Peace Accords, however, and undermines efforts to circumscribe the mission and role of the armed forces in order to maintain civilian supremacy. Given the different levels of success in building a new police force discussed above, one would expect to find greater confidence in the police in El Salvador than Guatemala. One also would expect that opinions about the police are significantly affected by people's experience with crime.

Survey Data

The analysis of attitudes toward the National Civil Police and the effects of crime on democratic values presented here is based on two national surveys conducted in El Salvador and Guatemala in 1999. In addition, the paper will make use of the data from the 1996 and 1998 *Latinobarometro* surveys. These national surveys are designed to be representative of the voting age population at the national level and, for El Salvador, at the departmental level as well. The size of the Salvadorian sample was 2,914 with a margin of sampling error at the national level of ±1.8 percent (the error is larger for the departmental samples). In El Salvador, the sample was stratified by dividing its 262 municipalities across the country into four groups based on their population size. In order to avoid excluding the largest municipalities from the sample, San Salvador, Santa Ana, and San Miguel were automatically included in the sample. In Guatemala, the sample was 1,200 with a margin of sampling error at the national level of ±3.0 percent. Interviews were conducted in eighteen of its twenty-two departments, plus Guatemala City. For purposes of stratification, the sample was divided into four major geographic regions and the Metropolitan Guatemala City area.

The *Latinobarometro* is sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank and is administered by MORI-Chile. The survey is conducted in each of the seventeen Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking mainland countries of Latin America. The samples vary in size and level of representativeness. For Central America, the samples are of national probability with a sample of 1,000 interviews in each country.[20]

[20] While the data sets are generally not available to the public, those interested in seeing results from the surveys can do so at http://www.latinobarometro.org.

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Survey Results: Public Attitudes Toward the National Civil Police

This section will examine public attitudes toward the national police. Trust is a key measure of the level of confidence the public may have in the ability of state institutions to carry out their functions. In each country, respondents were asked the extent to which they had trust in a series of institutions. In El Salvador, the responses were provided on a seven-point scale.[21]

In both countries, people exhibited relatively high degrees of trust in the National Civil Police. In El Salvador, the police received an average score of 59 on the 0–100 point trust scale, surpassed only by the Human Rights Prosecutor and the Catholic Church with 63 and 68, respectively. In Guatemala, the National Civil Police obtained a score of 50 on the scale, and while this may seem low, it is higher than any other institution. Moreover, in both countries, the police received similar or higher levels of support than the military. Nevertheless, when asked whether the military ought to fight crime or only the police should be in charge of those matters, 70.5 percent of Guatemalans supported a role for the armed forces. This finding reflects a lack of confidence in the ability of the National Civil Police to handle the problem of crime.

The Salvadorian survey (but not the Guatemalan survey) included several items measuring the perception of corruption within a number of state institutions. First, respondents were asked if a policeman had ever asked them for a bribe: only 3 percent said "yes." Second, people were asked if they had witnessed someone paying a bribe to a policeman in the last two years: 12 percent said "yes." Compared with other countries studied by the University of Pittsburgh Public Opinion Project, these percentages are quite low and reflect an overall low level of corruption among the Salvadorian national police.[22]

A key question is the extent to which crime victimization affects opinions of the police. One would expect individuals who have been victims of crime to exhibit lower trust in the police than those who have not experienced crime directly. In addition, respondents who feel insecure in their own neighborhoods should also express less confidence in the police. Therefore, survey results were analyzed in order to measure the impact of crime and personal security relative to other factors, including ideology and the traditional socioeconomic and demographic indicators of age, gender, socioeconomic status, level of urbanization, education, and, in the case of Guatemala, ethnicity.

[21] To make it easier, however, for the reader to compare these responses, the items are converted into a familiar 0–100 metric scale (commonly used in test grades in Centigrade thermometers). The conversion is accomplished by subtracting 1 from each score, so that they all have a 0–6 range rather than a 1–7 range. Then each score is divided by 6, so that they now range from 0–1, and then the scores are multiplied by 100. In the case of Guatemala, the original questions were measured using three possible answers: "a lot," "little," or "no" trust. For purposes of comparison, the items were recoded so that "a lot" is 100, "little" is 50, and "no" is 0.

[22] In the case of Nicaragua (survey conducted in 1998) 7 percent paid a bribe and 33 percent witnessed someone paying a bribe. In Bolivia (survey conducted in 1998), 27 percent said they had paid a bribe to a policeman and 46 percent said they witnessed someone paying a bribe.

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Measurement of Factors Affecting Attitudes Toward the Police

Age was measured by a question asking respondents to indicate their age at the moment of the interview. Gender was recorded on the questionnaire as male or female once the respondent agreed to be interviewed. Ideology was measured using self-placement on a scale from 1–10, with 1 being extreme left of the political spectrum and 10 being the extreme right. Because self-reporting of income tends to be unreliable, socioeconomic status was measured by adding responses to a series of questions asking individuals whether they owned a number of household items such as: a television, refrigerator, telephone, automobile or truck, washing machine, microwave, motorcycle, tractor, and radio, as well as the number of light bulbs in the house and whether they had running water and electricity. The assumption was that in countries such as Guatemala and El Salvador, the possession of these items and utilities can reflect well the socioeconomic status of respondents and their families. In the case of Guatemala, geographic region was determined by dividing the sample between urban and rural sectors. Because of the difference in the distribution of the Salvadorian sample, a variable was used that measured the rate of urbanization of the municipality where the interview was conducted. There also are differences between the two samples in the way that crime and fear of crime were measured. In the case of Guatemala, crime victimization was measured by the question, "During the last twelve months, have you or any member of your family been a victim of a robbery, assault, aggression, or kidnaping: yes, no, or don't know/didn't answer." Fear of crime was measured as responses to the question, "How safe do you feel walking in your neighborhood at night: very secure, somewhat secure, a little insecure, a lot insecure, don't know/didn't answer." In the case of El Salvador, the questions were as follows: "Have you been a victim of a physical aggression or some other crime during the past twelve months: yes, no, don't know"; and "Speaking of the place or neighborhood where you live and thinking about the possibility of becoming a victim of an assault or robbery, do you feel very secure, somewhat secure, somewhat insecure, or very insecure?"

Support for the National Civil Police

Table 1 in the Appendix shows the predictors of support for the National Civil Police.[23] In Guatemala, the factors that have a statistically significant impact on levels of confidence for the police are urbanization, ideology, ethnicity, and fear of crime. Therefore, support for the police is highest among individuals feeling secure in their neighborhoods and those living in rural areas, who are ideologically conservative and identify themselves as ladinos (individuals who are either mestizo or white, speak Spanish exclusively, and wear western style cloth-

[23] I performed a series of multicollinearity diagnostic tests to make sure that the independent variables were not highly correlated. The results were negative. Both the Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) statistics were well within the acceptable range. In addition, the bivariate correlations among the independent variables were low.

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ing). It is worth noting that, in the case of Guatemala, having direct experience with crime does not significantly impact opinions of the police. In El Salvador, the respondent factors with the greatest impact are socioeconomic status, gender, ideology, rate of urbanization, direct experience with crime, and feelings of security in their neighborhood. The highest support for the police in El Salvador is found among individuals living in the least urban communities, who are ideologically conservative, less wealthy, female, not prior victims of crime, and among those feeling secure in their neighborhood. An interesting finding of the Salvadorian survey, and one that is beyond the scope of this article to explore, is that crime victimization seems to be highest among wealthy, highly educated, and urban respondents. It is worth noting that because of the wording of the question it is hard to measure the instances of certain crimes, such as homicides. A key finding of this analysis is that in both countries the extent to which individuals feel secure in their neighborhoods has a significant impact on levels of trust for the National Civil Police.

These results show that people in Guatemala and El Salvador trust the new National Civil Police more than other state institutions. To some extent this finding reflects the success of the reforms in policing and internal security mandated by the Peace Accords. However, support is uneven within and among the two countries. In Guatemala, for example, about 70 percent support a role for the military in fighting crime (a position that violates the provisions of the Peace Accords). Moreover, while the police is the institution given the highest degree of trust, it barely reaches 50 points on a 0–100 scale, a reflection more of the poor performance of other institutions than of substantial support for the police itself. In addition, regression analysis indicates that support is greatest among rural, poor, and ideologically conservative respondents who feel secure in their neighborhoods and have not been victims of crime. Therefore, there is clear evidence that crime and fear of crime significantly reduce support for the National Civil Police, a key institution in the efforts to consolidate democracy in Guatemala and El Salvador.

Crime and Attitudes Toward Democracy

One of the major problems facing Central American nations today is the rise in criminal activity. From Guatemala to Panama, crime and the means to deal effectively with it have become a major social and political issue. The rise in criminal activity can be associated with a number of factors including economic policies that increase unemployment, inequality, and urbanization; legacies of conflict; the loosening of authoritarian controls; and demographic factors. When asked in the 1998 *Latinobarometro* survey about how much crime had risen in the past few years, overwhelming majorities said that it had "increased significantly:" El Salvador, 92 percent; Guatemala, 82 percent; Honduras, 88 percent; Nicaragua, 92 percent; Panama, 71 percent; and Costa Rica, 91 percent. Evidence suggests that the region may be among the most violent in the world.[24]

[24] World Bank, "Crime and Violence as Development Issues in Latin America and the Caribbean: The State of Rio de Janeiro and The Inter-American Development Bank" seminar on The Challenge of Urban Criminal Violence. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2–4 March 1997.

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In 1990, the last year for which there are comparable data for regions of the world, Latin America and the Caribbean had a homicide rate more than twice that of the world average: 22.9 per 100,000 versus a worldwide average of 10.7. Only Sub-Saharan Africa had a higher rate (40.1), and no other region of the world had a homicide rate in excess of 9 per 100,000. The most recent estimates for Latin America put the homicide rate at 28.4 in 1994; homicide rates exceed the regional average in Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia, and Jamaica.[25] Of the two countries under study, El Salvador has the highest per capita crime rate in the world, with a significant problem in gang-related activities.[26] And Guatemala, for the period from 1996 to 1999, had a homicide rate estimated at 58 per 100,000 inhabitants, placing the country right behind Colombia and El Salvador in the Latin American region. The 1996 *Latinobarometro* survey compared responses from residents of urban areas in seventeen Latin American countries regarding victimization by common crime. Guatemala and El Salvador ranked first and second on level of victimization by crime, respectively. In that year, 67 percent of urban Guatemalans and 57 percent of Salvadorians said that they or someone in their family had been the victim of an assault, an act of aggression, or another type of crime.

The crime statistics raise a fundamental question: What impact does crime victimization have on political attitudes? It would be expected that high levels of crime will undermine the legitimacy of the political system by reducing public support for the institutions of government. Furthermore, crime victimization, or the fear of it, should reduce levels of interpersonal trust. A recent study found that victimization (measured by fear and burglary victimization) undermines interpersonal trust, which, in turn, negatively affects confidence in government institutions.[27] Nancy Bermeo found that crime rates are a distinguishing characteristic between the surviving democracies of Europe during the interwar years and those that collapsed. In the cases of democratic breakdown, such as Italy and Germany, crime rates averaged three times the level in countries where democracy survived.[28] I do not argue that high crime rates in Guate-

[25] Data on Latin America and the Caribbean are derived from the Health Situation Analysis Program of the Division of Health and Human Development, Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). The figures are based on mortality by cause of death, supplied by PAHO member countries. These data are maintained in PAHO's Technical Information System database. The homicide rate for Latin America in 1994 was 53.1, while it was 20.5 for the Caribbean. All the above cited by Mayra Buvinic, Andrew Morrison, Michael Shifter, *Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Framework for Action*, Technical Study, Sustainable Development Department, Inter-American Development Bank, March 1999.

[26] In 1996, the number of murders per 100,000 inhabitants was 140 in San Salvador, 102 in Cali, 80 in Rio de Janeiro, and 6 in Santiago de Chile. See Pamela Orpinas, "Who is Violent?: Factors Associated with Aggressive Behaviors in Latin America and Spain," *Pan American Journal of Public Health* 5 (April 1999): 232–243.

[27] John Brehm and Wendy Rahn, "Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital," *American Journal of Political Science*, 41 (July 1997): 999–1023.

[28] Nancy Bermeo, "Getting Mad or Going Mad? Citizens, Scarcity, and the Breakdown of Democracy in Interwar Europe," accessed on the website of the Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine, at www.democ.uci.edu/democ/papers/bermeo.htm, 1999.

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mala and El Salvador will inevitably lead to a breakdown in democracy such that occurred in interwar Europe because the domestic and geopolitical contexts are quite different between the two regions and time periods. The evidence, however, does show that crime undermines support for democratic regimes. As crime rates increase, pressure mounts for "strong" government action which in many instances results in highly repressive and undemocratic measures. So, while high crime rates may not result in the toppling of elected civilian governments by military coups, they can slowly erode the quality of democracy.

Effects for El Salvador

The Salvadorian survey asked about the circumstances under which respondents would support a military coup. There is no more direct measure of support for democracy than the extent to which someone is willing to support a return to authoritarianism through a military coup. The survey asked: "Some people argue that under certain circumstances we can justify that the military take over power. In your opinion, under what circumstances would you justify the military taking over power: High unemployment; a lot of social protests; the victory of leftist parties in elections; the victory of ultra-right parties in elections; a lot of crime."

The results are convincing. Fifty-five percent of respondents would support a military coup under conditions of high crime. Table 2 in the Appendix indicates that age, gender, education, wealth, ideology, and crime victimization are the most significant factors in determining support for a coup. The analysis reveals that support for a coup is greatest among the less educated, young, less wealthy, ideologically conservative, females, and those who have experienced crime directly. In this case, sense of security in the neighborhood is not statistically significant. The evidence, therefore, is clear that crime victimization significantly increases support for the most extreme expression of authoritarianism, a military coup.

Beyond support for military coups, however, the Salvadorian survey contained a series of questions measuring support for less drastic authoritarian behavior. Among the seven questions in the survey, I constructed a scale using three items which were found to have high reliability. The three items were: "Do you believe that in our country we need a government that applies a strong hand, or that problems can be solved with the participation of everyone?" "With which of the following statements are you most in agreement: A. What El Salvador needs is a strong and determined man who will establish order through a strong hand, or B. What the country needs is a man who knows how to dialogue and compromise with all sectors of the population?" and "With which of the following statements are you most in agreement: A. The only way to move the country forward is by eliminating with a strong hand those that cause problems, or B. For the country to move ahead it is necessary to listen to everyone

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FIGURE 1
Support for Coup under Various Circumstances in El Salvador



including those that cause problems?"[29] Thirty-one percent of Salvadorians expressed high support for a government that applies authoritarian measures.

Table 3 in the Appendix shows that sense of security in the neighborhood, socioeconomic status, education, and ideology are the factors that have the greatest impact on whether a Salvadorian individual supports authoritarianism. Those who feel insecure in their neighborhood, have low socioeconomic status, low levels of education, and are on the right ideologically are more likely to support an authoritarian regime. Being a victim of crime does not significantly impact support for authoritarianism. Thus, it is the sense of insecurity and vul-

[29] During the review process, doubts were raised about the validity of these questions. First, as stated earlier, a test of internal consistency, based on the average inter-item correlations, indicates relatively high levels of reliability (that is, Cronbach Alpha of 0.68). Second, some of the items come from the work on authoritarianism by Robert Altemeyer (See Robert Altemeyer, *The Authoritarian Specter.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). Third, by their very nature closed-ended survey instruments sacrifice subtlety in order to increase our ability to generalize across individual respondents and nations. Fourth, the low levels of missing data (for example, from 3–6 percent for each question) indicate that respondents understood the choices they were presented with and were capable of answering them without hesitation. In addition, given the low levels of education among many in Latin America, there is every indication that greater flexibility and subtlety will increase confusion and missing data rather than add clarity to the survey results. Fifth, by asking a series of questions the survey instrument attempts to capture the multidimensional nature of support for authoritarianism, thus reducing the validity issues raised by any one single question. In other words, the cumulative effect of using a reliable scale ensures us that these questions are indeed measuring an authoritarian syndrome among respondents.

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nerability to crime that pushes individuals to support regimes that employ authoritarian measures.

The results in Appendix Tables 2 and 3 indicate that in the case of El Salvador there is an important distinction between those who have experienced crime directly and those who fear becoming victims of crime. A crime victim is significantly more willing to support the most extreme measure of authoritarianism, namely a military coup. Fear of crime does not have a significant impact on support for a coup. Instead, those who exhibit fear of becoming victims of crime in their neighborhood are significantly more willing to support "strong hand" measures that fall short of rejecting all elements of democracy completely.

Effects for Guatemala

The Guatemalan survey measured support for authoritarianism in a different manner. Not all the questions used to determine the Salvadorian support for authoritarianism were asked in Guatemala, and so similar findings were not possible. Nonetheless, a question asked in both countries was: "Do you believe that in our country we need a government that applies a strong hand, or that problems can be solved with the participation of everyone?" The survey found that 60 percent of respondents chose the "strong hand" option. Only 29 percent indicated support for the participation of everyone, and 11 percent did not choose a preference. Analysis of the impact of crime victimization on support for a strong hand government shows that there is virtually no difference between victims and non-victims when it comes to their attitudes toward a government that applies a strong hand.

In order to examine preferences for democracy or authoritarianism, the survey also asked the following question: "With which of the following phrases do you agree the most: 1. Democracy is preferable to any other form of government; 2. In some circumstances, an authoritarian government is preferable to a democratic one; or 3. It makes no difference to people like me whether there is a democratic or authoritarian regime?"

This question has been used in the *Latinobarometro* surveys since 1995. The results indicate that only slightly more than two-fifths of respondents unequivocally prefer democracy, yet less than one in ten would choose an authoritarian government, far less than the 60 percent who chose a "strong hand" government. The largest group includes those who either did not express an opinion (31.8 percent) or saw no difference between democracy and authoritarianism (15.5 percent). These results suggest that respondents in Guatemala are not necessarily equating "strong hand" with authoritarianism, but rather with a more energetic effort at combating the nation's problems. This interpretation is borne out by interviews conducted during a pre-test of a survey instrument in Honduras where open-ended probes were administered to some individuals to ascertain their understanding of authoritarianism. None of those respondents equated authoritarianism with a "strong hand" government, but rather

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FIGURE 2
Association between Support for Democracy and Strong Hand Government in Guatemala



expressed the opinion that an authoritarian government is one which "violates the law," "does not respect liberties," and "commands obedience." Furthermore, Mitchell Seligson quotes results from a survey in Costa Rica where over 60 percent of respondents supported a "strong hand" government.[30] However, numerous surveys, from the multi-year *Latinobarometro* to those conducted by the University of Pittsburgh Public Opinion Project in 1990 and 1995, show a clear preference for democracy among Costa Rican citizens. The question, then, is to what extent are support for democracy and a strong-hand government related. I would expect a majority of respondents to support both democracy and a government that takes a strong-hand approach. In addition, there should be individuals who support authoritarianism and a strong hand government, as well as those who support democracy and reject strong-hand tactics.

Figure 2 reflects the percentages in each category when the two factors are considered together. A plurality of respondents (43.4 percent) choose both democracy and a strong hand government. Adding "committed democrats" to these respondents produces an overwhelming majority of Guatemalans (72.7 percent) who support some level of democratic governance, only 27.3 percent are willing to support authoritarianism outright.

[30] For additional analysis of these questions and the Guatemalan survey in general, see Mitchell A. Seligson, Malcolm B. Young, Cynthia Hamill, Dinorah Azpuru de Cuestas, and Max Eduardo Lucas, "Guatemalan Values and the Prospects for Democratic Development: With Emphasis on Civil Society Participation and Attitudes Regarding Crime, Due Process and Authoritarian Regimes," *Development Associates* (January 2000). Details of the Costa Rican survey can be found at *La Nación*, 23 October 1999 and in the electronic edition, www.nacion.co.cr for that date.

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In order to test the effects of crime victimization on preference for democracy, a multivariate regression model was employed. The independent variables are those used in the previous models. The dependent variable is a scale created from the four categories in Figure 2.[31]

Table 4 in the Appendix shows that age, education, and sense of security in the neighborhood are the factors that most affect preference for democracy in Guatemala. Support for democracy increases among respondents who are older, more educated, and feel more secure in their own neighborhood. Again, just as in El Salvador, direct experience with crime does not have a significant effect on support for democracy. It is the fear of crime or lack of security in one's neighborhood that impacts people's preference for or rejection of democracy.

Conclusion

The study reported here has analyzed the connection between crime and support for democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala. It found that while people seem to have favorable opinions of the National Civil Police, support is affected significantly by the fear of crime resulting from a generalized feeling that neighborhoods are not secure. Moreover, those same feelings of insecurity have a significant and negative effect on support for democratic regimes. In the case of El Salvador, those who have been victims of crime are significantly more likely to support a military coup. Thus, public perception of democratic legitimacy can be severely constrained by an inability of public security forces to combat crime.

While these results indicate a clear connection between democracy and crime victimization, there are additional areas of research that would assist in understanding the link. First, researchers might focus on longitudinal data that can shed light on how changes in crime rates affect democratic values over time. Second, they might examine how attitudes for specific crime fighting measures (for example, jailing criminals without trials for prolonged periods, searching and seizing property without warrants) are linked to democratic values. Third, they might identify whether there are additional psychological or attitudinal characteristics that may help explain why those who fear crime are more likely to support authoritarianism. Fourth, they might examine specific sub-samples of the population, including elites, in order to further understand how demographics affect crime victimization. Fifth, they might examine whether the type of crime people experience significantly affects attitudes toward democracy.

The transition between a militarized police and a civil one, mandated by the Peace Accords, has been very difficult. Both countries suffer crime rates among the highest in the world, and the lack of resources, corruption, and political infighting have weakened the efforts to institutionalize an efficient civilian

[31] The categories were recoded to create a scale of increasing support for democracy where 0 represents strong hand and authoritarianism and 100 represents committed democrats.

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police. There are growing pressures to partially remilitarize public policing by involving the armed forces in efforts to combat common street crime. The presidents of both nations have used provisions in the national constitutions allowing for the use of the armed forces to "assist" civilian institutions in cases of emergencies in order to deploy army units in an effort to help fight crime in the largest cities. It is not uncommon to see armored personnel vehicles with automatic weapons patrolling the streets of San Salvador and Guatemala City. In a region where authoritarian legacies are widespread, both the government and the public often find these practices appealing.

The dilemma for fragile democracies is how to fight crime vigorously, which the public demands, while preserving the civil and political rights so essential for democratic governance. The answer to the problem is neither to give free reign to the police forces nor to allow the military to resume its previous internal security role. What is necessary is to design public security and judicial reforms that deepen and strengthen democratic values by focusing on increasing accountability, enhancing effectiveness through better training and improved technology, and building meaningful community relations.*

Appendix

TABLE 1

Predictors of Trust in the National Civil Police

	Guatemala	*El Salvador*
Age	−0.004 (0.062)	0.002 (0.017)
Gender	0.023 (0.018)	2.534 (1.141)*
Education	−1.806 (1.031)	−0.246 (0.148)
Socioeconomic Status	0.219 (0.670)	−2.251 (0.534)***
Urbanization	7.721 (1.974)***	−5.100 (2.020)*
Ideology	0.976 (0.434)*	0.911 (0.244)***
Ethnicity	7.277 (2.022)***	–
Crime Victim	−0.020 (0.023)	−0.040 (0.014)**
Feeling of Security	0.100 (0.025)***	0.100 (0.017)***
F	7.416***	20.810***
R^2	0.053	0.054
N	1199	2913

Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are given in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

* I wish to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers of *PSQ* for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this article. In addition, I thank Sarah Spencer for her valuable assistance during the elaboration of the initial draft. I thank Dr. Mitchell A. Seligson, director of the University of Pittsburgh Latin America Public Opinion Project, for providing access to the surveys. For El Salvador, I acknowledge the assistance and generosity of Dr. Ricardo Córdova, director of the *Fundación Guillermo Manuel Ungo (FUNEAUNGO)*, cosponsor of the Salvadorian survey. The research for the article was made possible by funding from the Office of Research and Sponsored Programs, the Faculty Research & Creative Endeavors Committee, and the department of political science, all of Central Michigan University. In addition, funding from the United States Institute of Peace (Grant #USIP-104-01S) provided time away from teaching to complete revisions to the article.

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TABLE 2

Predictors of Support for a Coup under Conditions of High Crime in El Salvador

	Logistic Coefficient (s.e.)
Age	−0.010 (0.003)**
Gender	0.453 (0.095)***
Education	−0.054 (0.012)***
Socioeconomic Status	−0.094 (0.042)*
Urbanization	−0.119 (0.169)
Ideology	0.056 (0.018)***
Crime Victim	0.002 (0.001)*
Feeling of Security	−0.001 (0.001)
Model Chi-Square (d.f.)	123.806 (9)***

Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are given in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

TABLE 3

Predictors of Support for Authoritarian Regime in El Salvador

Age	0.061 (0.046)
Gender	1.808 (1.339)
Education	−1.474 (0.174)***
Socioeconomic Status	1.786 (0.626)**
Urbanization	1.425 (2.370)
Ideology	1.372 (0.286)
Crime Victim	0.024 (0.017)
Feeling of Security	−0.100 (0.019)***
F	22.747***
R^2	0.059
N	2913

Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are given in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

TABLE 4

Predictors of Preference for Democracy over Authoritarianism in Guatemala

Age	0.145 (0.046)**
Gender	0.023 (0.014)**
Education	1.990 (0.763)**
Socioeconomic Status	0.335 (0.496)
Urbanization	0.217 (1.462)
Ideology	0.559 (0.321)
Crime Victim	0.004 (0.017)
Feeling of Security	0.077 (0.018)***
F	5.141***
R^2	0.037
N	1199

Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are given in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

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The Politics of Gambling in the South

MICHAEL NELSON
JOHN LYMAN MASON

In a remarkable instance of state policy innovation, the final third of the twentieth century was marked by the rapid spread of legalized and often state-sponsored gambling throughout much of the United States. Southern states were slow to embrace this trend. As recently as 1963, no state had a lottery. By 1985 most nonsouthern states—but none in the South—were lottery states. In the 1990s, however, lotteries were legalized in several southern states, a trend that continued into the twenty-first century when Tennessee adopted a lottery in 2003. Casinos, whether owned by corporations or American Indian tribes, also have spread in recent years, from one nonsouthern state in 1963 to twenty-five today and from no southern states in 1960 to five today.

Employing two case studies, this article addresses three questions. First, why have some southern states recently legalized new forms of gambling? Second, why have these states chosen the forms that they have, especially lotteries and casinos? Third, and most important, how well do prevailing theories of state policy innovation enable us to understand the politics of gambling in the South and, in turn, what modifications of these theories may be suggested by the study of this issue? The case studies concern Mississippi, the first southern state to legalize casino gambling, and Georgia, whose lottery has become the model for lottery proponents in other southern states.

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Gambling in the States: An Overview

Lotteries

The politics of gambling in the United States has not gone unstudied. In their book on state lotteries as a public policy for raising revenues, economists Charles Clotfelter and Philip Cook included a chapter on politics.[1] They found that lotteries generate a form of mass politics that eventually overcomes elite resistance. In a typical case, political leaders, who disdain lotteries as an erratic revenue source that disproportionately raises money from the poor and lends the moral authority of the state to gambling, yield in the end to a public who wants to play. Characteristically, as popular support swells, legislators delegate the decision to voters by placing a lottery referendum on the ballot. Clotfelter and Cook presented the results of thirty state referenda in the period from 1964 to 1988 on proposals for state-sponsored lotteries as evidence of the popularity of this form of gambling. The proposals were approved in all but two of these referenda, with the yes vote averaging 63 percent. Once enacted, the lotteries became uncontroversial. No state in the modern era has repealed its lottery.

Clotfelter and Cook found that lotteries are much more popular among voters than are other forms of legalized gambling, which (with the exception of charitable bingo) usually lose in state referenda. They also reported that a state was most likely to adopt a lottery when certain of its internal characteristics were accompanied by the presence of neighboring lottery states. These internal characteristics include the presence of other forms of legalized gambling, especially racetrack betting and bingo, a high percentage of Roman Catholics (whose version of Christianity is tolerant of gambling) and a low percentage of Baptists (whose version of Christianity is not), and a broad liberalism on social and religious matters. States often were persuaded to adopt lotteries when they saw their citizens crossing the border to buy lottery tickets.

In 1990, political scientists Frances Stokes Berry and William Berry published an "event history analysis" of the politics of state lottery adoptions.[2] Event history analysis is a method used "to explain a qualitative change (or event) in the behavior of an individual at a particular point in time." Berry and Berry found that a state government (the "individual" whose behavior they were attempting to explain) was most likely to adopt a lottery in a year when its fiscal health was poor, the personal income of its citizens was high, a number of neighboring states already had a lottery, the percentage of religious fundamentalists in the state's population was low, and a gubernatorial election was taking place. According to their analysis, these elements typically were strongest when they appeared in combination. For example, Berry and Berry found

[1] Charles T. Clotfelter and Philip J. Cook, *Selling Hope: State Lotteries in America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).

[2] Frances Stokes Berry and William D. Berry, "State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovation: An Event History Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 84 (June 1990): 395–415.

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support for the hypothesis that "[t]he effect of previously adopting neighboring states in overcoming obstacles to lottery adoption is greater in an election year and when a state's fiscal health is poor than in a year after an election and when fiscal health is stronger."

Some disagreements exist between the findings of Berry and Berry and those of Clotfelter and Cook. For example, in a subsequent article, Frances Berry discounted a "national interaction model" of state policy innovation, which she narrowly defined as involving "a national communications network among state officials in which officials of adopter states interact freely and mix completely with officials of nonadopter states."[3] Yet, Clotfelter and Cook noted the growing presence and influence of multi-state actors in lottery adoptions. This difference may be rooted in the authors' differing understandings of what constitutes national political influence. Clotfelter and Cook uncovered activity by lottery-supply corporations such as Scientific Games, Inc., and the American Sweepstakes Corporation, which engineered lobbying efforts in support of lotteries.

In addition, and in contrast to Berry and Berry, Clotfelter and Cook found that the fiscal health of a state had little or no effect on the likelihood that it would adopt a lottery as a source of additional revenue. This difference may be the result of the authors' employment of different measures of state fiscal health. The indicator that Clotfelter and Cook used was the percentage change in state revenue adjusted for inflation between the year a state adopted a lottery and the two preceding years. The state-level indicator of fiscal need employed by Berry and Berry was the ratio of total state revenue minus total state spending to total state spending.

These disagreements notwithstanding, the similarities between the Berry and Berry and Clotfelter and Cook studies are striking from the standpoint of theories of state policy innovation. Both interstate diffusion and internal state characteristics emerged in their studies as significant causes of lottery adoptions. As such, each set of scholars was led to incorporate the two leading models of state policy innovation in its explanation. Diffusion theory, as formulated by Jack Walker, posits that "the likelihood of a state adopting a new program is higher if other states have already adopted the idea," especially if "the innovation has been adopted by a state viewed by key decision makers as a point of legitimate comparison," usually a "regional pace setter."[4] Virginia Gray, although not discounting diffusion theory, argued that innovation in public policy is better explained by a state's internal characteristics, notably high per capita income and vigorous party competition.[5] Other scholars have found the inte-

[3] Frances Stokes Berry, "Sizing Up State Policy Innovation Research," *Policy Studies Journal* 22 (1994): 442–456.

[4] Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion Innovation Among the American States," *American Political Science Review* 63 (September 1969): 880–899.

[5] Virginia Gray, "Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study," *American Political Science Review* 67 (December 1973): 1174–1185.

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gration of diffusion and state characteristics to be helpful. One of them, Michael Mintrom, placed particular emphasis in his study of state policies concerning school choice on the importance of "policy entrepreneurs," including think tank analysts, constituency group representatives, and elected officials.[6]

Casino Gambling

Casino gambling on the national level was the subject of a study by John Dombrink and William Thompson.[7] In contrast to the two lottery studies, their analysis of state policy innovation relied entirely on internal characteristics. Dombrink and Thompson concluded that a number of factors influence the likelihood that a state will allow casinos to operate legally within its borders: "political environment" factors, such as the economy and the state's prior experience with gambling; "political elite and active interests" factors, including the stance of public officials and business interests on casinos; "campaign sponsorship" factors, such as the credibility and financial commitment of casino advocates; and "campaign issue dominance" factors, notably the ability of casino supporters to frame the issue as one of economic development rather than of crime, morality, or quality of life. Dombrink and Thompson found that, in contrast to lotteries and some other forms of legalized gambling, a "veto model" describes the politics of casinos; that is, if even one of the four factors they enumerated is adverse to a casino measure, the measure will fail.

A final observation concerning all of these studies is that they are of limited applicability to the politics of gambling in the South. All end in the 1980s, the time when lotteries were just beginning to emerge on the southern political landscape and before any southern state had legalized casino gambling. In addition, although Dombrink and Thompson included a "political elite" factor in their analysis, neither lottery study made much of the role of elected politicians as innovators in this area of public policy. Clotfelter and Cook treated elected officials as part of the political elite that opposed lotteries, and Berry and Berry characterized them as at most reluctant converts, resigning themselves to a lottery only when doing so became the path of least resistance to a strongly supportive public opinion. Yet, in 1998, Democratic challengers, following the advice of national political consultants to emphasize the lottery issue, unseated incumbent Republican governors in Alabama and South Carolina. These were the only two incumbent governors to lose in that year's elections.

[6] Michael Mintrom, "Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation," *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (July 1997): 738–770; and Michael Mintrom, *Policy Entrepreneurs and School Choice* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000).

[7] John Dombrink and William N. Thompson, *The Last Resort: Success and Failure in Campaigns for Casinos* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1990).

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Two Case Studies

In an effort to consolidate and advance the theoretical literature on state policy innovation and the substantive literature on the politics of gambling, we have employed the case study method. Case studies are a particularly suitable way of approaching a subject whose literature resembles the research on the politics of gambling—that is, full of interesting but sometimes conflicting findings, which case studies may help to sort out,[8] and marked by large omissions (the South, the 1990s) whose terrain case studies, like early voyages of exploration, may help to map. In employing them, we take advantage of two other aspects of the case study method.[9] One is that the method encompasses developments that research focused on particular data sets or hypotheses might neglect. For example, this study is able to encompass both of the leading forms of legalized gambling, not just one form. The other is that case studies allow multiple explanations when called for by the data. For example, state constitutions—which no study of gambling has taken into serious account[10]—may be as critical in some instances as other causal factors that have been identified in the literature. In sum, although case studies do not render other methodologies unnecessary, they may provide just the sort of insights that will make the productive use of other methodologies possible.

Mississippi and Georgia are particularly useful cases to explore the theoretical issues in the literature on state policy innovation. First, the political developments that brought about commercial casinos in Mississippi and a lottery in Georgia occurred nearly simultaneously in both states in the early 1990s, several years after Virginia and Florida had become the first southern lottery states and several years before other southern states, such as South Carolina, Alabama, and Tennessee, considered in earnest the legalization of gambling. Thus, any national or regional political force related to gambling that acted on one of the cases was also acting on the other. Second, and most important with regard to this study's second research question (why states choose the form of gambling they do), Mississippi and Georgia may be neatly defined as a casino state and a lottery state, respectively. Both states, for various reasons, chose to

[8] Sidney Verba, "Some Dilemmas in Comparative Research," *World Politics* 20 (October 1967): 111–127; Arendt Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review* 65 (September 1971): 682–693; Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science" in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 7 (Reading, PA: Addison-Wesley, 1975): 79–137.

[9] Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1979), 54–57.

[10] This includes even recent studies such as Patrick A. Pierce and Donald E. Miller, "Variations in the Diffusion on State Lottery Adoptions: How Revenue Dedication Affects Morality Politics," *Policy Studies Journal* 27 (1999): 696–706; E. B. McKinney and J. W. Swain, "State Lotteries: Explaining Their Popularity," *International Journal of Public Administration* 16 (2001): 1023–1035; and Denise von Herrmann, *The Big Gamble: The Politics of Lottery and Casino Expansion* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002).

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go in singular and different directions with regard to their policies on gambling. Third, advocates of legalized gambling have identified both states as models of how to "do it right." Georgia is widely regarded as having among the best state lottery policies, and the laws establishing and regulating Mississippi casinos have also been heralded. The exemplary status of these state policies makes the politics behind their creation all the more interesting and important.

Mississippi

As the 1990 session of the Mississippi Legislature began its work in January, the stage seemed set for the adoption of a state lottery. Nineteen states had adopted lotteries in the preceding ten years, including two in the South: Florida in 1986 and Virginia in 1987. Mississippi's neighbors, Tennessee to the north and Louisiana to the west, were actively considering lotteries. Mired in recession, the state treasury had experienced several consecutive years of budgetary shortfalls. Democratic governor Roy Mabus, eschewing a tax increase, had made a lottery the financial centerpiece of his recently proposed Better Education for Success (BEST) program to improve Mississippi's notoriously poor public schools. A 7 January poll by the Jackson *Clarion-Ledger* showed 62 percent public support for a lottery.[11]

The Enactment of Casino Gambling

Early in the 1990 legislative session, much to the surprise of Mabus and most political observers, the lottery lost a test vote in the Senate. But, even more surprisingly, legalized gambling was very much alive. On 15 March, the Legislature gave final passage to the Gaming Control Act, a bill which, in the absence of local opposition, would legalize casino gambling in fourteen of the state's eighty-two counties: the three counties along the Gulf Coast and the eleven along the Mississippi River, which constitutes the state's western border. In passing the Act, legislators made Mississippi only the fifth casino state in the nation and the first in the South. Within a few years, Mississippi would have more casinos than any other state except Nevada.

Mississippi's decision to reject a lottery and legalize casinos in 1990 was anomalous by any standard. As the economist Richard McGowan has observed, "Mississippi is the great exception" to the rule that "casino gambling is usually the last form of gambling that state officials will recognize."[12] This observation is consistent with Dombrink and Thompson's "veto model" of the politics of casino gambling in which, in contrast to the politics of state lotteries, any one of several factors can keep a state from legalizing casinos.

[11] "Mississippi," *USA Today*, 8 January 1990.

[12] Richard McGowan, "Lotteries and State Government: A Consistent Partner or a Stepping Stone for More Gambling," Testimony before the National Gambling Impact Study Commission, 17 March 1998, 2.

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The reasons for Mississippi's decisions in 1990 are various. Some, as predicted by diffusion theory, involve the influence of other states' actions on Mississippi. Others are grounded in the internal characteristics of the state itself: its constitution, its political norms, and its prevailing economic situation.

Diffusion. In the popular mind, Mississippi is the quintessential Deep South state. But it is also a river state, and the river extends well into the North. At least a few legislators in Mississippi paid close attention when, in March 1989, Iowa legalized casino gambling on boats that would cruise the Mississippi River. Iowa had suffered great economic distress during the farm crisis of the 1980s, especially in the river cities of Davenport and Bettendorf, where the farm equipment manufacturing industry experienced plant closings and severe layoffs. Riverboat casinos docked on these cities' waterfronts seemed an ingenious way to tap into the mythology of riverboat gambling on paddlewheel steamboats. "We're selling the lore of Mark Twain," said the Iowa Legislature's leading casino advocate; indeed, the law to authorize casinos actually mandated that the gambling vessels resemble nineteenth-century riverboats.[13] The Legislature of neighboring Illinois, realizing that most of the Iowa casinos' customers would be from Illinois, quickly followed suit by legalizing a limited number of casinos in Joliet and other nearby river cities.

Although Dombrink and Thompson neglect the influence of other states in their model of casino politics, casino gambling's initial advocates in the Mississippi Legislature were in large part inspired by the Iowa and Illinois experiences. They also feared that Louisiana would soon decide to legalize riverboat gambling, raising the specter that New Orleans casinos would drain money from Mississippians and draw tourists away from the already declining Mississippi Gulf Coast.[14] From Iowa, these legislators got the idea of riverboat casinos. Iowa, however, placed strict limits on the size of gamblers' bets ($5 or less per bet) and total losses (no more than $200 per cruise), which shrank the appeal of its casinos as soon as more freewheeling alternatives were available nearby. Illinois, the Mississippi legislators learned, provided exactly that alternative by allowing no-limits casinos.

Just as diffusion theory helps to explain Mississippi's response to casinos, Mississippi's response to casinos suggests two modifications of diffusion theory. The first, "anticipatory diffusion," involves a state's enactment of a policy innovation for fear that another state will make that innovation less effective by enacting it first. Much of the impetus for Mississippi to legalize casino gambling was the expectation that neighboring Louisiana was about to do so, thereby preempting the tourist market that Mississippi thought it could attract by acting first. The second, "incremental diffusion," occurs when one state alters a policy

[13] Robert Goodman, *The Luck Business: The Devastating Consequences and Broken Promises of America's Gambling Explosion* (New York: Free Press, 1995), 97.

[14] H. L. "Sonny" Meredith, former representative, Mississippi Legislature, interview with the authors, 4 November 1999.

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innovation in the course of copying it. In this case, Iowa inaugurated water-based, low-stakes casino gambling in a limited number of licensed establishments, Illinois removed betting limits, and Mississippi removed both the betting limits and, eventually, the limit on casino licenses.

To be sure, the experience of lottery states, especially Florida and Virginia, also made the lottery idea appealing in Mississippi, as did the fear that neighboring Louisiana and Tennessee soon would adopt lotteries. On the basis of that experience, Mabus was able to argue plausibly that a lottery would generate more than $50 million per year for the state treasury; that lotteries were an increasingly familiar part of state governments' operations, even in the South; and that lotteries generated almost no political or financial corruption. On 19 June 1990, meeting in special session, the lower house of the Mississippi Legislature voted 83–39 to put a lottery referendum on the November ballot. Two days later, the Senate voted in favor of the same measure by 28–23.

Constitution. Despite this seemingly favorable vote, the lottery measure died in 1990. Mississippi's constitution, enacted in 1890, explicitly banned lotteries. Amending the constitution to permit a lottery would have required a two-thirds vote of both houses of the Legislature. The Senate majority fell six votes shy of this requirement. But even an affirmative legislative vote would not have enacted the amendment: voter approval in a statewide referendum was also necessary to alter the state constitution. And if enacted, the amendment would only remove the ban on a lottery. Legislation still would have to be passed to create one. Because the lottery was by definition a revenue measure, a three-fifths majority in both houses would be needed to pass it.

Casino gambling required only simple legislation passed by a simple majority to be enacted. Thus, although both the House's 66–52 vote in favor of the Gaming Control Act on 7 March 1990 and the Senate's 22–20 vote in favor of the act eight days later fell short of the majorities the lottery amendment commanded, they were sufficient to pass it. In addition, "casinos never had to go to a statewide [referendum] vote," said one of their chief advocates, Representative Charlie Williams. "If that had been the case, it never would have passed."[15]

Politics. Several explicitly political reasons help to account for Mississippi's enactment of casino gambling. Legislators from the three Gulf Coast counties, which had recently been experiencing economic distress and which had a history of illegal casinos,[16] reached out to colleagues from the eleven chronically distressed delta counties along the Mississippi River and formed an alliance to promote the legalization of casino gambling in their districts. Their chief strategists were two of the House's most powerful members, Representative H.L. "Sonny" Meredith and Speaker Tim Ford. Meredith and Ford realized that

[15] John Branston, "Against All Odds," *Memphis* (September 1997), 34.
[16] Von Hermann, *The Big Gamble*, 21, 79–80.

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most of their fellow legislators, as well as the general public, would generally be opposed to as extreme and, at the time, unusual a form of gambling as casinos. Thus, they sought little public attention for their campaign. They were aided in this strategy by the prominence of the lottery in the governor's legislative agenda, which diverted the media spotlight from the casino bill. "The 'antis' were focused on lotteries," Williams recalled. "The cat was out of the bag [on casinos] before they started chasing it."[17]

In addition to adopting a low-profile strategy, casino proponents in the Legislature developed arguments that would be particularly appealing to their generally conservative colleagues. They pointed out that in contrast to a lottery, which would put the government into the business of running a gambling operation and encouraging people to wager, casinos would be private enterprises. They appealed to state pride, reaching deep into the state's antebellum past to argue that Mississippi had a better claim to the riverboat gambler tradition than Iowa or Illinois, while also warning that Louisiana might soon supplant that claim.[18] More importantly, they presented the casino bill as a measure of local rather than statewide importance, relying on the legislative norm that members should defer to each other on constituency matters. Unlike a lottery, which would operate throughout the state, "the riverboat gambling idea seemed to confine the sin," according to Democratic State Committeeman Wilson Golden, "because it was for fourteen counties and not everybody's county."[19] In addition, the proposed law would not by itself authorize casinos to operate because the citizens of each affected locality were empowered to ban them by county referendum. The model for this procedure was the 1966 repeal of Mississippi's prohibition on the sale of alcoholic beverages, in which the adoption of a local-option approach had secured an otherwise unobtainable majority for passage.

The best evidence of the casino advocates' success is that, when the two key votes on the casino bill took place in the Senate on 2 February and 15 March 1990, ten generally anti-gambling senators who did not want to vote for casinos, but also did not want to interfere in what had been defined as a local matter, chose to be absent. On each vote, the casino bill passed by a majority of two."[20]

Economics. One of the most persuasive arguments that casino advocates were able to make had to do with the economic condition of the affected counties. Among the river counties of the Mississippi delta, for example, was Tunica County, which had the lowest per capita income of any county in the nation in 1980. (When Jesse Jackson visited Tunica in 1985, he called it "America's Ethiopia.") The Gulf Coast counties, historically a center of tourism and ship-

[17] Ibid.

[18] Charlie Williams, representative, Mississippi Legislature, interview with the authors, 20 September 1999.

[19] Ronald Smothers, "Riverboat Gambling Gets a Chance in Mississippi," *New York Times*, 4 December 1990.

[20] "Senators Approve Casinos on River," *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 3 February 1990.

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building, had never recovered from the devastation wrought by Hurricane Camille in 1969 and recently were suffering from declining oil and gas prices and from cutbacks in the federal defense budget. These cuts had severely affected the coast's naval bases and shipbuilding industry.

Pro-casino legislators, expecting only minor revenues for the state treasury from casino taxes, stressed the "tourism enhancement" advantages that casino gambling would bring to distressed areas of the state. De-emphasizing revenues also preserved the casino bill's status as simple legislation and, thus, did not trigger the state constitution's three-fifths requirement for revenue measures. Six years after the casino law was enacted, at a time when nearly thirty casinos were operating in Mississippi and generating more than $200 million dollars each year for state and local treasuries, Williams recalled that "[o]ur expectations were way too low—three boats on the coast, three on the river, with $18 million to the state."[21] Proponents further claimed that casinos made greater economic sense than a lottery. A casino, they argued, is a major capital investment by the private sector that employs many people and, if properly situated, attracts tourists to the state. A lottery, on the other hand, would employ few people, involve little investment, and bring in few tourists.

Merely legalizing casino gambling, advocates knew, would not attract any casinos to Mississippi. Thus, the law was written to be industry-friendly. With the assistance of International Gaming Technologies lobbyist Scott Scherer,[22] Representative Meredith, the chair of a special Ways and Means subcommittee appointed by Williams, adopted what has been called the "Nevada model" of casino legislation rather than the stricter and more skeptical "New Jersey model," which most casino states have adopted.[23] In Mississippi, as in Nevada, no restriction was placed on the number of casino licenses that could be issued, and although a background check for casino operators was required, the cost of obtaining a license was nominal. No limits were placed on the amounts that gamblers could bet, the losses they could suffer, or the days and hours they could wager. Riverboat casinos could be docked; they did not have to cruise. Most important, perhaps, the tax rate on casino profits was about half that of most other states: 8 percent to the state and, at local option, no more than 4 percent to the county in which a casino operated. Quick confirmation of the attractiveness of these measures to the casino industry came when Iowa's first two riverboat casinos sailed south to relocate in Mississippi.

The After-Politics of Casino Gambling

As described above, the politics of gambling in the great majority of lottery states has followed a standard pattern: initial mass support and elite resistance,

[21] John Branston, "Against All Odds," *Memphis* (September 1997) 34.

[22] Gary Burhop, Vice President, Harrah's Entertainment, interview with the authors, 25 March 1999.

[23] *Report of the National Gambling Impact Study Commission* 1999, chapter 3, accessed at ngisc.gov.

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a full-scale public debate, a statewide referendum, legislative enactment, and absorption of the lottery into the fabric of state government. The enactment of casino gambling in Mississippi departed from this pattern in several important ways: there was no initial mass support, no full-scale public debate, and no statewide referendum. The abbreviated politics of casino adoption spawned what may be called an "after-politics" of continuing controversy.

Start-up: Litigation. Even with an industry-friendly law on the books, at least two things had to happen before casinos could begin to operate in Mississippi: the Legislature had to assign responsibility for casino licensing to a regulatory commission and counties had to decide whether to allow casinos to operate within their borders. Both of these ends were initially stymied by litigation.

On 27 April 1990, barely a month after the casino law was enacted, a chancery court judge in Jackson ruled that cash bingo games, whether charitable or commercial, violated the state constitution's ban on lotteries. The judge based his ruling on a 1989 decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court, which had held that bingo was a form of lottery.[24] The Tennessee Court's definition of lottery, adopted in full by the Mississippi judge, included any game of chance in which people bet money in the hope of winning more money. The judge added that, by this definition, most casino games also were barred by the state constitution.[25] These included table games such as roulette and, more importantly, slot machines, which casinos rely on for most of their business.

Although the Mississippi Supreme Court overturned the chancery court decision on 21 December 1990,[26] grounding its ruling in a much narrower definition of lottery than the Tennessee Court had adopted, casino operators were initially reluctant to move into the state until the legal climate was stable and favorable. Another controversy arose a few months later when, after a casino company announced plans to operate a dockside gambling boat in Tunica County, the owners of the Southland Greyhound Park in nearby West Memphis, Arkansas, hired a consulting firm to try to persuade the U.S. Corps of Engineers to deny the wetlands-related construction permit that was required under the federal Clean Water Act to the casino—and, by implication, to all water-based casinos along the Mississippi River. As with the chancery court case, this effort was unsuccessful in the end, but for a time it placed in jeopardy the prospects for casino gambling in the river counties.[27]

The involvement of a competing out-of-state gambling enterprise in Mississippi's effort to undertake casino gambling suggests a third variation on the diffusion process, which we call "anti-diffusion." Anti-diffusion involves actors in

[24] *Secretary of State v. St. Augustine Church/St. Augustine School*, 766 S. W. 2d. 499 (Tennessee 1989).

[25] Reed Branson, "Judge Slaps Ban on Miss. Bingo," *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 28 April 1990.

[26] Myra Humphries, "Court Rules Bingo Legal in Mississippi, Calls for Controls," *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 22 December 1990.

[27] Tom Charlier, "Track Tried To Halt OK for Casinos," *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 18 October 1992.

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one jurisdiction trying to forestall adverse consequences for themselves by preventing another jurisdiction from enacting a policy. As noted below, anti-diffusion concerning casino gambling occurred, not only across state lines, but also across county lines within Mississippi.

Start-up: County votes. Mississippi's casino law allowed either 1,500 or 20 percent of a county's registered voters (whichever was less) to petition for a referendum to bar casinos from the county for a period of one year. In some counties, including Tunica, no such petitions were filed and the county boards of supervisors authorized casinos on their own authority. But in most counties, Southern Baptist, Methodist, and Church of Christ clergy took the initiative in organizing a petition drive, and a referendum was held. Typically, casino opponents offered morally grounded concerns about crime, addiction, and destruction of the work ethic, while proponents from the business and, in some cases, the political community stressed job creation, tourism, and other economic development arguments.[28] Some counties voted to approve casinos in late 1990. Others initially voted no but, in a subsequent referendum, voted yes. Still others voted no year after year.

In ways analogous to the Arkansas racetrack's effort to forestall casino gambling in Mississippi, some casino-eligible counties in Mississippi interfered in the politics of neighboring counties. For example, when Harrah's announced plans to open a casino resort in DeSoto County, which is closer to Memphis than Tunica County, Tunica casino interests were alarmed. Realizing that their businesses would dry up without the Memphis market, they surreptitiously financed hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of anticasino television commercials.[29] DeSoto County voters rejected casino legalization by a 60–40 margin.

Start-up: Regulatory Commission. The law that legalized casino gambling entrusted licensing and regulatory responsibility to the Mississippi Tax Commission, pending the creation of a freestanding gaming commission. Both the Tax Commission and its successor, the Mississippi Gaming Commission, saw their role as promoting the casino industry, not just regulating it to assure that casinos operated honestly. In August 1993, for example, the Tax Commission interpreted the law's requirement that casinos be built only on the Mississippi River or one of its tributaries to include a lagoon at the end of a canal that extended a few thousand feet inland from the river. The practical result was that casinos in Tunica County could be built on a site twenty minutes closer to Memphis than a stricter interpretation of the law would have allowed.

[28] Paul Jones, former Executive Director, Christian Action Commission, interview with the authors, 5 November 1999.

[29] William C. Baynes, "Rose Says Rival Backs Casino Foes in DeSoto," *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 1 November 1992; Laurel Campbell, "Tunica Casinos Have High Stakes in DeSoto Vote," *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 2 November 1996.

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Three years after the Gaming Commission began operating in October 1993, the Legislature's Joint Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review (PEER) criticized the Commission for its "failure to regulate Mississippi's legalized gambling industry aggressively and failure to monitor the industry's negative social consequences." Commissioner Robert C. Engram, defending the Commission's generally pro-industry approach, replied, "I think they're completely wrong." Other commissioners have regularly echoed Commissioner Victor Smith: "economic development, that is part of our task."[30]

Lottery politics. The combination of low casino taxes, loose regulation, a supportive judicial climate, and a mostly welcoming stance by the coastal and river counties, joined with the Gulf Coast's appeal as a tourist destination and Tunica's proximity to Memphis, enabled casinos to flourish in Mississippi. In 1992, five casinos opened in Mississippi. The number of casinos grew to fourteen in 1993 and leveled off at thirty in 1999.

As noted earlier, none of this success was foreseen by Mississippi policy makers during the early 1990s. Consequently, the lottery issue remained alive for a few years after its initial legislative defeat in 1990. Mabus campaigned for renomination in the September 1991 Democratic gubernatorial primary on his lottery proposal: he won and ten anti-lottery legislators lost in their own bids for renomination. Mabus was defeated in the November general election by Republican Kirk Fordice, but the new governor, although personally opposed to a lottery, said that he would not object to having a referendum on the question. With Mississippi's revenue picture still bleak in early 1992, the Legislature voted to allow the voters to decide in November whether the constitution should be amended to remove the ban on lotteries.

As has been the case in almost every state that has put the matter on the ballot, the lottery referendum passed in Mississippi. In contrast to most other states, however, the margin of victory was narrow: six percentage points (53 percent to 47 percent) as opposed to an average of twenty-six percentage points (63 percent to 37 percent). In addition, the referendum only made a lottery constitutionally permissible; the legislature still would have to pass the enabling act to create one. As a revenue measure, a lottery bill would require a three-fifths vote in both the House and Senate. Yet, a majority of the pro-lottery votes in the referendum had come from only three counties.[31] Most legislators represented constituencies that had voted against it.[32]

[30] Bartholomew Sullivan, "Gaming Regulators Prefer a Light Touch," *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 20 October 1997; Reed Branson, "Gambling Regulators in Miss. Defend Task as Boosters," *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 16 August 1996; and von Herrman, *The Big Gamble*, 47.

[31] Daniel A. Smith, "Homeward Bound?: Micro-level Legislative Responsiveness to Ballot Initiatives," *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* (Spring 2001): 50–61.

[32] Paul Barton, "Geography May Doom Mississippi Lottery Law," *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 10 January 1993.

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Casino supporters at the 1993 session of the Legislature worried that the new industry might suffer from competition with a lottery. They pointed to the casinos' early success and the dangers of stifling further growth. By December 1992 Mississippi was leading the South in job creation, with more than a third of the new jobs coming from the state's five casinos.[33] Already, the early estimate that casinos would contribute $18 million per year to the state treasury was being wildly exceeded. What to do with a budget surplus, not where to make mid-year budget cuts, was the Legislature's new challenge. In the end, the lottery bill never came to a vote.

The entrenchment of casino gambling. Not everyone has been happy with casino gambling as it has developed in Mississippi. Some complaints have arisen from inland counties which, under the Gaming Control Act, are not permitted to have casinos but would like to share in the wealth. Other politicians have wanted to eliminate casinos from Mississippi entirely. The state's dominant religious organizations continue to oppose casinos strenuously, as does the American Family Association, a national conservative Christian organization based in Tupelo. Polls commissioned by Harrah's have consistently found that public opposition to gambling in general is higher in Mississippi than in any other southern state.[34]

Despite the opposition, casinos seem strongly entrenched in Mississippi. Most of the initial promises for economic development, tourism, and tax revenues have been more than fulfilled, with little clear evidence of serious increases in crime or immoral behavior. In state politics, the dominant stance among candidates on the casino issue has been to express personal opposition to gambling but to praise the casino industry for its contributions to the state's economy. Governor Fordice adopted this stance (and consistently accepted political donations from casinos), as did nearly all the guberatorial candidates to succeed him in 1999 and 2003.[35]

What has changed in the after-politics of casinos in Mississippi is that the state government increasingly supports not casinos per se, but casinos as they have developed during the 1990s. Mississippi's initial posture of permissive licensing to felony-free applicants on any body of water even remotely related to the gulf or the river has gradually been tightened to restrict entry. In 1993, for example, the Legislature responded to pressure from Harrah's, which was building casinos in Tunica, Vicksburg, and Biloxi, by defeating a bill that would have allowed casinos to be built on any body of water west of Highway 61, some of them lakes more than fifty miles from the Mississippi River.[36] In 1994, Speaker

[33] Paul Barton, "Fordice Trumpets Miss. Job Growth," *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 28 December 1992.

[34] Gary Burhop interview.

[35] Ibid; Edward Walsh, "Two Sides of Casinos' Coin," *Washington Post*, 12 July 1998.

[36] "Miss. Senate Rejects Compromise Casino-Sitting Bill," *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 31 March 1993.

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Ford defended the Legislature's decision not to allow every country to have casino gambling on the grounds that the existing casinos had been built in good faith that the permissible territory for casino gambling would not expand.[37] In 1997, a bill was enacted to lengthen the minimum amount of time between casino referenda in a particular county from one year to eight years. The Legislature was responding to Tunica casinos seeking protection against possible casino legalization in DeSoto County. Finally, in January 1999, the gaming commission mandated that anyone bidding to build a new casino would have to spend a dollar on land-based facilities such as a hotel, golf course, restaurant, and concert hall for every dollar it spent building the casino itself.[38] By raising the costs of entry, the commission's decision strongly discouraged new, smaller-scale casinos from trying to do business in the state.

Georgia

Legal gambling in Georgia has involved charitable bingo since 1977 and a state-run lottery since 1993. The Georgia Legislature legalized charitable bingo in the late 1970s because local authorities were not enforcing the existing prohibition on bingo. The story of the Georgia lottery is more complicated than the one regarding charitable bingo and intersects at various points with unsuccessful attempts to legalize pari-mutuel betting on horse races in the state.

The first attempt to legalize horse racing in Georgia occurred in the late 1950s when a group of seventeen investors organized a company called Atlanta International Racing. The investors purchased land in Henry County, just south of Atlanta, for the purpose of automobile and horse racing. Although pari-mutuel betting, lotteries, and casino gambling were forbidden by the state constitution, the investors thought that profits from ticket sales to auto races would allow the facility to succeed until the constitution was changed and horse racing could begin.[39] These hopes were dashed when proposals to change the constitution to allow pari-mutuel betting were consistently buried in committee in the Georgia House of Representatives.

Zell Miller's 1990 Campaign for Governor

Meanwhile, Georgians became attracted to a different type of gambling. In the 1970s and 1980s, numbers-style lotteries were commonplace in poorer areas throughout the state. For example, two suspected lottery operators were arrested in a Tifton funeral home in 1983 when state agents seized $17,000 in cash and gambling paraphernalia. The lottery ring attracted betters from many coun-

[37] Sarah C. Campbell, "Lawmakers Not Keen on New Casinos for Miss.," *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 2 January 1994.

[38] Reed Branson, "Miss. Forces New Casinos to Make Big Land Investment," *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 22 January 1999.

[39] Jack Black, president, Old Hickory House, interview with the authors, 8 July 1999.

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ties in south Georgia, who wagered as much as $2 million per year. The arrest was the fourth major gambling operation uncovered that year.[40] As late as 1990, the "bug" lottery—based on predictions of butter and egg futures (hence "bug") and published in state newspapers—was also to be operative and popular.[41]

The presence of illegal lotteries illustrated the desire of many Georgians to play such games and contributed to the acquiescence of some political leaders to a state-run lottery. In preparation for his 1990 campaign for governor, Zell Miller led the movement for a lottery. In the late 1980s, he had become a lottery advocate after having stated his opposition to pari-mutuel betting and lotteries several years before.[42] In 1989, Miller, who had been lieutenant governor for the past sixteen years, staged a battle in the Legislature to place a lottery amendment to the state's constitution on the 1990 ballot.

The constitutional amendment process in Georgia requires a two-thirds vote by both houses of the General Assembly to place an amendment on the ballot and approval of the amendment in a referendum. In 1989, the Georgia Senate, in which the lieutenant governor plays a substantial leadership role, started the process of amending the constitution by passing easily a resolution that would have allowed voters to decide in 1990 if they wanted to change the constitution to allow a state lottery, with the profits earmarked for education. But Miller's proposal met substantial opposition in the Georgia House of Representatives, in which the anti-gambling influence of Speaker Tom Murphy and Governor Joe Frank Harris ran deep. On 7 February 1989, the House Industry Committee voted 10 to 8 to kill the bill, but it approved by 9 to 8 a motion to consider it at some later time. These votes came one day after hundreds of Georgia clergy appeared at a subcommittee hearing to oppose the lottery resolution.

The lottery issue was revived in the House in early 1990, mostly because of the lobbying of E. Jack Smith, who had represented horse owners in the Legislature for years and was one of the original investors in Atlanta International Racing. Smith hoped to attach a proposal to legalize pari-mutuel gambling to Miller's proposal for a state lottery. Even if that effort failed, he hoped that a lottery would eventually pave the way for horse racing in Georgia. On 30 January 1990, the House Industry Committee voted 11 to 6 in favor of a do-not-pass recommendation, which according to House rules disapproved the lottery resolution but let it remain alive because a member of the House could call a floor vote challenging the committee's recommendation. One member did that, but the House voted 143 to 24 to let stand the Industry Committee's do-not-pass recommendation.

The committee's action and the subsequent floor vote defeated the 1989–1990 proposal for a lottery. Miller shrewdly spun this apparent legislative defeat into a rhetorical victory in his 1990 campaign for governor. Advocates for a

[40] "Gambling Raid Nets Arrest and Evidence," *UPI Regional News*, 9 November 1983.

[41] Bill Shipp, editor, *Bill Shipp's Georgia*, interview with the authors, 8 June 1999.

[42] W. Lowry Anderson, "Zell Miller Affirms Gaming Stance," *The Christian Index*, 16 January 1975.

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lottery could argue that Georgia politicians, in particular the House leaders, were denying the people of Georgia the opportunity to vote on whether they wanted a lottery. Miller led this charge the day after the legislative vote, saying that the lottery "is an issue that's not going to go away. It will be with us this summer on the campaign trail for the governor's office."[43] Miller went on to claim that his long-time rival in the Legislature, Speaker Murphy, had used the leadership apparatus of the House to make sure that representatives upheld the decision of the Industry Committee and, hence, the norm of deference to the committee system as a whole. Miller was arguing that the large margin of defeat for the resolution did not mean that a lottery was unpopular among representatives but rather that members were adhering to legislative norms.

In addition to illegal lotteries and the failed push for a lottery in the General Assembly, Miller's 1990 gubernatorial campaign had as backdrop the money that many Georgians were spending on the recently created lottery in Florida. Seven of the top ten sales points for the Florida lottery were along the Georgia border. Nor were players of the Florida lottery confined to the southern parts of Georgia. In August 1990, two men were arrested outside a warehouse in Norcross, an affluent suburb north of Atlanta, when they were seen selling Florida lottery tickets with a $1.00 face value for $1.50 apiece.[44]

Miller's campaign for governor, then, took place in a state where people were already gambling. With his access to the state Legislature while serving as lieutenant governor and with the counsel of political consultant James Carville, whom he had hired in 1989,[45] Miller had primed the Georgia electorate and other state politicians with the idea of a lottery for education. In fact, it could be said that Miller primed Georgians too effectively because, in a textbook display of rival candidates in a two-party election moving toward the median voter,[46] Republican gubernatorial nominee Johnny Isakson endorsed a lottery for education as well. What remained for Miller was to convert his longstanding leadership on the lottery issue—the most prominent policy proposal of his campaign—into electoral success. This was a task that Carville had already helped to accomplish for successful gubernatorial candidate Wallace Wilkinson of Kentucky in 1987. Toward this end, Miller emphasized that lottery revenues would not go into the state's general fund but would go, instead, into a new education trust fund. Isakson proposed that lottery revenues go directly to local school systems, a narrower proposal that would not directly benefit a sizable constituency: the parents of college-age children.

Miller won the election. But the battle for governor would prove to be easier than the three battles awaiting his lottery proposal: the Legislature's passage

[43] Jim Barber, "Lottery's Luck Runs Out," *UPI Regional News*, 1 February 1990.

[44] "Two Arrested For Allegedly Selling Florida Lottery Tickets," *UPI Regional News*, 20 August 1990.

[45] Al Cross, "Wilkinson Camp Holds Fund-raiser for Georgian," *Louisville Courier-Journal*, 6 December 1989.

[46] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).

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of a resolution for a constitutional amendment to be placed on the ballot, its passage of enabling legislation for the lottery, and the referendum on the proposed constitutional amendment.

The Legislative Proposal for a Constitutional Amendment, January–February 1991

The campaign proposal that Miller parlayed into victory in the 1990 election called for lottery revenue to be spent creating pre-kindergarten programs, college scholarships, and improved school equipment, with authority to determine the distribution ratio among these programs resting with the governor. His proposals for the new programs emerged after a three-year period of sluggish economic growth in Georgia and in a year when budget estimates indicated a $332 million revenue shortfall.[47] This economic situation favorably influenced the public and legislative response to Miller's lottery, which promised to provide new education programs for young people and their parents at a time when budget cuts would occur in other areas. Even so, interests collided when the General Assembly began debating the exact language of the lottery referendum.

E. Jack Smith and Shannon Staley, representing Georgians for a Lottery Referendum during the 1991 debate about the lottery resolution, attempted to have the resolution amended to allow pari-mutuel betting. Their effort failed when Miller rallied enough supporters for a pure lottery bill and, in order not to alienate those whose main concern was horse racing, stated that he would not object to a separate amendment on pari-mutuel betting. The lottery resolution passed the House by a vote of 126 to 51, six votes more than the two-thirds majority required to place a constitutional amendment on the November 1992 ballot. Some of the lottery companies lobbying for the resolution were Scientific Games and Dittler Brothers Printing, both of which are based in Atlanta, and GTECH Corporation, a Rhode Island-based manufacturer of lottery equipment. As the likely brokers of most lottery ticket sales, owners of convenience, grocery, and liquor stores also actively supported the lottery resolution. The opposition included the Georgia Council on Moral and Civic Concerns, the Georgia Baptist Convention, and the Georgia Coalition for Traditional Family Values. Their leader, Representative Roger Byrd, argued against the resolution but conceded that it was a "noble attempt" at a constructive lottery.[48] Byrd was referring to the section of the resolution specifying that the lottery funds would be used for education and prohibiting pari-mutuel betting and casino gambling. As with the 1989 resolution, the Georgia Senate passed the 1991 lottery resolution by the required two-thirds majority.

[47] Bill Shipp, "Zell's Attack Campaign Indicates He's Still Fearful of Johnny Sting," *Bill Shipp's Georgia*, 15 October 1990.

[48] Bill Shipp, "Lottery Who's Who: Reputations, Big $$ Riding on Lottery," *Bill Shipp's Georgia*, 4 February 1991.

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The amendment to revise the state constitution and allow a lottery was in stark contrast to similar proposals in other states such as Mississippi. The proposal in Georgia, for example, said that all profits from the lottery would go only to educational programs and specified what these programs would be. The Georgia proposal was also different from the Mississippi lottery amendment because it stated explicitly that "net proceeds shall . . . not supplant, non-lottery educational resources for educational programs and purposes."[49] This language ensured that Georgia would not follow the lead of Florida, Texas, and other lottery states in substituting lottery revenues for existing state appropriations for education.

As with aspects of the casino policy adopted by Mississippi, the "non-supplant" feature of the Georgia lottery serves as an example of "incremental diffusion," that is, a state's modification of a borrowed policy innovation. Georgia did not simply copy Florida's lottery policy but rather modified it in an effort to correct its perceived weaknesses.

The Enabling Legislation, January–March 1992

The next controversy concerning the lottery occurred in early 1992 when, in anticipation of passage of the lottery amendment referendum, the enabling legislation was debated in the General Assembly. As early as 31 December 1990, Speaker Murphy argued against some of the particulars of Miller's lottery. The question, according to Murphy, was not whether there would be a lottery but who would control the distribution of its revenues. The Speaker argued that the governor's office should not be in charge of parceling out lottery receipts for education. Murphy was trying, at a minimum, to ensure that the General Assembly would have a role in deciding how revenues from the lottery would be spent. He appointed a long-time Miller antagonist, Representative Bill Dover, as chair of the Ways and Means Committee, which would have a hand in writing the enabling legislation for the lottery. Shortly after Dover was appointed, Miller backed off his proposal to have the governor oversee the distribution of lottery funds.

The compromise that Miller and Murphy reached, which proved to be illusory, was to have the legislation specify that the funds from the lottery would be divided equally among Miller's three educational priorities: pre-kindergarten programs, improved school equipment, and new HOPE (Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally) college scholarships. But when the bill emerged from the House Industry Committee in February 1992, it read: "It is the intent of the General Assembly that appropriations from the Lottery for Education Account shall be for educational purposes only." As Bill Shipp, a long-time chronicler of Georgia politics, noted at the time, this meant that there "is no specific dedication of lottery funds in the bill" beyond the general allocation of the

[49] *Constitution of the State of Georgia*, Article I, Section II, Paragraph VIII.

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funds to education and, more importantly, that the General Assembly would determine specific appropriations for education.[50] The committee's version of the bill, which broke Miller and Murphy's compromise agreement to divide funds equally among the three educational programs, passed the House 127 to 32. The House also amended the lottery bill in the floor debate, specifying that a special sales tax of four cents would be levied on each lottery ticket sold and that the resulting revenue would go into the state's general fund. With Miller's campaign promise of a lottery that would dedicate revenue exclusively to an education trust fund in jeopardy, he looked to the Senate for help.

The sales tax provision was deleted in Senate committee, as was a floor amendment that would have reattached the provision to the bill. The Senate version of the lottery bill, like the original version introduced in the House, allocated the lottery revenue equally among Miller's three new education programs. A House-Senate conference committee took up the two versions of the bill and, in the end, Miller and the House leaders struck a compromise. Lottery revenues would go to the three programs, but the General Assembly initially would determine and, in subsequent years, could adjust the distribution ratio. The final bill also established a governor-appointed, seven-member board to evaluate bids for major lottery contracts, such as those for scratch-off tickets. The board would hire its own lottery director, and neither the governor nor the Legislature would be able to intervene in contract decisions.

The Campaign for the Lottery Referendum, September–November 1992

The final test for Miller's lottery proposal was the 1992 referendum, which was needed to approve the lottery amendment to the state constitution and thus allow the new lottery law to take effect. It proved to be a very narrow victory for the governor even though lawmakers in early 1992 perceived the public's support for a lottery as being "so strong, they were afraid not to go along, according to lottery opponent Roger Byrd."[51] In the November referendum, 52 percent of Georgia's voters said yes to the lottery amendment and 48 percent opposed it. Lottery opponents had been encouraged by a poll taken by the *Atlanta Journal and Constitution* that indicated support for a lottery had fallen from more than 70 percent in 1990 to 53 percent in late October 1992,[52] as well as by evidence that Miller's popularity had recently plunged because of his proposal to remove the Confederate battle emblem from the state flag.

Passage of the lottery amendment can be attributed primarily to the successful organization and deep pockets of the pro-lottery effort spearheaded by Georgians for Better Education (GBE). GBE had been formed by Miller but

[50] Bill Shipp, "Hold Still Little Bill, All I'm Gonna Do Is Gut You," *Bill Shipp's Georgia*, 17 February 1992.

[51] Andy Sher, "Florida Key to Miller's Lottery Push," *Chattanooga Times*, 27 October 1992.

[52] Charles Walston, "Election '92: The Lottery," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 27 October 1992.

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was chaired in 1992 by David Garrett III, a widely respected Atlanta businessman and a long-time advocate of educational reform. The week before the referendum Betsey Weltner, the director of GBE, brought personnel from three state lotteries to Atlanta to describe the success of their lotteries in raising revenues for their states.[53] GBE also can be credited with keeping the debate centered on education and on the revenue that was being lost to Florida by Georgians playing that state's lottery.

An example of GBE's efforts to frame the debate can be found in an article by David Garrett in the *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*'s "Perspective" section on the eve of the referendum. According to Garrett, "More than 200 million Georgia dollars have flowed into the Florida lottery since 1988."[54] Garrett also emphasized the overcrowded buildings, outdated laboratories and computers, and "scrimping" of Georgia's parents to send their children to college. His article cited the abundance of lottery proceeds in states such as Iowa, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. Finally, Garrett claimed that "what happened with Florida's lottery funds [that is, substituting lottery revenues for funds previously appropriated for education] cannot happen here. We have learned from Florida's mistakes and will avoid them."[55]

In sum, Garrett, Miller, and other lottery proponents pointed to the success of the Florida lottery while claiming that Georgia had learned from its flaws. As mentioned above, a variant of diffusion theory colored the politics of the Georgia lottery. Incremental diffusion allowed for the borrowed policy to be changed and apparently improved before being adopted in its new setting.

GBE was able to significantly outspend the anti-lottery groups. GBE's budget of $722,671 was more than five times greater than the budget of all the anti-lottery committees combined ($136,167). Among the large contributors to the pro-lottery organization were the Georgia Association of Convenience Stores, which gave $80,000; the Marathon Oil Company, which gave $24,373 of in-kind contributions; and Miller's campaign committee, which gave $29,500. Also on the list of significant contributors were several Georgia banks, travel agencies, law firms, and a host of individuals.

Opponents of the lottery amendment included clergy from the United Methodist, Southern Baptist, Episcopal, Presbyterian, and Roman Catholic churches. A combination of anti-lottery groups aired radio commercials featuring former Atlanta Braves star Dale Murphy.[56] In the end, the opposition groups ran a surprisingly strong campaign.[57] By astutely focusing their efforts outside

[53] Ibid.

[54] David C. Garrett, III, "Election '92: Debating the Amendments, Amendment 1: Should the State Operate a Lottery? Yes," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 1 November 1992.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Charles Walston, "Election '92: The Lottery," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 27 October 1992.

[57] Bill Shipp, "The Georgia Lottery: Will Georgia Become First State to Reject Lottery?" *Bill Shipp's Georgia*, 2 November 1992.

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lottery-friendly Atlanta, it decreased public support for the amendment.[58] The anti-lottery groups argued fervently that the lottery was a regressive source of revenue, that the state's encouragement of gambling was immoral, and that the lottery would erode the work ethic of citizens who might come to believe that purchasing a lottery ticket would solve their financial problems.

The steep decline in public support for the lottery suggests that the fight could have gone either way. Miller paid a price for securing the lottery's enabling legislation in advance of the referendum. In identifying who would benefit from lottery revenues, Miller also identified who would not benefit, such as senior citizens, environmentalists, and other groups of voters who now saw little stake in his version of the lottery. Nonetheless, primarily because of the difference in financial resources and organization, opponents were not able to counter the momentum for an education lottery. A second explanation for the victory of the lottery amendment was the voters' perceptions of a lingering recession. Some Georgians doubted that new education programs could be enacted during times of economic hardship and budget constriction unless funded by new sources of money such as a lottery. A final explanation for the narrow passage of the lottery referendum was that the white clergy of Georgia failed to coordinate with the state's African American clergy. William T. Neal asserted that the white clergy, of which he is a member, shoulders most of the blame for the lack of coordination because it failed to reach out to the black clergy early enough in the campaign to stop the lottery.[59] Many leaders of black churches publicly addressed the dangers of gambling in general but remained largely silent regarding the lottery amendment. Rev. Timothy McDonald, the African American pastor of the First Iconium Baptist Church, went so far as to say, "if the black clergy had come out against it, it would've been defeated."[60]

The Brief After-Politics of the Georgia Lottery

Lotteries seldom generate an after-politics. The large size of the majorities that enact them typically renders opponents quiescent. Although Georgia did not depart dramatically from this pattern, the lottery referendum's narrow victory set the stage for a brief period of continuing conflict. Postenactment controversies regarding the Georgia lottery began in the spring of 1993 when ambitious Georgia Republicans such as state Representative Matt Towery decided that the lottery could be used against Miller's 1994 re-election campaign. Towery alleged that suspicious ties existed between administrators of the Texas lottery and GTECH, one of the companies contracted by the Georgia lottery. By Fall 1993, however, money from the sale of lottery tickets was pouring in to the state treasury. Bill Shipp wrote that "Governor Zell Miller's 'education lottery' has

[58] Garrett, 1992.

[59] William T. Neal, editor, *The Christian Index*, interview with the authors, 12 July 1999.

[60] David Beasley and Gayle White, "Urban Vote May Boost State Lottery to Close Win," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 4 November 1992.

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succeeded beyond the Governor's most optimistic predictions. Millions of new dollars from the lottery will go into thousands of scholarships for worthy students."[61] By the end of the year, Georgians had spent $300 million on the lottery, with all of the profits going to education. The early revenue, the immediate provision of HOPE scholarships and capital improvements to schools, the planning for the new pre-kindergarten program, and the absence of unethical state contracts to companies made the lottery a positive element in Miller's reelection bid. Even a long-time anti-lottery state politician, Roy Barnes, pledged to leave the lottery alone when he successfully ran for governor in 1998.

Conclusion

This article promised to address three questions. The first two—why some southern states (specifically, Mississippi and Georgia) recently have legalized new forms of gambling and why they chose the forms they did—have been treated in the case studies. In Mississippi, the quest for additional state revenues and for economic development in its distressed areas prompted the turn to gambling, with casinos preferred to lotteries for a congeries of diffusional, constitutional, political, and economic reasons. In Georgia, a pro-lottery politician successfully framed his gubernatorial campaign as a choice among lottery proposals, then persuaded citizens to approve his version of a lottery with the promise that it would provide new educational programs and recover dollars that previously had flowed from the state into Florida.

The case studies also offer insights into the broader, more theoretical issues of state policy innovation that lie at the heart of the third question treated in this article: How well do existing theories of state policy innovation enable us to understand the politics of gambling in the South and, in turn, what modifications of these theories may be suggested by our study of this issue?

The electoral and economic state characteristics that have been identified in the literature as the most significant were elements in the Mississippi and Georgia controversies. Remove poverty from the Mississippi Delta, for example, and there would be no casino gambling. One state characteristic thus far overlooked in the literature—namely, state constitutions—also emerged as significant in the cases. In Mississippi, the constitutional ban on lotteries but not on casinos meant that casino gambling could be legalized much more easily than a lottery. In Georgia, an identical constitutional amendment process prompted a different strategy: the effort, however risky, to pass the enabling legislation for the lottery before the amendment authorizing lotteries was enacted, thus revealing to voters the specific consequences of approving the amendment.

Diffusion theory was also enormously helpful in understanding the politics of gambling in Mississippi and Georgia. Georgia was much influenced by the

[61] Bill Shipp, "If Money Won't Work, What Will?" *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 11 September 1993.

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popular and fiscal success of lotteries in Florida and other states. Similarly, Mississippi took some of its cues from Iowa and Illinois, which already had legalized riverboat casinos.

Nonetheless, we suggest three refinements to diffusion theory. The first refinement suggested by our research is "anticipatory diffusion," a term that describes one state's decision to enact a policy innovation for fear that another state will make that innovation less effective by enacting it first. Casino advocates in Mississippi, for example, wanted to get the jump on Louisiana by borrowing the riverboat casino idea from the Mississippi River states of Iowa and Illinois. As Thomas R. Dye has argued, states compete with each other on some policies but not others.[62] The reason existing diffusion theory does not incorporate anticipatory diffusion may be that the policies it has been applied to, such as workers' compensation and educational reform, do not have obvious consequences outside each adopting state because the costs and benefits of such policies are captured almost entirely within the state. Policies that lure people or firms across state lines, such as gambling (or competitive tax breaks for businesses), do have obvious interstate consequences.

The second refinement is "incremental diffusion," which occurs when one state alters a policy innovation in the course of copying it from another state. Georgia, for example, modified Florida's purportedly education-dedicated lottery by explicitly providing that lottery-generated revenues would be used to fund new programs, not be substituted for existing spending on education. Mississippi adopted a much freer policy toward casino licensing and betting than did its fellow river states to the north. The learning that comes from studying other states' experience is part of the explanation. So are the imperatives of political campaigning. The rhetoric of state pride often requires political candidates to avow that, rather than simply copying another state's policy, they are improving it and adapting it to their own state's unique circumstances.

Our third refinement of diffusion theory is "anti-diffusion." It involves a state (or other political jurisdiction) which tries to forestall adverse consequences for itself by preventing another state or jurisdiction from enacting a policy. Arkansas racetrack interests, for example, tried to prevent casinos from operating in the nearby river counties of northern Mississippi. Within Mississippi itself, Tunica County casino interests worked strenuously to dissuade DeSoto County voters from allowing casinos in their county. In recent years, Tunica casinos have poured campaign funds into at least one casino ballot measure campaign in Arkansas and hired a Nashville lobbying firm to dissuade the Tennessee Legislature from adopting a lottery.[63] As with anticipatory diffusion, only a limited number of policies are likely to trigger interventions in a state's policy-making process by out-of-state political actors—namely, proposed policies that seem likely to threaten the economic livelihood or general well-being of such actors.

[62] Thomas R. Dye, *American Federalism: Competition Among Governments* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990).

[63] Michael Nelson and John Lyman Mason, *The Politics of Gambling: State Policy Innovation in the American South* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, forthcoming).

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More broadly, our cases suggest that the study of state policy innovation can be improved by not treating the act of policy innovation as the end of the story. Rather, enactment may be a chapter in a story that continues in a process of after-politics. This after-politics was especially apparent in Mississippi, where the enactment of the Gaming Control Act in 1990 spawned a diverse and extensive political aftermath in the judicial, regulatory, legislative, and electoral arenas. Among other things, the scope of casino gambling was widened by regulators and courts that expansively interpreted the law's requirement for river-based casinos.

But the most interesting implication of our research is that politics, more than existing theories would suggest, is the key to understanding certain state policy innovations and that elected officials are often the key actors. Specifying which innovations will be politics-centered is no easy matter. Mississippi's enactment of casino gambling was almost entirely the product of legislative politics. A small number of state legislators quietly developed the idea, roused the support of fellow legislators from districts that stood to benefit from casinos, then appealed to norms of legislative deference on constituency matters to persuade colleagues not to oppose casinos strenuously. In Georgia, Zell Miller accompanied the hard work of legislative politics with a much more public political strategy. He made the lottery the most important aspect of his gubernatorial campaign and the first priority of his new administration. In most accounts of the existing theories, policy innovation seems a rather bloodless process: state officials or think tank analysts hear about a good idea from their colleagues in other states or read about it in a professional publication, then place the idea in their own state government's suggestion box, where it is gladly adopted on the basis of its obvious merits.[64] Our case studies lead us, at least in some areas of policy, to urge scholars to bring politics back into their study of the policy-making process.

[64] For a partial exception, see Mintrom, "Policy Entrepreneurs," 738–770.

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

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

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

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Partisanship and Governance: A Review Essay

STEPHEN J. WAYNE

The trends are clear. Partisan identification declined in the late 1960s and 1970s; so did the strength of partisan attachments, but to a lesser extent; and the proportion of self-identified independents in the electorate increased. Split-ticket voting became more prevalent. Party organizations also suffered as a result of reforms in the nomination process. With the electronic media, principally television, gradually replacing the parties as a major link to voters, campaigns and elections became more candidate-centered.

Within the government, Congress decentralized power, evolving from a standing committee to a standing subcommittee system. The ability of its leadership to dictate policy outcomes also declined as did party unity. Presidents began to exercise more initiative in creating and maintaining issue-based coalitions across party lines.

The weakening of the Democrats' status as majority party provided opportunities for Republicans to win the presidency, opportunities which they lacked in the aftermath of Roosevelt's New Deal coalition. With the Democrats retaining control of one or both houses of Congress, divided government ensued. Presidents were forced to reach out to those in the moderate center. Advances in communication technology magnified the president's bully pulpit, providing a vehicle by which the administration could exert public pressure on recalcitrant legislators.

As the Republicans gained parity with the Democrats in the 1980s, the pattern of divided government persisted. Meanwhile, congressional incumbents increased their electoral advantages, and public relations became an even more important component of presidential power. The days when Washington was a small and relatively closed political community were over.

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The end of the 1980s saw an increase in party voting, particularly at the presidential level. Analysts of voting behavior found that a majority of self-identified independents leaned in a partisan direction and voted more regularly for party candidates than did weak partisans. The congressional parties became increasingly polarized. Ideology reinforced partisanship, resulting in greater party unity in Congress. The leadership on the Hill gained power. Still plagued by divided government, but facing more unified opposition in one or both houses, presidents resorted more frequently to the threat of a veto to prevent Congress from enacting legislation, all or part of which they opposed.

These trends of more partisan voting in elections, particularly at the presidential level, greater party unity on Capitol Hill, and the strengthening of Congress's leadership have continued into the twenty-first century. What are the principal factors that have contributed to the resurgence of parties? How has the legislative presidency been affected by the polarization and ideologicalization of congressional parties? What do these trends augur for the future of American politics and government? Do they facilitate or impede democratic governance?

The authors of three books address these important questions.[1] They examine the bases of split-ticket voting, partisan homogeneity in Congress, and the impact of divided government on presidential leadership and policy making. They do so in a reader-friendly manner. Although they employ different methodologies, their analysis is clear, their arguments are convincing, and some of their findings refute the conventional wisdom. Each of them contributes to a deeper understanding of contemporary American politics. They have written good books.

Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball examine why Americans divide their votes among candidates of different parties. They reject the thesis that split-ticket voting is a conscious decision by voters to achieve and maintain divided government. Rather, they argue that mixed election outcomes are an accidental consequence of the U.S. federal system and the political forces operating within it today. In arriving at this judgment, the authors analyze voting data in congressional districts and states and ask the question: Why do some districts and states evidence more split-ticket voting than others? Since the use of survey data derived from a national sample would not enable them to answer such a question because the district subset would be too small, the authors employ a variant of Harvard professor Gary King's economical inference technique to draw inferences about individual-level voting decisions from the aggregate data they analyze, the actual district or state vote. The results are then compared to the findings of more generic survey research.

[1] Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball, *Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003); Jeffrey M. Stonecash, Mark D. Brewer, and Mack D. Mariani, *Diverging Parties: Social Change, Realignment, and Party Polarization* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002); Richard S. Conley, *The Presidency, Congress, and Divided Government* (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2003).

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In their analysis, the authors identify two factors as primary explanatory variables—the level of competition within congressional elections and the policy positions of the two parties and their candidates. It should come as no surprise that an unlevel playing field, caused by partisan gerrymandering and incumbency, has much to do with the absence of competitive elections, particularly in the House of Representatives. Burden and Kimball found that the great advantages of incumbency—name recognition, fundraising prowess, and the performance of constituency services—enable popular officials running for reelection to gain votes from partisans of the other party in situations in which their opponent is weak and lacks the resources to mount an effective campaign.

Taking moderate policy positions also enhances the ability of elected officials to cross party lines to win electoral support. Those who take more extreme positions have more difficulty in bridging the partisan divide. Thus, the closer the positions of the candidates to one another, the more likely that split-ticket voting will occur. Split-ticket voting is more likely for the House than for the Senate and more likely during midterm elections than presidential elections.

But what explains the decline of split-ticket voting today? With incumbency re-election at historic highs in the House of Representatives, the authors' calculus would suggest the increasing ideological orientation of the parties and their nominees as the principal culprits. That orientation has made it harder for some people to cross party lines and vote for an incumbent. As a result, the margins by which incumbents get re-elected have been getting smaller. Theoretically, "vanishing marginals" should produce more competitive races, but they haven't. What has caused members of Congress to become more ideological, with Democrats more liberal and Republicans more conservative than their respective electorates, and much more ideologically consistent than the country as a whole?

To answer this question we turn to the authors of *Diverging Parties: Social Change, Realignment, and Party Polarization*, Jeffrey M. Stonecash, Mark D. Brewer, and Mack D. Mariani, whose research is directed toward explaining the increasing polarization of major parties today. Taking a longitudinal perspective, the authors look at long-term social trends that have had an impact on partisan politics—the flow of immigrants into the United States; their concentration in certain states (California, Florida, Texas, and New York), and particularly in the urban centers of those states; the migration of whites out of these areas; and the increasing income differential among population groups, evident in the communities in which they reside. Since representation in the House is based on population and geography, these trends will naturally affect parties and their elected officials.

Using the electoral constituency as their principal unit of analysis, the authors describe major economic and social changes within the American polity that have resulted in a realignment of congressional districts along racial and ethnic lines, reinforced by income levels. The degree of urbanization also differentiates the bases of the major parties. "Increasingly, Democratic candidates win in districts that are low income, have a relatively high percentage of non-

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whites, and are urban. Republicans now dominate elections in districts that are relatively affluent, white, and rural or suburban" (p. 28). These distinctive constituencies explain the increasing polarization of parties in government.

The major parties have become more internally homogeneous but externally different from one another. As the ideological division between them has increased, the moderate center in Congress has shrunk. Partisan policies have also become more distinctive with less common ground for the parties to share. These trends have obvious implications for politics and governing.

The good news is that they contribute to party unity. In the House, unity works to the majority party's advantage. It enhances the clout of its leadership. In a unified government, it also works to the president's advantage as George W. Bush has demonstrated with the success of his tax, national security, and antiterrorism initiatives. The bad news is that such unity makes compromise more difficult. Civility has suffered; rhetoric has become more strident and personal. The minority's ability to provide substantive representation to its electoral base has declined.

In addition to explaining increasing party polarization, the authors have another purpose—to rectify an imbalance in the literature that overstates the impact of candidates on election outcomes. Interpreting elections on the basis of the quality, resources, and ingenuity of the candidates does not explain the increasing polarization of parties along ideological lines; a constituency-based analysis does, or so the authors contend. In much the same vein as Burden and Kimball, Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani conclude that structural variables are as important as candidate characteristics in explaining election results and congressional voting behavior.

Ending their book on a normative note, the authors applaud the improved democratic representation that a constituency-based system reflecting social, economic, and racial concerns produces. The reference to democratic representation, stated as if it were an obvious inference, seems overly simplistic, however, given the increasing differentiation between descriptive and substantive representation that majority/minority districts in the House of Representatives have produced in the last decade. Greater majority party unity has not benefited minority racial and ethnic groups, although it is possible that the substantive representation of these groups may improve in the future if their numbers grow and when those numbers are reflected in the apportionment of legislative seats, if they are not offset by artful redistricting.

How has the increasing polarization of the major parties combined with the increasing dominance of the majority party in the House affected the balance of institutional powers? Have these developments enhanced or reduced presidential influence? Have they altered the pattern of interaction between the two branches, affecting the time, effort, and manner in which each institution relates to the other? In general, have they facilitated or impeded policy making?

In his study, *The Presidency, Congress, and Divided Government*, Richard S. Conley tries to answer these questions. He is concerned with presidential lead-

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ership of Congress, the strategies presidents pursue, and the success they have achieved. Like many other presidential scholars and practitioners, Conley laments the loss of leverage that presidents have suffered in recent decades in their dealings with Congress. He attributes this loss to the political and institutional changes that Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani describe, exacerbated by the extended periods of divided government. Contemporary presidents have less influence on Congress because they lack coattails. With fewer centrists of both parties in Congress, they have more difficulty in coalition-building across party lines. Their ability to obtain autonomous policy goals has declined, thereby forcing them to give greater weight to Congress's ongoing agenda at the expense of their own. In the face of a more resurgent Congress, presidents have had to adjust their strategic legislative behavior in order to surmount the higher hurdles that partisan polarization in divided government has produced.

After providing a theoretical framework for understanding and evaluating the exercise of presidential influence, Conley details and assesses presidents' legislative strategies in a series of rich case studies. His objective is to place the presidential–congressional relationship within a situational context in order to see what strategies worked, which of them did not and why, and what policy outcomes resulted. History serves the author as a prologue to explaining contemporary presidential–congressional relations.

Conley concludes that divided control of government between the major parties matters because it substantially reduces the ability of presidents to achieve their policy goals. But he also notes that even during periods of unified government they have had difficulty in the last half of the twentieth century, as the Kennedy, Carter, and first two years of the Clinton administration illustrate. Conley suggests that a fair number of these presidents' legislative successes emanated from their support of congressionally initiated and considered measures.

But clearly, during periods of divided government, the leadership challenge for presidents is more difficult. That challenge has often forced them to change from an offensive to a defensive strategy, using veto threats for leverage. To maintain the focus on their top priorities and to pressure Congress to enact them, presidents have no choice but to use their bully pulpit as a crude instrument of legislative persuasion. Conley summarizes the contemporary president's legislative dilemma: "Presidential-congressional concurrence has been diminished by stronger institutional parties in Congress, more assertive leadership, and the sharpening of policy distinctions between Democrats and Republicans. Weakened electoral ties between the president and opposition party in Congress have decreased presidents' sway over those members' voting decisions. Presidents' floor success rates have plummeted as congressional majorities have given short shrift to the presidents' preferred agendas" (p. 217). What a bleak perspective for contemporary presidents, especially in the light of their campaign promises and the ongoing policy issues on which they are expected to craft and achieve public policy solutions.

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Although Conley fairly synthesizes and supports the findings of most of the recent literature on presidential–congressional relations, his portrait of the presidents' plight seems unduly pessimistic in the light of George W. Bush's experience in his first two years in office. What explains Bush's legislative successes, particularly during his year and a half of divided government? Was it September 11 and the unity that the crisis produced and the consensus on antiterrorism and national security issues it helped generate? Was it the president's high approval ratings, his limited domestic agenda, and the impact of the deficit on domestic programming? Was it a combination of a skillful inside and outside lobbying campaign? Was it the perceived successful intervention of the president in the 2002 midterm elections and his willingness to sacrifice ideology for politics in his legislative decision making? In short, was Bush's legislative presidency atypical because of unusual circumstances, or did he and his advisers strategize successfully to overcome the impediments of divided government? Is his a model that his successors should follow?

The fact is that Bush did not issue many veto threats and did not exercise the veto at all during this period. The fact is that the White House did control the issue debate in the mass media. The President achieved five of his top legislative priorities—tax cuts, educational reform, tight domestic budgets, fast-track authority, and almost all of the antiterrorism and national security measures his administration introduced. There were disappointments, however. No legislative faith-based initiative, patient's bill of rights, or energy policy was enacted. Bush had to accept new laws on campaign finance and electoral reform, a budget-breaking farm bill that re-established subsidies, and the federalizing of the air security personnel. But the legislative record at worst is mixed, and at best it is more favorable than unfavorable for this nonplurality president in the divided government from June 2001 to December 2002.

Although the author is careful not to make an explicit normative judgment, his implications are clear. Unified government contributes to presidential leadership and divided government detracts from it, now more than ever. The most hopeful sign is that renewed partisan loyalties, evidenced by the decline of split-ticket voting, and increased partisan, ideological polarization provide clearer partisan choices for the electorate, a firm foundation for party unity in Congress, and eventually, perhaps, a partisan realignment that could usher in longer periods of unified government. This is hopeful, of course, for those in the majority who wish government to respond quickly to the dominant mood of the moment and those who favor a stronger presidency and a weaker Congress. The proponents of responsible party government might also be smiling.

On the other hand, the Constitution's framers would be aghast. Minorities, particularly those lacking the leadership and resources to support large-scale grassroots and public-relations campaigns, have suffered. And the gap between the rich and the poor will probably continue to increase. Not a very pretty picture or hopeful development for liberals.

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Book Reviews

Identity in Democracy *by Amy Gutmann. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2003. 264 pp. $27.95.*

Amy Gutmann begins this book by discussing the uneasy place that identity groups occupy in democracy. On the one hand, they are a natural byproduct of freedom of association and mutual identification. On the other hand, they are sometimes based on unchosen characteristics, they limit individual autonomy, and members occasionally place loyalty to their identity group above justice and peace. By examining the role of identity groups in democratic politics, this book fills an important lacuna in democratic theory. Most discussions of democracy revolve around interest groups but do not discuss the theoretical challenge posed by identity claims and identity groups.

The discussion of ascriptive identities in Chapter 3 explains why identity groups should not be conflated with voluntary associations. The following chapter, "Is Religious Identity Special?" underlines the special relationship that some identities have with the ethical core of the self. Gutmann examines the various arguments for the "specialness" of religion and concludes that respect should be accorded to claims of consciences and to the ethical commitments of religious and nonreligious persons alike, as long as such respect is compatible with protecting the basic rights of individuals.

Throughout, Gutmann stresses that identity groups should not be conflated with interests and interest groups: the language of interest is sometimes inappropriate, in part because people's identities help to shape their sense of their own interests. She offers useful suggestions for distinguishing between interests and identities, arguing, for example, that "the defining feature of an identity group is the mutual identification of individuals with one another around shared social markers whereas the defining feature of an interest group is the coalescing of individuals around a shared instrumental goal that preceded the group's formation" (p. 13). Identity groups, she argues, are bound up with a sense of who people are, while interest groups are bound up with what people want.

However, in practice, this distinction is very slippery; indeed, I was sometimes unsure whether in the end she successfully distinguished between the two. Consider, for example, her characterization of the National Association for the

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Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in the United States as an identity group. It seems more plausible to view this as an interest group that appeals to people with a particular racial identity (Black or African American). While the NAACP draws its members principally from a particular identity group, it seems closer to a classic interest group, in the sense that its principal purpose is to advance the interests of that segment of the population. Moreover, it may have to contest for support from other interest groups which are comprised of the same identity group but which might have a different strategy for advancing African American interests. The identity of Blacks or African Americans is relatively stable, but the interest groups which claim to support people sharing that identity are subject to the vagaries of political fortune. I would also argue that Gutmann's description of political parties as "identity groups" (pp. 4–5) is also problematic. Further, the category of identity group in some parts of her book seemed over-inclusive. Certainly, the distinction between interests and identities is much clearer when she is dealing with partially ascriptive identities or religious identities.

There is much to admire in this book. It is clearly written, deploys interesting and topical examples, and is accessible without losing important nuance and careful insight. In the end, Gutmann is tough on identity groups while recognizing their importance, and their inevitability, in democratic politics.

MARGARET MOORE
Queen's University

You Call This an Election? America's Peculiar Democracy *by Steven E. Schier. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2003, 176 pp. $24.95.*

In an especially compelling metaphor, Steven Schier compares an electoral system to a calendar: as the calendar structures our lives, the electoral system structures our political process. His evaluation of electoral systems is based on four cogent goals: stability—political, governmental, and regime; accountability; high voter turnout; and deliberation of public policy. He offers an analysis that is at once rich and lucid, arising from a distillation of the research results and the conclusions of an amazing number of experts in the field. He discusses the characteristics and consequences of electoral systems beginning with the theories of John Locke and James Madison and extending to the practices of the world's other constitutional democracies.

It soon becomes clear that the goals of electoral systems, including his own four, are not necessarily compatible in practice. As a result, readers are forced to rank order their own goals and to confront their own personal tradeoffs. Which is more important: stability or accountability? What kind of accountability—party or individual official—is most desirable? Is a swift and decisive election more or less important than achieving the most humanly accurate

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vote count? Is direct democracy superior to representative democracy? Is a plurality system less legitimate than a majority one? Is a locally-based constituency more functional than an ideologically-based one? Is the more representative multi-party system preferable to a stable two-party system?

Like the rest of us, Schier makes choices. Of the evaluative four criteria, only voter turnout merits its own chapter. At times it appears to be his paramount concern, shaping more of his recommended reforms than the other three and explaining his endorsement of the instant runoff system in a single member district with a majority requirement. Under this system, used in Australia, voters must rank their preferences, and if no candidate receives a majority in the first round, the second choice ballots of the lowest candidates are counted. Such counting continues until one candidate achieves a majority. Although this system appears to increase turnout, it is a curious choice because it might very well create a multi-party system which would undermine both stability and accountability. At the very least, it would give influence and appointive offices to extremist candidates. The average citizen's response to this voting mechanism usually is that it gives some voters two votes. Further, it is very complex, though endorsed by a theorist who wants "to make America's electoral system simple and user friendly" (p. 143).

Schier's analysis of the Populist-Progressive reforms and their consequences for the political process is quite devastating. He points out that these reforms undermined party-based elections and made ballots too complicated for most voters. Favoring legislative democracy over direct democracy, he finds the referendum, the recall, and most particularly, the initiative promising, but they do not provide accountability. Instead, they are disruptive of the deliberative Madisonian system because they ask too much of voters and empower the special interests. As for campaign finance, he concludes it is an antiparty reform that helps interest groups and incumbents and harms parties and challengers. Other topics examined are the electoral college, redistricting, and racial gerrymandering.

This book is a keeper, not only as a stimulus to sorting and ranking personal political values, but also as a useful reference work—it is chock full of information. The bibliography is extensive, the text provides easy source and page references, the organization is excellent, and the argument flows smoothly. His students must love his classes.

JUDITH A. BEST
State University of New York
College at Cortland

Democracy by Decree: What Happens When Courts Run Government *by Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod. New Haven, Yale University Press, 2003. 256 pp. $30.00.*

Rights to such benefits as health care, schooling, humane prison conditions, and environmental quality are easy to assert and difficult to provide. They re-

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quire national, state, and local governments to design and carry out expensive programs that reduce the funding available for other urgent priorities or that lead to tax increases. A desirable outcome may be stated in terms of rights with the hope that the language of rights will give this outcome priority in the struggle for public funds.

The United States Constitution includes few positive rights. In general, the Constitution prevents governments from taking action rather than mandating action. Sometimes, however, the language of the Constitution is interpreted to mandate government action as in such fields as voting rights, school desegregation, and prison conditions. New rights are also frequently created by federal statutes that require state and local governments to carry out the laws with only partial federal financial help. The goal of such statutes is to change the spending priorities of state and local governments in the interest of some federal goal. However, without a strong federal funding commitment, the national government lacks the leverage to force compliance.

One alternative is a mandate in the form of a right. Framing a mandate in the language of rights opens the door to court challenges under which plaintiffs assert that their individual rights have been violated. These cases and their aftermath are the topic of Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod's provocative book. As they point out, a case seeking to protect individual rights is familiar territory for a federal judge. However, the usual remedies will not work. With positive rights, the judge cannot just order the state to stop some offensive practice. Instead, he or she must order the state to do something that is both expensive and complex. The operation of an entire educational, hospital, or prison system may be at fault; thus, the remedy requires a basic reorganization of an important governmental sector. Sandler and Schoenbrod argue that the judges who must resolve such cases have, however, almost no administrative capacity and little expertise in the substantive policy areas that come before them. Individual judges may make heroic efforts to learn what they can, but if a system is to change, the judges must rely on others to craft a detailed solution. Thus, the authors argue, judges seek to induce the parties to craft a consent decree that will govern the reform process. An individual judge may oversee a decree for years, but the basic choices are made by the representative of the parties—class action lawyers and government officials.

Judges treat these decrees like contracts and enforce them as such even though those around the bargaining table are frequently not good representatives of their supposed principles, and even though the problem may evolve over time in a way that was not envisaged at the time of the original decree. Nevertheless, claim the authors, judges stick with this format because it is a form they see in the private law contract disputes that also come before them. The result, as the authors show with numerous examples, is frequently both an unsuccessful effort to enforce the federal law and a process that flies in the face of democratic accountability at the state and local level.

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Sandler and Schoenbrod make a convincing case for the problems of government by consent decree. They even provide a list of reform proposals that by and large seem sensible. Decrees should be framed narrowly to deal with the problems faced by the class of plaintiffs before the court. Judges and parties to a lawsuit should not undermine the public's right to democratically accountable state and local governments. To them, this means relying more on government officials and less on a "controlling group" of plaintiffs' lawyers and public officials. The authors would also require decrees to have fixed time limits and permit judges to modify decrees in response to changed circumstances.

Sandler and Schoenbrod claim to be presenting realistic proposals, although many of their recommendations would require major changes in judicial practice. It seems to me, however, that they lack the courage of their convictions. After a largely persuasive critique of current practice, they assert that they do not mean to question the good faith of any of the participants because the problem is structural. However, if the problem is structural, why not handle it as a structural matter rather than through modifications in current practice? There are two ways to deal with the underlying problem. The first is to develop a judicial doctrine of positive rights that explicitly recognizes the political and budgetary tradeoffs involved and interprets the underlying rights in that light. The second is for the courts to refuse to enforce laws where aspirational statements of purpose are inconsistent with the funds that Congress is willing to make available. In practice, the Supreme Court in *Pennhurst State School v. Halderman*, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) has simply refused to take statutory assertions of positive rights seriously. Instead, the Court could send a strong signal to Congress that it will not enforce laws where purpose and funding do not match and require the Congress to pass an amended law or else see it lapse.

Positive rights enshrined in the Constitution are a different matter, however, and here Sandler and Schoenbrod go too far in seeking to preserve state and local democracy. Although their examples of flawed consent decrees are convincing, the authors underestimate the serious collective action problems faced by disadvantaged plaintiffs who lack clout at the state and local levels. While many of their suggestions are sensible ways to deal with a difficult reality, limiting decrees to the plaintiffs before the court seems unnecessarily restrictive if constitutional rights are being violated as does their proposal to limit decrees to the term of the consenting chief executive.

SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN
Yale University

The American Direct Primary: Party Institutionalization and Transformation in the North *by Alan Ware. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2002. 270 pp. $70.00.*

Alan Ware here takes up the question of why America adopted primary elections to determine nominations for nearly all offices. He winds up solving

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both that puzzle and the question of how the Australian ballot was adopted, which turns out to be related. Since the direct primary is critical to the development of American political parties, and since Ware has uncovered a story of how it came to be that differs quite a bit from the textbook version, this is a very important book indeed.

Ware has discovered that the direct primary was enacted in large part by the parties themselves and not by progressives battling party bosses and emerging victorious. Relying on original sources, findings by recent historians, and long-forgotten but fascinating research from early political scientists, he concludes that the standard account is hokum. He further points out that it almost has to be so: the legislators and governors who enacted primaries were nearly always party politicians.

Even more fascinating is Ware's account of the slightly earlier adoption of the Australian ballot. He brings us into the world of nineteenth century voting, when political parties prepared color-coded ballots for their voters, a world of "pasters"—ballots altered by local factions by sticking a different name over that of the officially designated nominee. The problem for the parties was that since nominations were purely private and voluntary, they could not be legally enforced. The solution was to ask the government to print ballots automatically listing formal party nominees. Legislation mandating the Australian ballot swept through the states rapidly, beginning in the late 1880s, with many states opting for variations that helped the parties achieve straight ticket voting.

Once the states were involved in ratifying party decisions, they immediately began passing laws to ensure that party procedures were fair and democratic. The parties, meanwhile, were open to new forms of nominations. Here there are parallels to 1970s presidential nomination reforms, as documented by Byron Shafer in his definitive *Quiet Revolution*. In neither case was the old system the idealized caucus-convention process that some claim to miss. In the case of the prereform presidential nominations, delegates were more likely to be chosen by party committees (or chairs) than by participatory caucuses open to all party members. As for state nominations before the direct primary, while many different systems were in place just before reform, the most common was a two-stage convention system whose first stage, as Ware describes it, was a simple election of delegates to county conventions. Deliberation was rarely present at that level.

As the system came under pressure from increased government involvement, rapidly growing populations, and the particular circumstances of individual party politicians, the role of progressive reformers was limited to establishing the direct primary as the best known alternative to existing arrangements. As Ware shows, "antiparty reformers . . . did not change the direction that reform was taking; rather, [they] helped to speed up acceptance of the direct primary among party elites" (p. 223). The parties and their politicians, Ware explains, reformed because it was in their short-term interests to do so, even at the eventual cost of severe harm to the parties decades later.

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This account fits nicely with recent American studies of parties as rational institutions. What makes this book so absorbing is that Ware studies the details and explores ways in which politicians may have goals that are separate from those of the party as an institution while remaining party loyalists. In short, this is a nuanced, informative study that should be read by all those interested in American political parties, American political development, the Progressive era, and comparative parties.

JONATHAN BERNSTEIN
University of Texas at San Antonio

Pulp Politics: How Political Advertising Tells the Stories of American Politics *by Glenn W. Richardson, Jr. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002. 168 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $19.95.*

Here is a fresh look at political advertising and what has been written about it. Glenn Richardson, who teaches political science at Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, argues that most scholars misunderstand the messages conveyed by ads because they analyze them improperly. He suggests new approaches to political advertising scholarship and practices, buttressing his arguments with several small research projects. They include an analysis of twenty-six ad-watch stories from three newspapers and a comparative analysis of nine well-known ads that show how they would be classified under various types of coding schemes including genre analysis, which he prefers. News organizations use "ad watch" stories to inform news audiences about the correctness of the claims made in political advertisements. Ad watches may be a regular daily or weekly news feature. He also reports a comprehensive yet simple ad-exposure experiment which suffers from the common drawbacks of convenience samples of undergraduate college students.

According to Richardson, most researchers unfortunately ignore solid evidence that campaign ads work largely by stimulating viewers to draw on their pre-existing stores of knowledge, including popular culture, to develop reactions to the political situations covered by advertisements. Politics is theater and tells its stories through familiar genres using visuals, speech, and background sounds including music. Tying political figures to popular culture heroes, good or bad, invests them with the qualities and characteristics of their prototypes and rekindles similar emotions. The impact of advertisements must, therefore, be assessed by looking beyond the visual and verbal stimuli they contain to the associations these stimuli arouse collectively. Analyzing the genres created by ads, Richardson contends, is the only method that reveals the actual meanings of campaign spots.

Audiences understand ad messages because they are familiar with the genre and its usual features. Richardson describes genres used in well-known ads, including several from the 2000 presidential campaign. The Bush campaign

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subtly tied candidate Gore to the image of his flawed predecessor by showing him in settings reminiscent of the Clinton years. In line with John Anderson's "spreading activation" principle, this tactic was expected to first arouse thoughts of Clinton followed by thoughts about the widely publicized Clinton scandals.

The book contains separate chapters on negative advertising and ad-watch journalism. Richardson contends that people's dislike of negative ads is partly based on unwarranted fears that such ads will arouse their emotions and dull their critical faculties. He points out that attacks on even vicious political opponents have a long historical tradition in the United States with no real proof of adverse effects on the quality of political judgments or election turnout. In support, he cites a meta-analysis of existing research which is equivocal on that score, partly because scholars disagree about what constitutes a negative ad. Richardson argues that a country that values freedom of speech must welcome all types of political criticism. In fact, stirring people through negative ads may actually be beneficial because it focuses their attention on politics when they might otherwise be disinterested.

Misunderstanding the meanings that ads convey by ignoring their genres also accounts for misguided ad watches that attempt to discourage factually incorrect advertising and correct misleading impressions. Richardson believes that it is pointless to dwell on questionable claims within the larger message if the impact of the ad springs from its overall effect, especially its audio-visual messages and their connotations. Genre analysis points to different solutions to the problem.

One may quarrel with Richardson's analysis of current practices, his complaints about the *status quo* in political advertising research, or his recommendations for reform. One cannot deny, however, that the great advances made in information processing research in recent years demand a rethinking of how people perceive political stimuli. Richardson's research-grounded book is a fine example of how such re-evaluations may proceed and the intriguing findings that may ensue.

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago

Averting 'The Final Failure': John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings *by Sheldon M. Stern. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2003. 504 pp. $35.00.*

Reading the transcripts of the tapes of the famous ExComm meetings of the Cuban Missile Crisis is exhilarating because it is as close as we will ever come to being a fly on the wall for discussions at the tensest point in the Cold War, but it is frustrating because the conversations are so hard to follow. Sheldon Stern, for twenty years the historian at the Kennedy Library, has listened carefully to the tapes and interwoven them with oral histories and other sources

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to construct a coherent and highly readable narrative. The story he tells is at variance with the standard one on a few points, and his transcription of the tapes differs in some places from those previously available, but the main contribution is less one of major revisionism than of provision of an account of the meetings that is both full and detailed, on the one hand, and comprehensible, on the other. If a choice is to be made between reading the full transcripts and *Averting 'The Final Failure'*, I would not hesitate to recommend the latter.

Stern is a critic of the transcripts provided by Ernest May and Philip Zelikow in *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis*, and an appendix to his book cites some examples to substantiate his criticisms. His claims are plausible, but obviously only someone who had listened to the tapes could render judgments on the disputed points. Given the importance of these discussions, getting even minor points right matters, but the examples provided on pages 436–439 are more than trivial, although they do not go to the central issues of the crisis. Unlike May and Zelikow, Stern uses italics to indicate words that speakers stressed, and even when this device does not represent a change of meaning and provides additional valuable information, it is still a poor substitute for actually hearing the tapes.

Stern's account does differ from conventional views on a number of points. He shows that Robert F. Kennedy was not a dove from the start, as some of his defenders have claimed. Nevertheless, his portrait of President John F. Kennedy's brother is generally quite favorable. Not only did Bobby drive home the point that the President could frame his crucial response to Nikita Khrushchev's contradictory letters as an acceptance of the Soviet leader's offer to withdraw the missiles in return for an American pledge not to invade Cuba, but he also was quick to see the flaws and inconsistencies in others' arguments and to point them out without resorting to the bullying that characterized his behavior on other occasions. Stern also rebuilds the reputation of Dean Rusk and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Adlai Stevenson. The former, although often pedantic, sensibly focused on necessary diplomacy, and the latter, although perhaps willing to make some unnecessary concessions, understood from the start that a price would have to be paid and allowed the President to seem resolute by contrast. While others have argued that McGeorge Bundy was often inconsistent or unsure of himself, Stern stresses that there were major substantive differences and tensions between the national security advisor and the President.

The narrative also shows Kennedy in a favorable light. Although there are no tapes of the key meeting at which the decision to impose the blockade was reached, Stern convincingly argues that, contrary to the common impression, the ExComm was divided and that Kennedy, rather than merely endorsing a consensus, exercised his own wisdom. Throughout, the President was similarly decisive after allowing extensive and quite uninhibited discussion that brought out opposing viewpoints. It speaks well of the members of ExComm that they were both willing to argue vigorously with the President and then loyally support the decisions he made. Most strikingly (and here Stern's story is slightly

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sharper, but not different from most accounts), Kennedy was almost alone in being willing to openly trade the missiles in Turkey to end the crisis. He altered his position not so much because all his advisers opposed him as because he listened to arguments about why it might not prove necessary and how he could first seek a more acceptable outcome. The combination of sticking to his ideas when the opposition was more vehement than well-reasoned and listening carefully when something worthwhile was said sets a high standard for other leaders. Stern also stresses—I think correctly—that Kennedy was very skeptical of most military advice, an attitude that owed something to his own wartime experience with the top brass.

In making a comprehensible, if complicated, story from the transcripts, Stern has obviously left out a great deal of material. Those who would propose alternatives will have to go back over the record to argue that a different selection would be more compelling. Until then, *Averting 'The Final Failure'* will stand as the definitive statement of these deliberations.

ROBERT JERVIS
Columbia University

Bipartisan Strategy: Selling the Marshall Plan *by John Bledsoe Bonds. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2002. 238 pp. $64.95.*

Historians usually cite the fifteen weeks in the spring of 1947 as the decisive turning point for post-World War II U.S. foreign policy. Certainly the Greek crisis, the Truman Doctrine, and the announcement of the Marshall Plan marked a significant shift away from accommodation and toward confrontation with the Soviet Union. But as John Bledsoe Bonds argues convincingly, the congressional passage of the Marshall Plan in the spring of 1948, in the midst of a perceived war crisis, marks the final acceptance of the Cold War policy of containment that would guide American diplomacy for the next four decades. While Bonds compares the war scare of 1948 to the later Cuban missile crisis, a contemporary journalist found a more apt historical analogy with the summer that witnessed the fall of France and the Battle of Britain. "If one were to drop back in history for the feeling and temper of Congress," Frank McNaughton observed in March 1948, "the period would be 1940, the sense of urgency, of living on the edge of a live and rumbling volcano, the feeling of almost utter helplessness to halt a steamroller bearing down upon you" (p. 172).

Today the adoption of the Marshall Plan seems a foregone conclusion. But as Bonds explains, the huge sum involved—just over one-half of the entire federal budget for 1948—and the risk of confrontation with the Soviet Union caused strong resistance from both conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats. Secretary of State George C. Marshall tried to avoid the anti-communist rhetoric that characterized the Truman Doctrine; instead, he sought to educate Congress on the dire economic plight of Europe and the need for American assistance to rebuild a region vital for American security. Marshall won over the foreign policy elite, but it took an adviser with a keener political instinct,

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White House aide Clark Clifford, to persuade the President that he had to demonstrate his own leadership skills by speaking out forcefully for the Marshall Plan as the only way to halt Soviet domination of all Europe. On 17 March 1948, in a speech to Congress, Truman ignored the advice of Marshall and got tough with the Soviets, ensuring passage of the Marshall Plan by 1 April and his own re-election in November.

The title of the book is misleading. Bonds spends very little time analyzing the nature of the bipartisan approach beyond a brief bow to the part played by GOP Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg. Instead, he focuses, quite rightly, on the interplay among the contending factions within the Truman administration. Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestral, obsessed with the Soviet danger, helped create the March war scare by distributing an ominous telegram sent by General Lucius D. Clay, the American commander in Germany, warning of an imminent attack by the Soviet Union. Marshall, who had insisted on inviting the Soviets to participate in the plan for European economic recovery, kept stressing the positive aspects of the Marshall Plan, while Clifford realized that the President had to capitalize on the fears caused by the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in late February and the death of Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk in early March. Clifford naturally hoped that a get-tough-with-Russia policy would help win a second term for Truman, but he also argued that the only way to ensure passage of the Marshall Plan was to appeal to the anti-communist sentiment raging in Congress.

In his balanced analysis, Bonds rejects the conspiracy thesis advocated by some revisionist historians who claim that Truman created an artificial war scare to force passage of the Marshall Plan and win re-election. But at the same time, Bonds admits that there was little substance to the war crisis since few American leaders really believed that hostilities were imminent in March 1948. He argues, however, that aggressive Soviet behavior, especially the fall of Czechoslovakia, a country so recently betrayed at Munich, generated the mood of urgency and fear described so eloquently by McNaughton. It is possible, even likely, that Congress would have enacted the Marshall Plan without this sense of immediate danger, but the vote would have been much closer and the program much less generous. For better or worse, the nation's commitment to the new policy of containment would have still been in doubt.

ROBERT A. DIVINE
The University of Texas at Austin

Woodrow Wilson and Harry Truman: Mission and Power in American Foreign Policy *by Anne R. Pierce. Westport, Praeger Publishers, 2003. 320 pp. $69.95.*

This is a good book that ought to be better. Its strengths are twofold. First, the author takes her subjects' thought and utterances seriously, rejecting schools of interpretation that view historical actors as agents of larger forces. Second, the author does something rigorously and probingly that other scholars usually do piecemeal and haphazardly: she makes a comparison.

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At first blush, Woodrow Wilson and Harry Truman might seem an odd pair to compare—the most highly educated of American presidents versus the last one not to go to college, the lofty moralist and idealist versus the earthy and often profane realist. Moreover, some might argue that a better fit for comparison would be Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, who led the United States through the two world wars. Pierce ably shows that such objections are wrong. The burden of her argument is that both Wilson and Truman sought to reconcile ideas about America's mission to promote peace and freedom with the exigencies of world politics. As she states, "At the end of his term, Truman was an idealist who engaged in pragmatic geopolitics, a pragmatist determined to uphold and perpetuate Wilsonian ideals and a political liberal bent on conserving the best in American political traditions and American political thought" (p. 267). That could also serve as a characterization of Wilson.

Truman serves better than Roosevelt for comparison with Wilson for two reasons. First, despite the deficiencies in his education, Truman was much better read and deeper thinking than Roosevelt. Second, it really fell to Truman to take up where Wilson had left off. Roosevelt had bent all his energies to winning the war, and, except for his summit-level dealings with Churchill and Stalin, he largely left designs for a new international order and justification of an active American role in the world to others. Further, Pierce demonstrates how conscious Truman was of following in Wilson's footsteps, avoiding his mistakes, and fulfilling his vision.

This book falls short mainly in its treatment of Wilson. Not everyone can or should try to master all the material on as vast a subject as Wilson's politics and foreign policy, but Pierce fails to use some basic sources, such as Arthur Link's edition of *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* and his five-volume biography of Wilson. Likewise, except for the works of Frederick Calhoun and Thomas J. Knock, she appears to have read none of the scholarship of Wilson of the last three decades. The main loss from this neglect is a failure to ground Wilson's foreign policy thought and actions in his political and personal circumstances. Her work is better on Truman, although some delving into the archives might have helped strengthen her treatment of his foreign policy. In the end, Truman "succeeded" where Wilson "failed" in great measure because of the difference in their circumstances and opportunities. It is a pity that Pierce does not give a better sense of these two men as historical actors.

JOHN MILTON COOPER, JR.
University of Wisconsin–Madison

What Happened to the Soviet Union? How and Why American Sovietologists Were Caught by Surprise *by Christopher I. Xenakis. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002. 248 pp. $64.95.*

The subtitle of this book captures its theme more accurately than does the main title. Christopher Xenakis, of Tidewater Community College, claims that

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"the vast majority" of U.S. experts on the Soviet Union "failed to anticipate the possibility of significant innovation, or of virtually any kind of political, economic, or social change taking place in the USSR" and that "most American Sovietologists miss[ed] the sure signs of Soviet change that were evident during the 1970s and 1980s" (p. 1). He sets out to explain why "so many political scholars [were caught] by surprise" (p. 1). He is by no means alone in this endeavor. The collapse of the Soviet Union was followed by a spate of "gotcha" articles that castigated American experts for having failed to predict the breakup of the USSR. The authors of these postmortems differed in their explanations: Some argued that American political scientists had been remiss in using Western concepts to analyze the Soviet system, others argued that American experts had been too indulgent toward the Soviet Union, and still others insisted that American scholars had been led astray by their reflexive anti-Sovietism. Whatever the precise reasoning, nearly all the critics would agree with Xenakis's contention that "America's foremost political scientists and Soviet experts failed to anticipate even the possibility of significant social, political, and economic transformation occurring in the USSR" (p. x).

Xenakis believes the main reason that "so many scholars reject[ed] even the possibility of Soviet political, social, and economic change" is that they were driven by "virulent anticommunism" and were conditioned by the Cold War to take a "hostile and moralistic" view of the Soviet Union as a country that "could not and would not change" (p. 17). Elaborating on this indictment in a repetitive opening chapter, Xenakis outlines what in his view were "eighteen indicators of Soviet social, economic, and political transformation" that were "right before our eyes" in the 1970s and early 1980s (pp. 10–16). His next chapter focuses on the works of "three of the most influential American Sovietologists of the Cold War era:" George F. Kennan, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Jerry Hough (p. 23). In four subsequent chapters, Xenakis considers how American experts (political scientists, historians, economists, sociologists, and even journalists) assessed what was going on in the Soviet Union during four periods under Leonid Brezhnev and his successors: 1974–1977, 1978–1981, 1982–1985, and 1986–1988. In a brief epilogue, he once again emphasizes his main allegation (an allegation that recurs over and over)—to wit, that American experts on the Soviet Union "seemed to expect the status quo in Moscow [and the Cold War] to continue forever" (p. 210). Xenakis contends that these "scholars may have been co-opted" to "mirror the Cold War consensus" and to "parrot the official government line" by the "possibility of acquiring lucrative research grants or winning the ear of an influential senator or presidential candidate" (pp. 215, 216).

The premise of Xenakis's book is questionable. It is not the task of political scientists to anticipate every chance event that occurs. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was a highly contingent phenomenon, and the notion that political scientists should have predicted in the 1970s or early 1980s that it would happen is a misrepresentation of the scholar's mission. Political scien-

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tists are not fortune tellers. While some experts tried to gloss over this failure by asserting that "it was not the job of Sovietologists to make predictions" and that "the Soviet collapse was unforeseeable" (p. 209), Xenakis finds these claims "disingenuous" (p. 209), but, in fact, the statements he criticizes are entirely correct. No serious conception of the scholarly enterprise should include (much less give pride of place to) crystal ball gazing.

Xenakis's broader critique of American Sovietology is equally problematic. He denounces "the vast majority" of American experts for allegedly having "failed to anticipate . . . virtually any kind of political, economic, or social change." This allegation is ludicrous. The indicators of Soviet change that Xenakis briefly mentions in his introduction were all widely discussed in the Western literature in the late 1970s and 1980s. The experts may not have envisaged how bold Gorbachev would eventually prove to be, but Gorbachev himself did not anticipate that either. The notion that far-reaching political liberalization was a sure thing in 1985—and that the momentous changes of 1988–1991 were fully "foreseeable" in light of "clear and unassailable evidence" that existed as far back as the 1970s (p. 18)—is a retrospective fallacy. Everything may seem inevitable in retrospect, but the reality is far more complex. There was no ironclad guarantee in 1985 that Gorbachev would succeed Konstantin Chernenko as the leader of the Soviet Communist Party, and even when Gorbachev did take over there was no assurance that he would embark on radical political changes. He did not come to office with that intent, and it is not at all clear that he would have proceeded in that direction if his initial measures had proven successful in spurring economic and technological improvements.

The real question should be whether American experts did a reasonable job of understanding the Soviet system. The verdict on this score is decidedly positive, especially if one takes account of the paucity of reliable information during the Soviet era. Many experts came to understand the Soviet system well and were able to produce scholarly works that have stood the test of time. Archival evidence has greatly enriched and, in some cases, altered our understanding of the Soviet Union, but it has not fundamentally changed much of what we "knew" before. As with any academic discipline, some experts on the Soviet Union were better than others, and some scholarship was tendentious or of no lasting value. Contrary to Xenakis's broadsides, however, many analyses of the Soviet Union were both illuminating and accurate.

Xenakis's sweeping denunciations of American experts are especially unfortunate because an even-handed assessment of these experts' views would have made for interesting reading. A few worthwhile publications that survey the strengths and weaknesses of Sovietology have appeared over the past decade, but a good deal more work along these lines is needed. Unfortunately, Xenakis's book does not contribute to that end.

MARK KRAMER
Harvard University

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Elections without Order: Russia's Challenge to Vladimir Putin *by Richard Rose and Neil Munro. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 262 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $22.00.*

Richard Rose and Neil Munro have written an informative account of developments in post-Soviet Russia that will appeal to country experts and Russia novices alike. Despite the title, however, this is not primarily a book about elections. Instead, the title is the authors' answer to the question, "What has Russia become?" or "Is Russia a democracy?"

Their central argument is that Russia has become an "electoralist" regime where citizens select their leaders in relatively free elections even though the rule of law has yet to take hold (p. 59). Once elected, leaders are not restrained by the rule of law, nor can they use the rule of law to ensure that their edicts are carried out by either state or society. The results can be as wide ranging as an inability to collect taxes, a proliferation of corruption, the abuse of state power, or problems providing routine services for citizens. Overall, life lacks *order*, which is based on "things being in their expected place, so that people can go about their daily lives without unexpected or unpleasant surprises" (p. 2). Russia is now a country with elections, but without order.

The book is organized chronologically. The first chapter, covering the tsarist and Soviet periods, clearly emphasizes that Russia has long been a land that lacks order. As the book progresses, however, it takes on more of a historical narrative tone, describing in a very concise manner most of the major political and economic developments in post-Soviet Russia. While this has the benefit of making the book a valuable introductory text, it becomes less clear how this narrative supports the central theme.

What distinguishes this book from other narratives is the authors' extensive use of survey data to allow the voices of the Russian masses to be heard. In addition to improving the scope of the narrative—we learn about citizens' preferences, concerns, and experiences, in addition to standard elite developments—the survey data also lead to conclusions that run counter to the received wisdom. For example, more Russians have become prosperous during the transition than destitute, the average Russian wants the country to be more democratic, and TV did not play a large role in informing Russians during the 1999 elections. Perhaps most surprising is that in June 2001 optimists outnumbered pessimists in predicting the future results of reforms across a range of issue areas.

My criticisms of the book focus not on what the authors have done, but rather on what they chose not to do. Despite access to a treasure trove of survey data (the University of Strathclyde's New Russia Barometer surveys), the authors use their data primarily to augment the narrative by reporting marginals and the occasional crosstab. While the book is informative and useful, it is disappointing that the authors did not focus more explicitly on hypothesis testing concerning the behavior of Russian citizens. Similarly, their overall

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claim regarding viable elections and a lack of order would have been strengthened by addressing *a priori* how to falsify the claim, the type of evidence that would support the claim, and how that evidence would be presented. These concerns notwithstanding, this is a valuable book for anyone interested in both understanding recent Russian political development and gaining important insights as to where the nation may be headed in the years to come.

JOSHUA A. TUCKER
Princeton University

Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations 1989–2000 *by Robert L. Suettinger. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2003. 556 pp. $39.95.*

This well-written account is likely to remain for some time to come the definitive assessment of U.S.–China relations in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen incident. Historians and other scholars will take many years to come up with data and insights to match Suettinger's richly nuanced review of American and Chinese policy making. The premier U.S. government intelligence and policy analyst on China, Suettinger had a unique vantage point as the China specialist on the National Security Council staff and the senior U.S. intelligence officer interacting with U.S.-China policy decision makers.

The assessment focuses on top-level U.S. decision making in the executive branch. The author's first-hand experience, careful interviews, and balanced and detached treatment of issues and individuals provide greater depth and detail than earlier accounts. They greatly enrich our understanding of the many factors at play in the various key decisions made by U.S. policy makers in dealing with China during this tumultuous period. The decisions often were misguided or went wrong. Pressures from competing U.S. bureaucratic interests, congressional activism, wide ranging U.S. interest groups, the media, and others all affected the U.S. decision-making process. The leanings and interests of individual decision makers, especially members of the senior foreign policy team headed by the National Security Adviser, are noted in some detail and generally without prejudice.

The narrative in the book is chronological, and the broad outlines of U.S.–China relations are consistent with earlier analyses. Thus, the initial U.S. reaction to the Tiananmen incident saw President George H. W. Bush fighting a rear-guard action to preserve an important international relationship in the face of heavy pressure from Congress, the media, and public opinion for a tougher policy. The drift in U.S.–China policy in the first term of the Clinton administration led to a major crisis prompted by the Taiwan President's 1995 visit to the United States and China's provocative military demonstrations in the Taiwan area. The author's account is particularly strong in explaining senior U.S. government decision making that led to the crisis and the thinking

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of these same officials as they sought to pull back from military confrontation with China and restore a workable relationship. This process led to U.S.–China summits in 1997 and 1998, but the positive impact was offset by Clinton administration scandals and a white hot U.S. domestic debate over China policy. Relations declined again following the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy during the NATO-led war against Serbia in 1999.

The book is long because throughout the narrative Suettinger gives ample attention to considerations and concerns of senior Chinese policy makers. Demonstrating skills of a veteran U.S. government China analyst, he uses available data to explain Chinese decision making regarding the United States and assesses how well or poorly it meshed with U.S. policy. What emerges is a convincing assessment of the constraints, pressures, and interests that drove Chinese leaders as they interacted with their American counterparts in periods of confrontation and efforts at reconciliation.

Those looking for a theoretical framework or thesis to structure their thinking about the complicated course of U.S.–China relations will be disappointed. Suettinger is interested in laying out in a straightforward and balanced way all the many complications and factors he has seen influence policy on both sides of the relationship. The reader is left with a picture of complications, differences, and difficulties that can be managed under some circumstances, but are seen as unlikely to be resolved soon.

ROBERT SUTTER
Georgetown University

Marching on Washington: The Forging of an American Political Tradition *by Lucy G. Barber. Berkeley, University of California Press, 2003. 358 pp. $34.95.*

On 24 August 2003, the *New York Times* covered the fortieth anniversary celebration of the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom. Unlike the original march, which had attracted around a quarter of a million people, the 2003 affair numbered only in the thousands. One participant expressed his disappointment: "I feel like numbers count. But there aren't many people here today" (p. 22). The historian Lucy G. Barber traces the development of marches on Washington from 1894 to 1971 and provides considerable understanding of how such demonstrations have become a routine part of the American political scene and why numbers matter.

As Barber shows in her exploration of six marches from Coxey's Army to the Spring Offensive against the war in Vietnam, groups of Americans increasingly believed that the achievement of political objectives depended upon traveling directly to the seat of national government. For the first hundred years of the nation's history, Americans did not believe the District of Columbia offered public spaces for ordinary citizens to demonstrate their concerns. Part

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of this view resulted from the geography of the town; part from the relatively small-scale business conducted by the government. The Civil War and the subsequent nationalization and industrialization of the country changed the scope of federal enterprises and shifted attention to Washington. At the same time, the city changed its landscape, providing opportunities to parade along a renovated Pennsylvania Avenue and congregate on the land between the Washington Monument and the Lincoln Memorial.

Besides Coxey's troops and antiwar protesters, Barber provides case studies of women's suffragists in 1913, Bonus Marchers in 1932, and African American civil rights demonstrators in 1941 and 1963. She explains how each group came to see the nation's capital (and Capitol) as a legitimate public space for dramatically delivering messages to lawmakers. In particular, disenfranchised women and blacks and politically impotent poor people viewed their collective presence in Washington as a means of claiming their rights as citizens. Calculating shrewdly, they protested in an orderly fashion and in ways both reflecting and challenging American values about gender, race, and class. They sought publicity to generate large attendance and focus national attention on their plight; but the media proved an undependable ally. The Associated Press, an example of national business consolidation, spread news from coast to coast of Jacob Coxey's forces heading to Washington, while at the same time portraying them unflatteringly as tramps. The development of television made personal appearance and conduct even more prominent. The 1963 March on Washington became the benchmark for demonstrations in an electronic era, emphasizing crowd size and deportment to judge success. Increasingly, marches became an exercise in mass marketing and consumption as much as "a petition in boots" (p. 12).

Marching on Washington is filled with irony. Barber shows that the demonstrations did not produce any immediate accomplishments. Indeed, the greatest success came when the projected Negro March on Washington in June 1941 was called off after President Franklin D. Roosevelt created a Fair Employment Practice Committee. Although these marches were the product of social movements, they depended on the organizing skills of a few leaders. If this book has a fault, it is the identification of these social movements with their mobilization in Washington rather than the grassroots organizing that spawned them in the first place and sustained them where they were most successful. However, Barber effectively shows that specific accomplishments were not as significant as the protesters' ability to invent a political tradition for citizens to present their collective grievances in the nation's capital. She has produced a highly readable book devoid of unnecessary jargon, based on solid research in a variety of archives and sprinkled with engaging photographs, maps, and illustrations.

STEVEN F. LAWSON
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

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Why Budgets Matter: Budget Policy and American Politics *by Dennis S. Ippolito. University Park, Penn State University Press, 2003. 329 pp. $55.00.*

What a timely book. As the U.S. federal government embarks on a course of record-setting debt accumulation, Dennis Ippolito provides the perfect context: the story of American fiscal policy. This is not another book about process. It is not another description of congressional wrangling. And it is not a period piece. In *Why Budgets Matter*, Ippolito offers us something new.

The subject of the book is American budgetary history, all of it, from the beginning to the current day. The chapter titles are understandably epochal, and include "The 'Small Government' Era (1789–1860)," "Budgeting for Government Growth (1860–1915)," and "The Transition to Modern Government (1915–1940)." They tell us a lot about what Ippolito is up to. He has provided a broad, sweeping history and a good one at that. What seems to belong, given the scope of the book, is there; what does not belong, is not. The accounting itself is nicely documented and rings true. It also is a pleasure to read.

Ippolito not only tells us what has happened over time but why it happened. We don't get detailed accountings of what happened in every policy area in every year, which would be impossible given the book's reach. Instead, we get the broad architecture of budgetary change. The usual suspects are there. That is, the economy plays an important role. Wars do, too. Politics matters, and Ippolito places particular emphasis on the politics of deficits and debt and particularly on how they are used; that is, as means to other policy ends. Here, tax cuts are not only a Republican pay-off to constituencies; they are the basis for leveraging social spending; Democratic opposition to tax cuts, meanwhile, provides the budgetary slack for expanding social programs. Both sides recognize the constraint of fiscal balance, at least over the long term. The battle, then, is over the size of government. This admittedly is not an entirely new story of fiscal policy. What is new is the application to all of U.S. budgetary history. It is an enormous undertaking.

Ippolito's analysis also has clear implications today, as the world unfolds before us. At this writing (September 2003), and as deficits mount, it appears that something in the fiscal policy equation will have to give, if not sooner then later. It may be the ongoing war on terror. It may be domestic spending. It even may be the tax cuts themselves. Probably some combination will be required. Perhaps policy change will happen under the current administration. Perhaps it will take electoral change. Regardless, Ippolito's analysis suggests that the issue should play an important role over the course of the current presidential election campaign.

The book is not perfect, of course. Most unfortunately, scant attention is paid to recent literature, especially journal articles. As almost all of this research supports Ippolito's premise, or is otherwise neutral, it is of small substantive consequence. A more complete review of the literature would have made the

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book's contribution clearer. It also would have enhanced its scholarly impact. This said, there obviously is much to recommend this book to many different audiences. It is ideal for various undergraduate courses and selected graduate courses as well. Most scholars of American politics and policy will want to have a copy at hand, as will attentive members of the general public.

CHRISTOPHER WLEZIEN
University of Oxford

The Grassroots of a Green Revolution: Polling America on the Environment *by Deborah Lynn Guber. Cambridge, MIT Press, 2003. 291 pp. Paper, $24.95.*

Understanding what the public thinks about environmental issues is important because public opinion is a major force in politics. Without public pressure on Washington, we would not have the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, or a host of other environmental legislation. Assessing public opinion about environmental issues is the task Deborah Lynn Guber sets for herself in her fine study, *The Grassroots of a Green Revolution.*

In her first three chapters, Guber examines the direction, strength, and stability of environmental attitudes. Using data from the American National Election Studies, the General Social Survey, and Gallup, Guber paints a picture of public support for the environment that is more restrained and realistic than the one often heard from environmental activists. Most Americans hold environmental opinions, but not strongly. They are sympathetic to environmental causes, but they are not active supporters.

Although Guber's efforts to rein in exaggerated claims is laudable, she occasionally goes too far and understates the environmental support shown in her data. For example, her description of the responses to a question asking whether we should protect the environment, even if it costs jobs, or should protect the jobs at the expense of the environment, is strained. She emphasizes the fact that two-thirds of the responses fall in the three center categories of the scale and describes the responses as forming "a bell curve" (p. 46), but she fails to mention that the curve is strongly skewed toward environmental protection. For the most part, however, Guber's assessments are on target and much needed.

The author also examines demographic sources of support for environmentalism, and tests claims that the environmental movement is elitist. She finds no support for the claim that environmentalism is a belief held only by upper income whites. More broadly, Guber finds that demographic variables explain relatively little because support for environmentalism is widespread. The variables that explain best are party identification and ideology.

Guber next turns her attention to the organization of attitudes. She produces solid evidence that "public attitudes on the environment have matured into a logical, structured, and constrained belief system" (p. 102).

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The chapter on voting is a bit dissappointing because the author focuses on presidential elections and then generalizes to voting in all elections. The problem is that presidential elections are not typical elections. The fact that environmental issues apparently make only a small difference when voters choose presidential candidates does not mean that environmental issues do not play larger roles in elections for lower office. Presidential candidates offer complicated packages of positions on a wide range of issues (for example, Iraq, crime, the economy). Environmental issues are easily lost in the mix. For evidence of environmental voting, we should look at less complicated elections. Many political observers suggest that environmental issues play prominent roles in at least some congressional races, and they certainly play key roles in many local elections. The role of environmental opinions on elections, therefore, remains unclear.

She completes her study with two nicely done chapters on voting in environmental ballot initiatives and on the influence of environmentalism in the marketplace. In both cases, she shows that environmental attitudes have a significant impact on society.

In sum, Guber offers an important contribution to our understanding of environmental attitudes across a range of settings. This book should be read by every student in the field.

ERIC R.A.N. SMITH
University of California, Santa Barbara

States, Parties, and Social Movements *edited by Jack A. Goldstone. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003. 287 pp. Cloth, $70.00; paper, $25.00.*

The dichotomization of political participation into "conventional" and "unconventional" modes has become canonical in academic political science. On the two sides of the divide are the "insiders," notably political parties and state actors, and the "outsiders," especially social movement participants. This new edited volume of eight varied articles seeks to bridge that divide, with chapters focusing mainly on the United States but also on Mexico, India, and Eastern Europe.

In a volume whose content is so eclectic, a major challenge is to provide a sense of coherence and continuity. It is achieved via a masterful introduction by editor Jack Goldstone, which successfully pushes the boundaries of existing thinking about conventional versus unconventional politics. Goldstone, and the volume as a whole, argue that far from being isolated from one another, states, parties, and social movements are actually inextricably intertwined. Part of this results from the increasing use, and even institutionalization, of organized protest as a mode of political participation. Goldstone goes even further, arguing that social movements have long interacted with parties and states, a

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reality underemphasized in the literature because the first scholars of social movements focused on unrepresentative cases such as the Civil Rights and youth empowerment movements in which actors lacked the electoral franchise. Far more commonly, social movement actors act on multiple levels simultaneously, perhaps participating in street demonstrations but also seeking to influence party platforms and shape electoral coalitions. Parties and states, likewise, spend a great deal of time seeking to co-opt, incorporate, neutralize, or undermine social movements.

The book is organized into two parts, one focusing on states, the other on parties. In Part I, Joseph Luders reveals how the Civil Rights movement was shaped not only by protestors but also by the strategic decisions made by state governments on how to respond to challengers. David Cunningham considers the case of the FBI's counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO), which tended to covertly target protest movements deemed most threatening ideologically rather than those which garnered the most media attention. The chapter by Heidi J. Swarts shifts attention to the case of two church-based movements that challenged policies in St. Louis, Missouri, and San Jose, California, their success often contingent on the structure of the local government. Finally, Jorge Cadena-Roa analyzes the interaction between elite factions and popular movement in ending the seventy-one-year reign of Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PTI).

Part II, on parties, also features four diverse articles. John K. Glenn examines the relationship between popular movements in Eastern Europe and the political parties that succeeded them (and at times pushed them aside) in the new regime. Manali Desai's chapter notes that communist parties in the Indian states of Kerala and West Bengal often adopted positions that diverged from the social movements in which they were rooted. The chapter on U.S. racial politics by Kim Williams focuses on the ability of social movements to influence decisions by state legislators to add a "multiracial" category to official demographic records. Nella Van Dyke examines the balance of threat and opportunity in left-leaning student protest, noting that Republican presidencies or governorships tend to prompt more activism even though Republican executives are less sympathetic than Democratic ones.

The volume concludes with an afterword by Charles Tilly on agendas for students of social movements. Tilly suggests four possible agendas: abandoning general movement models, focusing on the particulars of specific social movements, comparing movement politics with other varieties of politics, and focusing on a search for causation. Noting the heterogeneity of the cases in this volume, yet their frequent "family resemblance," Tilly states that "The challenge of social movement analysts is therefore the simultaneous explanation of similarity and difference" (p. 254).

RAYMOND A. SMITH
Columbia University

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No Fire Next Time: Black-Korean Conflicts and the Future of America's Cities *by Patrick D. Joyce. Ithica, Cornell University Press, 2003. 240 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $19.95.*

In this new study of urban ethnic conflict, Patrick Joyce trains a wide-angle lens on the 1992 Los Angeles riots. Under Joyce's eye, the L.A. riots become one—albeit the most acute—in a long series of Korean-Black disputes in U.S. cities. This analysis reaps some important benefits: namely, Joyce's theory about the role of local political institutions in the management of urban conflict. At the same time, the approach goes too far in asserting that tensions between L.A. Blacks and Koreans led directly to the riots. Despite this misstep, Joyce makes a thoughtful case for why we should pay attention to the work of local political institutions if we want to understand urban discord.

The book begins with some of its most interesting empirical evidence. Using local newspaper reports from thirty-nine U.S. cities, Joyce contends a much greater pervasiveness of Korean-Black conflict than is usually recognized. After arguing the shortcomings of idea-based (for example, prejudice, culture, immigrant ideology) and interest-based (competition, middleman minority) theories of ethnic conflict, he proposes tracing the formation and expression of ethnic disagreements to configurations of local political institutions. He argues that these settings vary in path-dependent ways; two of the most important variables are machine- versus reform-style political history and the extent of Black representation in formal political institutions.

Joyce then turns to case studies of New York City and Los Angeles, sites of the two best-known Black-Korean conflicts: the Red Apple Supermarket boycott of 1990 and the riots of 1992, respectively. Primary data consist of newspaper stories, public documents, and twenty-one personal interviews. As Joyce tells the two cities' stories, he touches on each one's recent history of protest and violence between Blacks and Koreans, the responses of Korean and Black organizations to tension-raising events, the form of Black nationalism in each city, the actions of the mayors, and the role of the media. He concludes that while New York City's contentious grassroots political institutions—a legacy of its machine past—helped prolong the Red Apple boycott, they also diffused tensions and prevented an outbreak of serious violence. In contrast, because L.A.'s reform-style politics placed power in a small, centralized elite, even Black and Korean political leaders had little connection to their respective ethnic constituencies. As a result, the few attempts at boycotts of Korean stores in L.A. were small-scale, short-lived affairs, leaving the riots as the major outlet for the expression of inter-ethnic hostility.

The major shortcoming of the book is its minimization of the Rodney King verdict as the riots' precipitating factor. Instead, Joyce takes pains to document the violent history of Korean-Black conflict in L.A., noting that the six days of unrest contained many different riots, and its seeking to explain only the Black-Korean violence. Even allowing for this analysis, it begs the question:

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would that violence have been unleashed if not for the King verdict? In this sense, the better New York comparison might be the 1991 Crown Heights riots, sparked by another long-standing ethnic conflict: between Blacks and Hasidic Jews. When a car carrying the Lubavitcher Rebbe struck and killed a six-year-old Black child, shouldn't New York's political institutions have diffused the tensions? Instead, four days of rioting ensued, during which a Black teenager stabbed a Hasidic man to death. Perhaps the combination of violent death and perceived injustice—the widely-circulated story that a Hasidic ambulance first on the scene had left the six-year-old unattended—could only lead to the same violent outcome as in L.A. Although the predictive power of Joyce's argument thus seems limited, he calls attention to local political institutions as important and under-analyzed actors. Future students of urban politics and conflict should heed that call.

NICOLE P. MARWELL
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Rehnquist Justice: Understanding the Court Dynamic *edited by Earl M. Maltz. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2003. 320 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $19.95.*

With the Court's controversial *Bush v. Gore* ruling in 2000, many observers of the nation's highest tribunal confidently declared that the long effort to reshape judicial interpretation in a conservative direction had—by the slimmest margin—finally succeeded. However, the Court's seemingly liberal turn in 2003, most importantly with decisions on affirmative action and gay rights, displayed in crystal clear terms that the Rehnquist Court is not so easily labeled. In fact, the Rehnquist Court may be best studied, not as a single entity under the leadership of a particular chief justice, as scholars are wont to do, but as a collection of nine independent thinkers. To help us comprehend the Court in such a fashion, Earl M. Martz and his collaborators present an excellent collection of essays detailing the legal backgrounds, confirmation fights, and judicial philosophies of the nine men and women who have sat together on the high bench since 1994.

There are many reasons why this book should garner the consideration and respect of students of the Court. Here, I focus on just a few. First, it provides an in-depth analysis of each of the justices, revealing the importance of individual philosophies for a Court that often splits sharply on its most important rulings. Second, through the eyes of the individual justices, the chapters make sense of a great number of cases. In doing so, the authors vary their approaches depending on the justice under consideration, with some spotlighting a few areas of the law and others providing more extensive coverage of a particular justice's opinions. For example, Mark Graber analyzes a wide swath of case law to show persuasively that, despite Justice Clarence Thomas's stated advocacy of originalism, "he is not particularly deferential to elected officials,

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and his legal conclusions do not differ substantially from those that might be reached by a conservative aspirationalist with a libertarian strain" (p. 87). Judith A. Baer's essay on Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg is a fine example of the more issue-focused approach. While Baer reviews much of the justice's work, her decision to give more attention to sex discrimination allows her to chart Ginsburg's role in the transformation of this area of the law, from her early years as a young woman shunned by the legal profession to her later role as a leading advocate before the Court to the author of *U.S. v. Virginia.*

Third, perhaps more than most Supreme Courts, the Rehnquist Court's divisions require special attention to specific swing voters— particularly Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, but also Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and David H. Souter—and this book is well-designed to shed a great deal of light on the Court's narrow decisions. In the chapter on O'Connor, for example, Nancy Maveety explains the importance of the Justice's accommodationism and conservatism, providing an insightful analysis on how and why the first woman to wear the High Court's robes has emerged as the "balance of power" on the bench (p. 128). The chapters on Kennedy (by Earl Maltz) and Souter (by Thomas Keck) are equally successful in revealing how these justices have limited the conservative reach of this Court.

While space limitations prevent a complete discussion of the chapters, I found each full of insights about the particular justice's judicial philosophy and each extremely useful in helping to understand the path taken by this Court as a whole. To further strengthen this collection, Earl Maltz leads it off with a thoughtful introduction that convincingly shows how the Rehnquist Court—even before its 2003 "liberal" decisions—"is by no means as extreme as some have claimed but rather is perhaps best described as moderately conservative" (p. 4). In the book's conclusion, Mark Silverstein nicely places the Court in the political time that created it, fittingly connecting the essays on the individual justices by explaining the politics that put these men and women in their chambers. In sum, *Rehnquist Justice* is a first-rate collection, and deserves the attention of anyone who is interested in understanding the doctrinal developments of this Supreme Court.

KEVIN J. MCMAHON
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The States of Campaign Finance Reform *by Donald A. Gross and Robert K. Goidel. Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 2003. 132 pp. Cloth, $69.95; paper, $24.95.*

The public debate over campaign finance reform has not been informed by scientific analyses of the potential benefits and costs of reform. In part, this is because supporters of reform are either well-meaning romantics or cynical demagogues; the former take on faith that more campaign regulations will "clean up the system," while the latter have no reason to question popular re-

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forms. Nevertheless, social scientists must accept most of the blame. To date, there have been few attempts to evaluate the efficacy of reforms in any systematic and comprehensive manner, despite the fact that the variation in state campaign finance regulatory regimes provides an ideal laboratory for studying the efficacy of such reforms.

Donald A. Gross and Robert K. Goidel take up this challenge by examining the effects of various state campaign finance regulations on total campaign expenditures, competitiveness, and turnout in gubernatorial campaigns. In doing so, the authors take an important first step toward addressing a lacuna in the campaign finance literature.

The authors first provide a brief history of campaign finance reform that will be useful to anyone not already well-versed in the variety and origins of state laws. Next, they discuss the rhetoric of reform and briefly describe some of the relevant political science literature. However, they ignore or give short shrift to studies that might be problematic for proreform arguments. For example, there is no discussion of any of the several recent and methodologically sophisticated studies published in economics journals that raise serious questions about the extent to which money influences either electoral outcomes or policy making. Consequently, readers seeking an appreciation of the state of knowledge regarding the role of money in American politics or insights into the methodological puzzles that have plagued this literature will be disappointed. However, one could probably write an entire book on those topics, so the authors can't be faulted for wanting to move on to their novel empirical exercise.

The remaining chapters are devoted to the authors' empirical analysis of the political consequences of campaign finance laws. However, the authors do not disclose the sources of much of their data (for example, state campaign finance laws), thereby limiting the usefulness of this study to other scholars. In addition, they provide little in the way of detail about their actual empirical work. Further, the authors do not conduct any sensitivity analysis, nor do they test the joint significance of campaign finance laws.

The dearth of sensitivity analysis is disconcerting, since the model specification is essentially *ad hoc*. Readers would have more confidence in the results if it could be demonstrated that key findings are robust to alternative specifications. For example, the authors do not control for state fixed effects, even though they work with a panel of state-level observations that spans twenty years.

The most serious problem with the empirical analysis is the implicit assumption that campaign finance laws are exogenous to campaign spending, electoral competition, and voter turnout. Again, including state-fixed effects in the analysis would at least purge the key estimates of any spurious association with time-invariant unobserved factors. The failure to address this fundamental methodological problem renders the empirical analysis uninformative about the political consequences of state campaign finance reforms.

JEFFREY MILYO
University of Chicago

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Superterrorism: Policy Responses *edited by Lawrence Freedman. Malden, MA, Blackwell Publishers, 2002. 200 pp. Paper $34.95.*

One of the large number of books published soon after the events of September 11, this volume stands out for three reasons. First, the European contributors analyzed the meaning as well as the actual and likely policy consequences of the attacks with the foreign observers' benefit of distance and detachment. Second, the European perspective presented here is free of anti-Americanism and reflects the authors' efforts to weigh the impact of September 11 on American and European politics and policies and on the U.S.-European relationship by carefully examining the concerns and interests at both sides of the Atlantic. Third, in content, presentation, and style the chapters of Lawrence Freedman's edited volume maintain the high promise of the opening chapters throughout and read as if written by one author, not nine contributors.

Dealing with the nature, roots, and conduct of the war on terrorism, the first three chapters present problems and prospects with respect to the post-Cold War "new" terrorism as well as thoughtful and challenging conclusions. John Gearson argues that the kamikaze attacks demonstrated terrorists' ability to inflict great damage, but not the inevitability of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorist organizations. However, the subsequent anthrax incidents and the content of discovered al Qaeda training manuals have underscored how real the threat of catastrophic WMD-terrorism is. After exploring whether poverty and the content of education produce terrorism, Karin von Hippel speaks of "collapsed" or "imploded" states (rather than using the common term "failed" states) as providing the natural environment for terrorists to live, hide, breed, and train. This is a reality that must be addressed by policy makers—especially after al Qaeda's ouster from Afghanistan. Written well before the invasion of Iraq, but after President George W. Bush's rhetorical attack on the "triangle of evil," Freedman warned that "the war on terrorism may well continue to take the United States into the sort of operation it dislikes . . ."(p. 55). This seemed to be the case in Iraq in the months after President Bush declared the end of hostilities.

The following two chapters focus on particular efforts to prevent further acts of terrorism and to bring terrorists to justice. Based on a thorough examination of the aspects of the international banking system that terrorists and their backers can and do exploit, Martin S. Navias concludes that the basic fundraising capabilities of terrorist organizations remain in place in spite of international efforts after the attacks to deprive terrorists of their financial resources. Helen Fenwick's analysis of the post-September 11 antiterrorism legislation introduced by Great Britain's Labour government weighs the need for security and the protection of civil liberties and points to a host of problems that violate fundamental democratic values. The problems she addresses happen to be as troublesome as similar provisions in the United States Patriot Act of 2001.

The next four chapters offer European views on American hegemony and the prospects for an American-European partnership in the future (William

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Wallace); on NATO and the organization's need to redefine its mission, strategy, and capabilities after September 11 (Ann Deighton); on the European Union's need to respond to the challenges posed by intra-European issues, global problems, and American unilateralism (Charles Grant); and, finally, on the effects of the attacks on the Russian-European and the Russian-American relationship (Nadia Alexandrova Arbatova).

Like most, if not all, books written and published during prolonged crises, this volume raises some issues and questions that were answered by recent events and developments. Overall, however, the analyses of post-September 11 challenges for policy makers in the United States and in Europe presented here remain as illuminating and thought provoking today as they were in the first year or so after the attacks on New York and Washington.

BRIGITTE L. NACOS
Columbia University

Images of Terror: What We Can and Can't Know About Terrorism *by Philip Jenkins. Berlin, Germany, Aldine de Gruyter, 2003. 227 pp. Cloth, $47.95; paper, $24.95.*

As a warning to consumers about the proliferation of post-September 11 theories on terrorism, this book is brilliant. Its "buyer beware" message is welcome and needed, and the examples used throughout the book of shoddy analysis and "socially-constructed interpretations" are compelling. Jenkins' book is a wonderful antidote to believing everything printed about terrorism in the press, not to mention government publications and popular books on the subject. It is a plea to see the current focus on this type of political violence within its historical framework and to carefully discern what is "spin" from what is an accurate understanding of the problem.

Jenkins' argument is that attitudes toward terrorism congeal through a process of negotiation. The outcome of that process depends upon broader social and political contexts and reflects a selective interpretation of events. In support of his thesis are chapters covering topics such as the definition of terrorism, motives for terrorism, the politics of terrorism, the mass media, investigations, intelligence, and other topics. The book forces a revisiting of familiar calamities such as the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 1995 Oklahoma City tragedy, and the 2001 anthrax attacks, to name a few, encouraging readers to re-examine assumptions of which they may be unaware. This is a healthy intellectual exercise and holds within it the key to higher quality scholarship and policy making.

Jenkins' purpose is not to deny the painful and very real existence of the realities of terrorism, he assures, but rather to unravel the layers of interpretation with which it is surrounded. His treatment of state sponsorship of terrorism and how the concept has changed, for example, is especially of interest in the

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current political climate: "In some periods, the concept of state sponsorship is seen as highly credible, while in others it is implausible conspiracy theory. And attitudes change with remarkable speed" (p. 162). The book has a very good chapter on "Iraq and State Terrorism," arguing that attitudes toward Iraq's role relate more to political and diplomatic factors than to objective information. Provocative and engaging, this discourse alone is worth the price of the book.

For those who study terrorism, a drawback in tracking perceptions is that it is impossible to get an in-depth analysis of the actual evidence on a given issue. At times, everything seems equally plausible and relative, with popular pulp lumped in with rigorous scholarship, myth with reality. There is also much talk in the book of received wisdom that no serious terrorism expert believes. Three obvious examples include the belief in a perfect definition of terrorism, use of the rhetorical phrase "The War on Terrorism," and the view that terrorists are "crazy." These are easy targets indeed. Despite its title, the book is much better covering what we *cannot* know than what we *can*, and in an era when there is a desperate need to raise the overall quality of terrorism knowledge and analysis, the book may have missed an opportunity to be even more constructive than it is.

Still, as a survey of popular belief and a talisman against taking an array of instant experts at face value, this is an excellent book. Jenkins' examination of what happens to the concept of terrorism when it enters the realm of public discourse is fascinating and original. It must be read by anyone who is serious about filtering available information and searching for effective responses to modern terrorism.

AUDREY KURTH CRONIN
Congressional Research Service

Governing from Below: Urban Regions and the Global Economy *by Jefferey M. Sellers. Cambridge University Press, 2002. 420 pp. Cloth, $75.00; paper, $30.00.*

Global capitalist development is being transformed in ways not yet fully understood by urban analysts. This view may come as a surprise to those familiar with the global cities thesis and the work of scholars like John Friedmann, Saskia Sassen, and David Harvey. It is, though, a point underscored in Jefferey M. Sellers's important new book on comparative urban political economy, *Governing from Below: Urban Regions and the Global Economy.*

Since the community power debates of the 1950s, the question of the relevance of urban governance has predominated in the literature of American urban politics. The literature has tracked capitalist urban development over the past half-century as it underwent periods of creative innovation and stalemate as cities have declined and risen again, and was transformed in its relations

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to national and international capitalist development. The globalization of new investment, production, and consumption patterns is accelerating the pace of change as the world urbanizes. Thus, once again, the question of the relevance of the local is (or should be) at the forefront of urban analysis.

This book addresses the fundamental opposition between structuralist and pluralist approaches to the question of local agency with an innovative comparative research design and a mountain of data that convincingly makes the case that the question of local agency is important, but often misconceived. It goes far to advance an understanding of why, contrary to popular misunderstanding, globalization is not rendering the local field of action redundant, even in the advanced post-industrial societies that promote the form of globalized economic relations seen today. In fact, Sellers argues that globalization is doing just the opposite as globalization itself is also taking place from below, through new pathways and increased flows of communication, information, migration, and networks that contribute as much as the interventions of hierarchical firms and governments to shifting relations between nation states and their cities, cities and their regions, and across cities themselves. What matters most and why Sellers's comparative approach is so innovative is his focus on lateral inter- and trans-local relations and the dynamic interplay of forces across all levels of government and the economy. Sellers discards a hierarchical approach to the study of urban political economy in favor of a method that highlights the transformations in politics and policy occurring at the interstices of the international, national, regional and local fields of action.

Governing from Below makes major contributions to a range of fields associated with the study of cities (that is, planning, public policy, urban politics, and the political economy of urbanization and urban social movements). It organizes and analyzes decades of data on the political and economic development of eleven cities in three leading advanced industrial countries: the United States, Germany, and France. Bucking the trend in analyzing the process of globalization across the largest global cities, all of Sellers's cities are midsize and in midsize metropolitan regions where, by 1990, the service sector had grown to be one of the primary components of the urban economy. By focusing on these cities, Sellers is able to control for some of the most important economic influences on urban policy outcomes. The attention to the midsize urban sector alone provides a much needed corrective to findings from the global cities research to date.

Sellers's research design allows him to analyze the variation in outcomes in three major policy areas: economic growth and development, environmental quality and protection, and social equity and inclusion. Important national differences emerge: over the last forty years, the German cities grew more slowly and evenly compared to the French and American cities, and they maintained higher levels of environmental amenities with the least spatial polarization and sorting across income and neighborhoods. The French cities did not meet the standards of the German cities, exhibiting surprising variation in local policy

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syntheses pursued and achieved by both left- and right-leaning local regimes. The American cities, which were more exposed to raw market forces than either the German and French cities, reflect this different fusion of state-market relations in their singular pursuit of growth, with varied outcomes in environmental quality and the highest, most persistent levels of class and ethnic polarization.

Sellers documents enough local variation within and across his cities, despite significant national differences, to beg the question of economic determinism and the power of supra-local political institutions to dominate local developments. He does this by digging deep into a well of data that he mines in new and interesting ways. For example, Sellers creates a simple index of existing-to-new housing in metropolitan areas incorporating the distance of new housing to the central city to track the success of governmental efforts at all levels of government to protect the environment and control sprawl. Correlations of the index with relevant federal, state or regional, and local policies reveal how the growing complexity of governing in both federal and unitary national political systems and the character of policy making itself, its breadth, specificity, bureaucratic underpinnings and command, combine in different ways to produce variation in local outcomes. This analysis allows Sellers to explain, for example, why there is less variation in land use policy outcomes under conditions of German federalism than in centralized France, which, despite a proliferation of legal provisions for land use protections approaches the United States in its inability to control urban sprawl. At the same time, where local outcomes are more consistent in Germany than in France and the United States, Sellers shows, through case studies of local planning efforts and the political histories of individual urban regimes, why and how local variations in Germany are still significant and reflect the independent influence of local politics. By applying this kind of analysis to cities within and across the national boundaries of his three countries, Sellers is able to disentangle state and market influences on local land use in new ways.

Richly detailed, reflecting years of work in three languages and a deft flexibility in qualitative and quantitative research methods, *Governing from Below* generates too many interesting findings to summarize in a short review. My only criticism is a minor one. The main argument of the book that local conditions, actors, politics, markets, and movements count in important ways in determining how well midsize service center cities perform in areas of economic growth, environmental protection, and social equity is convincingly demonstrated and repeatedly stated throughout the text. Given the volume of data the reader is asked to keep track of, however, the argument is not always summarized and extended as effectively as it could be. Sellers states again and again that infrastructures of local government and politics "ultimately add up to much more than the sum of policies from above" (p. 174); "account for much of the wide variation in local syntheses" (p. 284); and "[reveal] additional causes for the wide range of domestic and national variations in policy" (p. 369).

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At times, however, one is left wondering, not if or why anymore, but, more precisely, how much local forces matter relative to all others. These are questions that Sellers's understated style sometimes allows him to gloss over, but they do not detract from the overall power of the book. As Sellers rightly concludes, even more so than in advanced industrial countries, "the solutions will have to come from the bottom up as well as the top down" (p. 395) for the developing urban world where the greatest population growth of the century will occur.

LORRAINE C. MINNITE
Barnard College

Dead on Arrival: The Politics of Health Care in Twentieth-Century America *by Colin Gordon. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2003. 336 pp. $29.95.*

Why is the United States the only rich democracy that lacks an inclusive national health program? This is an enduring question—on par with Sombart's famous query about the absence of socialism: Why is there no socialism in the United States? And yet, it is also a question that could not be more timely, as the United States plunges toward yet another round of debates over its perennial health crisis.

Colin Gordon starts his new book by raising the question anew. His goal, however, is less to provide a new or unified answer than to change the way in which the question is posed. In that, he certainly succeeds—even if, in doing so, he raises more issues for analysis than his richly documented historical account can answer.

Dead on Arrival is easy to pigeonhole. Gordon is a left-leaning historian who tells a dismal tale of political failure and private enrichment. Yet, this thumbnail sketch does not do justice to his equal-opportunity dismissal of received historical truths. Against conventional left-of-center accounts, Gordon argues that American health reformers were deeply constrained by their acceptance of private business practices and racial and gender stereotypes. Against conventional right-of-center accounts, Gordon stresses that the private medical sector that conservatives laud was, in fact, extensively propped up by the national government that they disdain—and that this coddled private sector has, in turn, failed even minimal tests of efficiency, accountability, and justice.

Gordon's own account of the history of health care in the U.S. is not so single-minded. It weaves together three themes: the waylaying of government action by private employment-based insurance; the volatile intersection of social insurance ideals with nativism, red-baiting, racism, and sexism; and, above all, the overwhelming material and symbolic advantages of the shifting constellation of interests allied against reform. In exploring these themes, Gordon synthesizes and expands upon a number of recent movements in the

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study of U.S. social welfare history from the rediscovery of the employment-based "welfare capitalism" once consigned to the dustbin of pre-New Deal history to the renewed emphasis on the racial and gender exclusions embedded in America's public-private welfare framework.

Those familiar with Gordon's previous work on business and the New Deal will not be surprised by his focus on the role of business and business-provided benefits. Yet, unlike his previous work—and unlike the work of political scientists who have recently looked at employers' role in social policy—*Dead on Arrival* never really focuses on the crucial question of whether business got what it wanted in the political struggles that created America's unusually employment-oriented approach.

This lack reflects a larger weakness: *Dead on Arrival* is more a collection of historical vignettes than an attempt at explaining the central puzzle that launches the narrative. Crucial arguments—about the ways in which private insurance coverage shaped and displaced reformers' goals, for example—are raised, but never fully explored through comparative or theoretical reflection. (For a book explaining American distinctiveness, for instance, the references to other nations are surprisingly few and far between.) The goals of key interests are often hazily specified, making Gordon's arguments about who did what and why seem *ad hoc* and *post hoc*. In addition, the book is so dense with facts, quotes, and obscure health care terms that even the attentive will find that some of the key themes and arguments get lost in the historical underbrush.

At a time of renewed popular and scholarly debate over America's exceptional welfare state, students of American public affairs will find much of value in Gordon's timely book. They will have to turn elsewhere, however, for the larger comparative and conceptual framework that would be needed to answer the enduring and important question that Gordon explores.

JACOB S. HACKER
Yale University

The National Environmental Policy Act: Judicial Misconstruction, Legislative Indifference, and Executive Neglect *by Matthew J. Lindstrom and Zachary A. Smith. College Station, Texas A&M University Press, 2001. 188 pp. $34.95.*

This book is a well-written, well-documented history of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) as it has evolved to the end of the 1990s. Passed by Congress in 1969, and signed into law by President Richard M. Nixon on 1 January 1970, NEPA ushered in the environmental decade that we knew in the 1970s. Its authors and many others hoped the Act would be a turning point in history that would raise ecological values to the level of influence that economic values have always occupied in this nation.

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Lindstrom and Smith give us a concise legislative history of the Act and the major players who were instrumental in its creation, including Senators Gaylord Nelson, Edmund Muskie, and Henry Jackson; Representatives John Dingall and Les Aspin; and especially Lynton K. Caldwell, the academic who has devoted much of his career to trying to convince policy makers that ecological values ought to help shape every policy decision made in America and elsewhere.

The remainder of the book is a disappointed recital of how NEPA was misinterpreted and abused by administrative agencies that often sought to evade the process altogether. For a brief time, environmental groups were successful in getting the federal courts to give them standing in court to force reluctant agencies to write environmental impact statements (EISs), the main action-forcing Section 102 of the Act. The conservative Burger and Rehnquist Supreme Courts, however, quickly turned most of those decisions around. What was left was a procedural requirement that forced all federal agencies to write EISs about major projects but afforded no judgment about the substantive content of those statements. This reduced NEPA to the paper tiger that a federal judge early predicted it would become.

There are two theories about how the champions of NEPA hoped it would bring about a transformation of U.S. policies: the internal model asserted that federal agencies would reform as a consequence of having to write down all the devastating impacts that their pet projects would have on the natural and human environment. By so doing, personnel in all agencies would gradually see the error of their ways and adopt more ecologically sensitive values. The external model contended that, by allowing external actors to review and comment on EISs, the agencies would be forced to mend their ways. Originally, the Act designated a superior administrative body, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), that would be able to veto environmentally disastrous projects. Although CEQ did not have this power alone, it was designed to have the ear of the president in a manner similar to Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), which influences presidential decisions on the basis of their predicted economic impacts.

Lindstrom and Smith spend most of the book explaining why the external model did not work. Primarily a creation of the U.S. Congress, NEPA did not achieve favor with either presidents or courts in the 1980s and 1990s because they did not understand the goals of NEPA or they disagreed with them. The last chapter of NEPA is a series of recommendations for revitalizing the Act: First, an amendment to the U.S. Constitution should be proposed that would give Americans the right to a clean environment and force U.S. courts to acknowledge the substantive intent of the law as well as its procedural requirements. Second, the president should acknowledge the importance of the CEQ and use it as presidents use the CEA. Third, outside consultants should be prohibited from writing the requisite EISs. Fourth, NEPA should be expanded to include EPA's definition of risk assessment and give more consideration of the social issues like environmental justice. The last two recommendations

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would require amendments of the law itself—an unlikely outcome. Lindstrom and Smith end by urging more research into NEPA—an important recommendation, especially with regard to comparing impacts predicted by EISs and their actual impacts after the project has been completed. This kind of research is barely mentioned. Second, more studies would be helpful to test the efficacy of the internal reform model. Just how successful has the EIS writing exercise been in forcing bureaucrats to start thinking ecologically or in recruiting new kinds of personnel to write EISs that conform to the procedural NEPA?

The authors assert that they know the intention of the framers of NEPA. Unfortuntely, no one knows the intention of the members of Congress who voted for the law in 1969. NEPA was the result of political forces that converged at a particular time during the heyday of environmentalism. After that moment, NEPA evolved as a result of interest group activity and administration and judicial rulings.

The authors are disappointed that people who do not share their values regard environmentalism as just another interest in our pluralist system. Environmental issues should be of primary importance, but it is evident that most power brokers in Washington today do not share their belief.

LETTIE MCSPADDEN
Northern Illinois University

War and Genocide: Organized Killing in a Modern Society *by Martin Shaw. Oxford, United Kingdom, Polity Press, 2003. 272 pp. Cloth, $62.95; paper, $27.95.*

This book is about mass killing by governments. It seeks to draw a connection between genocide and war, not only by noting that most cases of genocide occur during war, but also by arguing that war tends toward what the author calls degenerate war in which many civilians are killed. Ultimately, the author argues against most forms of war, even defensive war. He wants to reserve war for cases of humanitarian intervention where military force is used to stop genocide and related gross violations of human rights.

Focusing on "mass slaughter" (p. 2), Martin Shaw a professor at the University of Sussex, starts with the point, not exactly new, that "war as such is deeply problematic" (p. 3). This is because, he says, "warfare has tended to produce its apparent opposite, genocide" (p. 4). In his view, belligerents tend toward degenerate war involving "the deliberate and systematic extension of war against an organized armed enemy to war against a largely unarmed civilian population" (p. 5). Because of this, he believes "the legitimacy of armed force remains fundamentally in question" (p. 6).

Shaw seeks to support his general arguments with descriptions of various mass slaughters: the trench warfare of World War I, the Armenian genocide, Stalin's mass murders, Nazism and the Holocaust, Japan's wars, allied bombing in World War II, nuclear war strategy, Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, and the Balkan wars of the 1990s.

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His notion of genocide is not the legal one found in the 1948 treaty prohibiting the intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. He quite rightly notes that the legal concept is vague and incomplete. It does not cover the intentional killing of political groups, nor of social groups beyond the ones named. The treaty definition also is not clear on whether killing large portions of a group, or killing enough to drive the remainder out, qualifies as genocide. Thus, Shaw substitutes his notion of genocide: mass killing intended to destroy the *power* of a social group within a society.

Curious is the omission in this book of any analysis of international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and the development of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. All have tried to keep war within legal limits since the first Geneva Convention of 1864. On the basis of this legacy, there are now three international courts holding individuals responsible for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, since the 1949 Geneva Conventions have been strengthened by two 1977 protocols. If Shaw's analysis is basically correct through World War II, his analysis leaves out much since then.

Also curious is the author's argument that all modern war tends toward degenerate war involving great collateral damage, given that modern technology raises the possibility of less rather than more civilian killing because of "smart bombs" and other precision munitions. He does discuss what he calls risk transfer, in which the high-tech military transfers risk from itself to civilians, and which is well-demonstrated by NATO's bombing of Serbia in 1999 over the issue of Kosovo. Yet, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 does indeed suggest that not all modern war has to result in the mass slaughter of civilians.

Ultimately, Shaw concludes with the old idea that people can learn to do without war by emphasizing institutions of peaceful change. The fact that so far we have not accomplished that learning, and that for large numbers of people war does retain its legitimacy, especially if they happen to be on the side of preponderant putative power, indicates that Shaw is still fighting an uphill battle. This is especially so when he goes against just-war thinking, as well as the UN Charter, and disavows defensive war as also illegitimate.

DAVID P. FORSYTHE
University of Nebraska at Lincoln

Reluctant Partners: A History of Multilateral Trade Cooperation, 1850–2000 *by Andrew G. Brown. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2003. 208 pp. $49.50.*

As global trade talks appear to stall, it is useful to reflect broadly on the forces that contribute to successful commercial negotiations. Andrew Brown's account is a highly readable one, free of jargon or academic advocacy of a particular theory. His sentiments are clearly in favor of the gains from trade, but he is

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more interested in showing how cooperation is a prickly affair that rests, not simply on material interests, but on security concerns, ideas, and the willingness to accept international rules.

Brown begins with the well-known conflict between exporters and import-competing industries and notes that an interest in freer trade typically arises as a result of industrialization. Manufacturers, and later multinationals that provide services, seek markets and thus the concessions at home necessary to secure them abroad. Brown also notes, however, that security calculations have sometimes been joined to the free trade cause, for example, in the United States interest in the postwar reconstruction of both Europe and Japan. Ideas also play an independent role. There can be little doubt that Keynsian and developmentalist ideas played a powerful role in much of the developing world, which largely abstained from early postwar trade negotiations at great cost.

The book begins with the British Corn Laws, and thus parallels recent work on globalization that takes note of the pre-1914 golden age of trade and financial integration. Brown underscores that hegemony was not a necessary condition for cooperation during this period. Britain's trade liberalization was and not initially driven by an effort to construct a free trade system. Yet, the political motives that led to a breakthrough with France in 1860 formed the basis for an incipient multilateral network that presaged later efforts.

One major theme that runs through several episodes is the centrality of exchange rates to agreements on trade. In his chapter on the interwar years, Brown notes that the infamous Smoot Hawley Tariff of 1930 was as much a consequence of the breakdown of the international monetary order as it was an independent cause of the mercantilism that ensued. When countries sought to dig themselves out of this hole, the rules they constructed proved crucial, particularly the norm of nondiscrimination.

The postwar history Brown tells is a familiar one to students of the international trading system, but he hits all of the main points squarely. He walks through the failure of the more ambitious International Trade Organization in the late-1940s and reminds readers of the temporary role that the much weaker General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was designed to play. He shows how the formation of the Europe Economic Community (EEC) was the spur to a more ambitious round of tariff cutting in the 1960s under the Kennedy Round. The economic turbulence of the 1970s and 1980s produced more ambiguous results; the "new protectionism" coexisted with the Tokyo Round initiative and some forward progress on multilateralism.

He spends a full chapter on the developing countries and sees their shifting interests as a key factor in the continued growth of the multilateral system and the transition to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Another chapter tackles the complex issue of regionalism, about which Brown is ambivalent, arguing that this economic approach has only been tolerable because of the generally robust economic climate in which it was born.

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A central theme of Brown's useful introduction is the fragility of the international trading system and the ever-present possibility of breakdown; thus the title. Brown seems optimistic in the end, noting the growing acceptance of a rule-based approach, the profound shift in developing and socialist countries, and the increasing networks of private commercial interests that thrive on free trade. His one hedge is proving exactly the right one: that the strength of protected sectors in the advanced industrial states may ultimately sour the developing countries on the multilateral process.

STEPHAN HAGGARD
University of California, San Diego

The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth *by Liah Greenfeld. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2003. 560 pp. $19.95.*

Explaining national differences in the timing, intensity, durability, and character of economic growth since 1500 has proven to be an impossible task for many political historians, but Liah Greenfeld has attempted it once again. Repeating her influential earlier book's stress on nationalism here, Greenfeld assembles comparative histories of England, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States—Japan and the United States receiving two full chapters each—to expand her previous arguments. Nationalism, for Greenfeld, results when people subject to a common political authority share a consciousness of belonging to a distinctive sovereign community. In her earlier book, the timing and form of nationalism accounted for distinctive subsequent political orientations in England, France, Russia, Germany, and the United States. Now Greenfeld argues that similar changes in consciousness caused people to overturn millennia of suspicion as they committed themselves to a belief in economic growth as desirable and natural. They did so because identification with the nation promoted a shared sense of dignity, efficacy, and relative equality among the citizens, hence a willingness to undertake an economic effort whose outcome depended on the efforts of distant others. Changed beliefs, according to the argument, then enabled sustained economic growth, country by country.

Greenfeld prudently denies that nationalism causes reorientation to economic growth wherever it occurs, and allows that the capabilities assigned center stage in most economists' accounts of economic growth affect how and how fast growth occurs; she accordingly distinguishes between economists' story of *how* and her—motivational—story of *why*. Greenfeld's story self-consciously pits nationalism against Weber's Protestant Ethic, while retaining Weber's general causal logic. For such an argument to gain credibility, Greenfeld's international comparisons must show that the sequence of nationalism-belief change-economic growth recurred both within countries and across them. The within-country component calls for a demonstration that national consciousness did, indeed, alter whole populations' commitments to economic activity and that

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altered commitments did, indeed, fuel sustained growth. The across-country component requires earlier nationalism in England than elsewhere, absence of sustained economic growth in Tokugawa, Japan, and so on. It implies that both nationalism and economic commitment eventually transformed the United States even more profoundly than its predecessors. It also necessitates brushing off objections that economic growth in the Netherlands, China, and elsewhere either preceded or caused growth in England.

Fully aware of these logical requirements, Greenfeld sets up the book as a series of single country analyses in roughly chronological order, preceded by a pithy introduction and followed by a thoughtful epilogue concerning the (very mixed) future of economic growth, especially in her native Russia. Readers should therefore ask three questions of the book: Do the treatments of individual countries adequately describe their experiences with nationalism, alteration of mentalities, and economic growth? Do within-country and cross-country sequences correspond to the argument's logical requirements? Do the proposed causal processes hold up to empirical and logical scrutiny? On the first count, Greenfeld concentrates so heavily on ideological transformation that historically informed readers will constantly find themselves calling up unmentioned and unanswered alternative explanations. In the case of England, for example, I could not suppress thoughts about how the sixteenth century shift from wool to cloth production signaled England's integration into the continental economy, especially that of the low countries and northern France. On the second count, the dismissal of the early-developing Netherlands, although well informed, looks like special pleading: the non-nationalist Dutch Republic, Greenfeld tells us, poses no objection to the general thesis because its economy probably contracted during the later seventeenth century, a contraction that disqualifies it as a case of sustained economic growth. On the third count, the dual processes by which first awareness of a shared nation spreads and then that awareness motivates economic effort remain underspecified and mysterious. Awaiting further specification and proof, we can cheer Greenfeld's bold challenge to received wisdom.

CHARLES TILLY
Columbia University

French Interventionism: Europe's Last Global Player? *by Adrian Treacher. Brookfield, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003. 190 pp. $79.95.*

French opposition to the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003 will doubtless widen the audience for this book. On the one hand, readers will mine it for help in understanding the reasons for France's dramatic challenge to the United States. On the other hand, France's behavior contradicts the book's core argument: that there has been "an accelerated process of downplaying the hitherto flaunted French exceptionalism. . . ." (p. 5).

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The book substantially succeeds in its aim of providing a judicious and fine-grained description of recent changes in French foreign and security policy, including France's participation in multinational peacekeeping, West European security arrangements, nuclear weaponry, and sub-Saharan Africa. Treacher demonstrates how French policy in these areas has shifted from a flamboyant, unilateral approach to a more modest one embracing multinational cooperation. In particular, France has sought to forge a united Europe both to constrain a renascent Germany and to counter American hegemony. While Treacher's argument is not original, it is documented by a wealth of secondary sources supplemented by interviews with French scholars and officials. The book provides a fine overview for nonspecialists.

Treacher claims that, notwithstanding the recent important shift, there is extensive continuity in two core values that makes French foreign policy exceptional. Long before Charles de Gaulle, French political leaders have given highest priority to maximizing France's global *rang* (rank) and *grandeur.* Even critics of de Gaulle would probably agree that Treacher underestimates the general's influence when he claims that de Gaulle's "principle [sic] contribution was [merely] to crystalise and give popular expression to policy approaches that had evolved over two centuries or more. . . ." (pp. 40–41).

Treacher does not explain why French leaders are uniquely committed to the pursuit of rank and *grandeur.* Nor does he consider alternative causal explanations for French actions, such as Andrew Moravcsik's claim that economic factors have played a key role in France's participation in the European Union. However, Treacher's main aim is not theoretical or analytical, but descriptive. And he ably describes the downscaling of French interventionism in one issue area after another. In brief, the book implicitly answers the question posed in the book's subtitle in the negative.

Which brings us back to French behavior in the Iraqi crisis. Although *French Interventionism* was completed before the second Gulf war, readers will naturally seek its help in understanding France's flamboyant exceptionalism in 2003—ironically, behavior dramatically at odds with the tidal shift that Treacher describes. In fact, his account underlines how great the continuity has been in French opposition toward American military intervention. Treacher's description of French behavior in the first Gulf war is uncannily applicable to the second one: "Prior to the launch of Operation Desert Storm, French diplomats were constantly seen to be going the furthest to reach a diplomatic solution to the crisis. . . ." (p. 70). Of course, France eventually committed significant ground and naval forces in the first Gulf war. But the question remains why France's shift toward a less independent and confrontational style evident in other issue areas has not extended to its posture toward American military intervention.

An 800-pound gorilla haunts the pages of *French Interventionism:* the United States. The cement binding France's strong foreign policy consensus that Treacher identifies has often been opposition to American influence.

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Treacher frequently alludes to this tendency but, in my view, underestimates its importance. He rightly alludes to the multi-faceted character of the American threat: economic, political, military, and cultural. In this connection—and such speculation goes well beyond the scope of Treacher's admirably limited focus—might normalization be occurring in a quite different manner than he identifies: by the anti-American aspect of French exceptionalism proving infectious elsewhere in the world?

MARK KESSELMAN
Columbia University

Blair's Britain *by Stephen Driver and Luke Martell. Oxford, United Kingdom, Polity Press, 2002. 256 pp. Cloth, $66.95; paper, $29.95.*

Concerned mainly with the domestic policies of Tony Blair's Labour government, rather than Blair's own career, this well-informed book would remain relevant even if Blair should fail to survive the decline in his own, as well his party's, popularity so apparent in mid-2003. The work was evidently written at a high point in Blair's fortunes, after Labour had begun its second term in 2001 with a continuing massive parliamentary majority and before Blair's commitment to the invasion of Iraq threatened his leadership. Earlier, as the authors observe, the government's foreign interventions, notably in Afghanistan and Yugoslavia, appeared successful, as did its cautious postponement of a decision to adopt the European Union's common currency.

At any rate, international affairs are decidedly secondary in the book's evaluation of Labour's program during its first four or five years following the electoral victory of 1997 and the beginning months of the parliament elected in 2001. However fully globalization is recognized as the context in which policy is developed, the authors (both social science teachers at British universities) devote most of their detailed discussion to welfare measures, fiscal restraint, health service reform, education, government-business partnership, and devolution. Labour policies are generally presented in a favorable light, but dissenting critical views are treated respectfully and fairly. The authors strike me as well-informed and judicious.

More than anything else, the book seeks to establish that Blair's New Labour is, at least in significant respects, a distinctive third way. That its program departs from Labour's traditional socialism, as its left-wing critics complain, requires relatively little argument. Plainly, by championing public-private partnerships to deliver governmental services, rejecting radical redistribution, transferring control of monetary policy to the Bank of England, and fostering business-friendly measures, New Labour is unlike the old party. More attention, therefore, is given to contending that Blair's domestic program is more than a continuation of Thatcherism. Here, though acknowledging that the Labour government has built on some of the accomplishments of Thatcher's long

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tenure, the authors suggest that so much has been added by way of social democratic measures as to make for qualitative changes in policy. A favorite example is the Blair government's provision of training for the unemployed, called the New Deal, in pursuit of the continuing effort to reduce welfare dependency. Another cited example is Labour's fiscal policy, whose notable restraint under Chancellor Gordon Brown, the authors argue, differs from restraint under the Conservatives because it was meant eventually to allow increased spending on public services and modest redistribution measures.

More straightforward in its departure from Thatcherism has been Blair's devolution program. Extending a substantial measure of self-government to assemblies in Scotland and Wales reflects, in the authors' view, a liberal pluralism that Conservative leaders had not embraced. The Blair government's break with tradition in its reduction of the hereditary membership of the House of Lords and in its as yet unfinished reform of that body is further evidence of that break.

In making the case that New Labour is distinguishable from both the old Left and the Right of British politics, the authors do not claim that the third way transcends those positions. Rather, they believe that its novelty lies merely in a combination of the older positions. Variations of this definitional discussion recur a little tediously throughout the short book. Perhaps the repetition can be explained by the fact that versions of five of the book's nine chapters appeared previously in journals.

More interesting are the book's references to British Labour's new posture in relation to other European social democratic parties. Under Blair, and to a considerable degree under the two party leaders who immediately preceded him, Labour seems to have moved farther right than its continental counterparts, thus reversing positions held a few decades ago. Indeed, the authors note the influence of Clinton Democrats on New Labour and also the extent to which Britain is now closer to the American model of a market economy than are the major continental nations.

LEON D. EPSTEIN
University of Wisconsin–Madison

Ideology, Party Change, and Electoral Campaigns in Israel, 1965–2001
by Jonathan Mendilow, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2003. 299 pp. Cloth, $81.50; paper, $27.95.

The title of Jonathan Mendilow's book could have been different, as it focuses on the history of the two large political parties—which, at times, were just electoral blocs—between the mid-1950s and 2001. The most prominent method used by the author is "content analysis of electoral appeals."

The author suggests two reasons for his concentration on the two large political parties. The first: "... because the communitarian parties do not

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compete for the votes of the general electorate but of closed communities, they are not germane to my subject" (p. 25). The second: ". . . to render this work accessible to the non specialist in Israeli affairs" (p. 25). It should be noted that, although the two large electoral blocs controlled 95 out of the 120 seats in the Knesset at the peak of their joint power (1981), in four general elections (1955, 1961, 1999, and 2001), they controlled fewer than half of the Knesset seats.

There are many cases where I find it difficult to accept Jonathan Mendilow's very thoughtful explanations. For example, in my opinion, the famous "Lavon Affair" played a major role in development of the party system in Israel. Thus, the "periphery mutiny" against Mapai and the cooperation between Herut and other—more central—parties, started with it. Furthermore, the decisions of Eshkol when forming the governmental coalition for Ben Gurion after the "Lavon Affair Elections" of 1961 paved the way to the new party system of 1965. As is well known in a last minute decision Eshkol preferred the participation of Ahdut Ha'Avoda over the participation of the Liberal Party. This paved the way to the establishment of the first Alignment and pushed the majority of the Liberal party to cooperation with Herut in 1965. All of this is totally ignored in the book.

The comparison of Israel to India and France is very original, but theoretically problematic. Israel is usually compared to West European parliamentary multi-party systems that employ proportional representation electoral systems.

Jonathan Mendilow's originality cannot be questioned. He is a very knowledgeable and intelligent scholar and his systematic content analyses of electoral appeals—although statistically over-simplified—is important and helpful. Nevertheless, contrary to the author's intention, I would recommend his book to the specialist who has mastered the means necessary to challenge his arguments, rather than to the nonspecialist in Israeli affairs.

A final word should be said about the elections of 2003. In these elections, it seems that the Likud captured, for the first time, the pure pivotal/dominant position enjoyed by Mapai/Labour until 1977. One can only hope that the author will cover this electoral campaign in his future works.

ABRAHAM DISKIN
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Professionalizing Research in Post-Mao China: The System Reform Institute and Policy Making *by Catherine H. Keyser. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2002. 256 pp. $69.95.*

This is an in-depth case study of institutional change in reform-era China. The case in question is the Chinese Economic System Reform Research Institute (SRI). Established in 1985 and closed in 1990, SRI was a high-level, within-system research institute that at the same time enjoyed substantial autonomy

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from the party-state. Catherine Keyser's story captures the tortuous process of the emergence of new types of social organizations from within the system and shows that the splitting of state and society unfolded in an ambiguous and even contradictory process.

Taking an "integrated approach" (a variant of new institutionalism), the author begins her analysis with the actors. Most members of SRI were young reformers from the Cultural Revolution generation. Appropriately, Keyser adopts a generational perspective to examine the impact of their experience. Citing both her interviews (thirty-five altogether) and the existing literature on this generation, she shows that by the beginning of the reform, the historical experience of these individuals had turned them into agents of social change.

The most innovative part of Keyser's analysis of the actors is her specification of two mechanisms that translate generational experience into action. First, she argues that for generational experience to influence present action, it is the interpretation of the experience that matters, not the accuracy of memory. This is an important theoretical insight that could serve well the growing interest in the collective memory of the Cultural Revolution. The application of this insight is somewhat ambiguous, however. The discussion of how the Cultural Revolution and the sent-down experience affected the young reformers, for example, is not explicit enough about whether it was the experience or the interpretation of it that produced the influences.

The author also argues that a generational consciousness influences action when it is given expression through powerful symbols. She suggests that two symbols were particularly important expressions of the collective consciousness of the Chinese young reformers. The label "economics worker" (as opposed to "political") provided political legitimacy at a time when open discussions of political reform were off limits. The symbol of "youth," an archetypal symbol of rejuvenation in modern China, legitimized a search for change.

After looking at the actors, Keyser examines the birth and growth of SRI in its interactions with the institutional environment. Chapter 3 shows how informal discussion groups in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as well as a successful meeting in 1984, helped to push the young reformers to the forefront of reform policy formulation. SRI was subsequently established as an organizational base for the young reformers to produce reform ideas for the government. Chapter 4 argues that SRI achieved substantial autonomy but also faced many bureaucratic barriers because it was a government-sponsored organization. As Chapter 5 goes on to show, an organization that sought to be both governmental and non-governmental was not viable. The tension built into SRI from its very inception was not only not resolved, but led to internal divisions such that had SRI been able to pursue its independence (instead of being closed after 1989), "it might have divided into separate organizations" (p. 118). SRI's short-lived success, Keyser argues, was due to "its ability to manipulate an ambiguous institutional environment to expand its scope" and maneuver "within a framework of intraparty struggle for reform orientation" (p. 118).

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Catherine Keyser devotes the last substantial chapter to a discussion of the "nongovernmental craze" (*minjian re*) in the 1990s. By comparing SRI and the Unirule Economic Research Institute (*Beijing tianze jingji yanjiusuo*), she argues insightfully that "The focus of the 1980s on getting within to gain autonomy was replaced in the 1990s by a focus on struggling to remain outside to claim autonomy" (p. 119). She shows equally well that Unirule faces its own challenges in trying to stay outside the system.

Where, then, might the new "nongovernmental" organizations of the 1990s be heading, given the new challenges they face as entities outside the system and the historical lessons of SRI? A central message in Catherine Keyser's story suggests some clues, for her story shows in fine detail how contradictory, yet understandable, the Chinese struggles for institutional change have been, how far these struggles have come, and how uncertain, and yet full of opportunities, the process continues to be.

GUOBIN YANG
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Creating Spaniards: Culture and National Identity in Republican Spain
by Sandie Holguín. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 2002. 304 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $21.95.

This is a solid study of the cultural programs of the Spanish Second Republic, 1931–1939. Officials who supported the cultural projects believed that they could "rescue Spain from its sickly status as a third-rate power" (p. 5) and foster national unity in a country rent by a lack of cultural and economic integration. The author places her findings on Spanish nationalism (or rather the lack of it) in the context of theories of nationalism and of other cultural "revolutions," such as the Soviet and Mexican.

Holguín begins by tracing the nineteenth-century roots of the liberal cultural project of the Second Republic, in which she finds in a peculiarly Spanish reform movement called Krausism, a blend of Enlightenment reasoning with German idealist philosophy. Krausism helped introduce political and intellectual liberalism into a Spain still dominated by the Catholic church and a semi-feudal ruling elite. She ably shows how Krausism influenced the cultural reformers of the 1930s.

The advent of the Second Republic provided an opportunity for Republican and Socialist reformers to establish Pedagogic Missions that ventured from the capital to civilize backward and illiterate Spaniards. Instructive maps demonstrate missionaries' concentration on mountain villages in Castile and León while other provinces were largely ignored. Reflecting the vitality of theater in Spanish popular and elite culture, staging plays became one of missionaries' most important activities. Holguín quite rightly points out how both the Left and Right wanted to create community through theater. The author acutely

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notes that Federico García Lorca, one of the most famous missionaries, realized that "in some strange way, the modern drama had to re-create the passion of the Mass before it could move the masses" (p. 105).

Cultural reformers identified theater with tradition, but saw film as the future. Holguín succinctly traces the history of cinema in Spain and attributes its slow development to unenterprising capitalists overly influenced by the Church. The author argues that liberal reformers missed an opportunity to employ film to consolidate the Republic. The moderate Left, which dominated the early years of the Republic, rejected Soviet films because it desired an evolutionary, not revolutionary, transformation of Spain. Of course, the Right was even more critical of Soviet productions, but one of its thinkers, Ernesto Giménez Caballero, sought to use film to launch a revived Catholic state.

Spain's high illiteracy rate—32 percent in 1930—attracted reformers' attention. The Republic initiated programs designed to reduce both rural illiteracy and the influence of the church. These campaigns aroused the hostility of clericals, some of whom argued that the poor were better off ignorant. Another source of opposition came from Catalan nationalists, who wanted literacy for the masses, but this literacy was to be Catalan, not Castilian. The outbreak of civil war in 1936 interrupted educational programs, but military mobilization provided an opportunity for Republicans—now allied with communists and anarchists, if not dominated by them—to instruct and propagandize the troops. Soviet films, radical theater, and a Spanish style of socialist realism supposedly inspired soldiers and civilians in the republican zone.

I have only a few, largely minor, reservations. The author may exaggerate the importance of the cultural struggle between Left and Right: "It is perhaps this failure of any one group to achieve cultural hegemony that resulted in the Spanish Civil War" (p. 9). Yet, an examination of culture (unless it means almost everything) cannot comprise the political and social violence that more directly contributed to the outbreak of the war. Also, a deeper analysis of Spanish society (as opposed to its educational institutions) might have increased understanding of cultural backwardness. Finally, the parliamentarians mentioned often remain unidentified.

Nevertheless, Holguín has made a fine contribution to the study of the Second Republic. Beautiful photos of the activities of the missionaries and of the joyful reactions of their small-town audiences gracefully complement her fluid prose.

MICHAEL SEIDMAN
University of North Carolina–Wilmington

Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power *edited by Thomas Callaghy, Ronald Kassimir, and Robert Latham. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2002. 336 pp. Cloth, $70.00; paper, $25.00.*

Given the complexity of Africa's inter-group relations, it is not surprising that analysts have become dissatisfied with conventional approaches to understand-

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ing the networks of power. Thus, the authors of the articles in this volume deem a focus on state-society interactions to be insufficient, in part because it pays inadequate attention to the international variable. Also, they question the standard distinction between domestic and inter-state relations on the grounds of rigidity; as Michael Barnett notes, the "bundling [of state, authority, and territory] makes it more difficult to understand complex global relationships and processes that defy and flirt with the neat boundaries between the systemic and the domestic, and recent contributions that unbundled these concepts and thus generate new insights into the organization and practice of global politics" (p. 48).

In this innovative book, the authors go beyond traditional conceptual frameworks to focus on what they describe as "transboundary formations." They adopt a holistic approach that seeks to overcome the separation between local, state, and international forces, thereby giving a full understanding to the various types of interactions in play. Janet Roitman, for example, writing about politics in the Chad Basin, comments that sovereign status as an "unqualified" form of unity is not relevant in this context; rather its place is taken by the "new configurations of power" that mark the reality on this scene (p. 262).

Not surprisingly, a study of the new configurations of power leads the various authors to scrutinize the different forms of international intervention taking place in Africa. To mention some of the substantive explorations, Frederick Cooper looks to the historical record on slavery to show the dichotomy of global and local to be inadequate in terms of the transnational linkages at work; Ronald Kassimir analyzes the ties between international organizations and African civil society; Thomas Callaghy probes the interconnecting institutions of the international debt regime, the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) principled-issue networks on debt, and the epistemic community; Hans Peter Schmitz discusses networking in the human rights arena; Cyril Obi explores the intersections of local, state, and international interests in Nigeria's Niger Delta; and, in separate chapters, William Reno, Carolyn Nordstrom, and Janet Roitman consider the various paradoxes of state sovereignty and anarchy.

Certainly, this volume tells us much about intricate sets of interactions that can prove constructive or destructive in terms of stable and productive relations. Despite its originality and contribution to our knowledge, it nonetheless leaves this reader wishing for more. For one thing, it would have helped if the authors had gone beyond describing transnational linkages to do the hard work of developing an overarching theory of the process at work. The descriptions of transboundary formations are useful, but the causal mechanisms and impacts could be examined more systematically. Further, I am left wondering why the important linkages between diaspora communities and local interests are not explored more fully; and finally, I felt a lack of focus at times on the central issue of transnational linkages. Why, for example, does a chapter on Kenya's transboundary formations include the whole history of its struggle for democratic rights? None of these factors should detract from my conclusion that this is a most useful and important volume, however. *Intervention and*

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Transnationalism in Africa brings original insights to bear on real world connections that have important consequences for African politics and international relations. The volume represents a significant contribution to the ongoing dialogue on these issues.

DONALD ROTHCHILD
University of California, Davis

REFERENCE BOOKS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST

The United States Executive Branch: A Biographical Directory of Heads of State and Cabinet Officials *edited by Robert Sobel and David B. Scilia. 2 vols. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003. 698 pp. $150.00.*

Encyclopedia of Tariffs and Trade in U.S. History *edited by Cynthia Clark Northrup and Elaine C. Prange Turney. 3 vols. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003. 1,631 pp. $299.95.*

Talking Terrorism: A Dictionary of the Loaded Language of Political Violence *by Philip Herbst. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003. 220 pp. $49.95.*

The Disputed Presidential Election of 2000: A History and Reference Guide *by Edwin D. Dover. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003. 192 pp. $45.00.*

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Political Science Quarterly

Volume 118
2003

Editor
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

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



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



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

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







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

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